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Every thought involves a whole system of thoughts, 
and ceases to exist if severed from its various correla­
tives. As we cannot isolate a single organ of a living 
body and deal with it as though it had a life indepen­
dent of the rest; so from the organized structure of our 
cognitions, we cannot cut one, and proceed as though 
it had survived the separation. 
Herbert Spencer, First Principles 
MAKING IT WHOLE

A Victorian Circle and the

Shape of Their World

Diana Postlethwaite

OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS : COLUMBUS 
J, JKJ 
Copyright © 1984 by the Ohio State University Press

All Rights Reserved.

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data 
Postlethwaite, Diana, 1950— 
Making it whole. 
Includes bibliographies and index. 
1. English literature—19th century—History and criticism. 2. Philosophy, British— 
19th century. 3. Philosophy in literature. 4. Great Britain—Intellectual life—19th 
century. 5. Eliot, George, 1819-1880. Middlemarch. I. Title. 
PR469.P45P67 1985 820'.9'008 84-20677 
Cloth: ISBN 0-8142-0372-8 
Paper: ISBN 0-8142-0401-5 
FOR MY FATHER 
R. Deane Postlethwaite (1925-1980) 

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments ix 
Preface xi 
Prelude. Polarities: Samuel Taylor Coleridge's Theory of Life 
(1817-1818) as Victorian Cosmology 2 
CHAPTER ONE
Comte
 Foundations: John Stuart Mill and Auguste 
 24 
I. Universal Causation—John Stuart Mill: A System 
of Logic (1843) 25 II. The Positive Plan—Au­
guste Comte: Cours de philosophie positive (1830­
1842) 39 
CHAPTER TWO Applied Science—Phrenology and Evolu­
tion: George Combe and Robert Chambers
I. A "Positive Psychology" 59 II. The Third 
Apostle and His Two Gospels—George Combe: The 
Constitution of Man in Relation to External Objects 
(1835) 71 III. More Than Metaphor: Phrenol­
ogy as Mental Geology 83 IV. "One Majestic 
Whole"—Robert Chambers: Vestiges of the Natural 
History of Creation (1844) 91 
 58 
CHAPTER THREE New Faiths—The Philosophy of Neces­
sity, "Force," and Mesmerism: Charles Bray and 
Harriet Martineau
I. Necessity: Victorian Headaches and Eighteenth-
Century Optimism 111 II. The Rational Roman­
tic—Charles Bray: The Philosophy of Necessity: or, the 
Law of Consequences; as Applicable to Mental, Moral, and 
Social Science (1841) 122 III. Mind Over Matter: 
 110 
 164 
"Force" and the Mesmeric Mania 132 IV. Mate­
rialism and Spiritualism—Harriet Martineau and 
Henry George Atkinson: Letters on the Laws of Man's 
Nature and Development (1851) 141 
CHAPTER FOUR Synthetic Philosophy: George Henry Lewes 
and Herbert Spencer
I. The Heart and the Brain—George Henry Lewes: 
"Spinoza's Life and Works" (1843) 165 II. The 
Foundations of a Friendship—Herbert Spencer: So­
cial Statics (1851) 178 III. Statics and Dynamics— 
Transcendental Anatomy and the Development 
Hypothesis—Spencer and Lewes: Essays, 1851­
1857 190 IV. Life and Mind—Herbert Spencer: 
The Principles of Psychology (1855) 201 V. The 
Knowable and the Unknowable—Herbert Spencer: 
"Progress: Its Law and Cause" (1857) 210 
Finale. "The Many in the One, the One in the Many": 
George Eliot's Middlemarch (1871-1872) as Victorian 
Cosmology
I. Borthrop Trumbull's Auction 233 II. A Vic­
torian Sensibility: the Poetry of the Real 237 III. 
Building a Novel: the Part and the Whole 246 
 232 
Bibliography 267 
Index 275 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Although this book is the product of a long evolutionary 
process, its origin can be dated with certainty to the day a de­
cade ago that I left a warehouse sale at the Yale University 
Press, happily burdened with seven blue-covered volumes: 
Gordon Haight's edition of The George Eliot Letters. Free 
from library due dates, I indulged in the luxury of reading 
them from cover to cover. It was therein that I met the members 
of this Victorian circle, and began to sense the rich interrela­
tionships of their world. In the Letters and in his biography, 
Professor Haight first gave us the historical George Eliot; his 
meticulous scholarship has been a continuing inspiration to 
me. If Gordon Haight introduced me to the facts, J. Hillis 
Miller introduced me to the theories. My gratitude to him for 
stimulating my interest in the Victorians, and for his support 
and advice in my early researches. 
Thanks are also due to Elisabeth Helsinger for her helpful 
reading of the manuscript, and to Robert Richards for encour­
agement at a crucial juncture. My greatest academic debt is un­
questionably to my students. As I have taught them, they have 
taught me; time and time again, they have sustained me emo­
tionally as well as challenged me intellectually. Among so 
many, I must single out Meri-Jane Rochelson Mintz, Jim Har­
baugh, Evy Asch, Bill Kuhn, Sharon Walsh, and Dan Whit-
more. I wish I could name them all. 
The love, strength, and faith of my husband, Paul Thibou­
tot, have been the gift of grace that made it whole. 

PREFACE 
In the Victorian age, the humanist and the scientist still 
spoke a common language. A logician could read contempo­
rary poetry; a novelist could debate the latest development in 
evolutionary theory. The increasingly alienated discourses of 
the twentieth century have created an intellectual climate that 
mediates against an accurate reflection of the Victorians. To­
day, the literary critic and the historian of ideas often move in 
different worlds; the investigator of popular culture may be 
given short shrift by the more traditional historian of the pe­
riod; science and literature share little common ground. This 
study attempts to bridge some of these distances, and to achieve 
a most Victorian ambition: to make it whole. 
The pages that follow will depict a Victorian circle whose 
members are drawn from a diverse range of intellectual voca­
tions: John Stuart Mill and Auguste Comte; George Combe 
and Robert Chambers; Charles Bray and Harriet Martineau; 
George Henry Lewes and Herbert Spencer; George Eliot. They 
number among them respected scholars and inflamed ideo­
logues, novelists and philosophers of science; men of letters, 
renegade industrialists, and bluestockings. They are not the 
Bloomsbury group or the Cambridge Platonists; neither a cozy 
biographical circle of intimate friends nor a united band of sec­
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tarian disciples. Yet the biographical interrelationships 
among them are intricate and important. In some cases they 
were drawn together by friendship or love; in all cases they 
were bound by a shared set of beliefs. As their circle takes shape 
in these pages, it encompasses a vision distinctively Victorian. 
What ultimately unites these thinkers is a Victorian frame of 
mind. 
George Eliot's heroine Dorothea Brooke finds herself amidst 
a prototypical Victorian cosmos: "Her world was in a state of 
convulsive change."1 Jerome Buckley opened his study of The 
Victorian Temper with the assertion that "the Victorian pe­
riod achieved little of the stability we have learned to associate 
with a semi-mythical classical culture. It moved from form to 
form, and nothing stood. Almost every Victorian thesis pro­
duced its own antithesis, as a ceaseless dialectic worked out its 
designs."2 Although stability may have eluded the collective 
sensibility of what John Stuart Mill characterized as an "age of 
transition," individual Victorians of widely-varied persua­
sions strove arduously for the third term of that great nine­
teenth-century dialectic: synthesis. Transition points toward 
resolution. The "transitional period" of "weak convictions, 
paralysed intellects, and growing laxity of principle" will ter­
minate in a "renovation . .  . in the basis of . .  . belief, lead­
ing to the evolution of some faith, whether religious or merely 
human, which they can really believe."' 
Mill's words are apt: all of these Victorians had faith in evo­
lution, and all of them evolved new faiths—hardly orthodox, 
yet more than "merely human." Walter Houghton draws at­
tention to the note of Evangelical fervor that can be heard in 
the new rationalist affirmations of faith: "Though for them 
the revelation was not religious but scientific, the same note of 
joy, part relief, part excited hope of discovering a new philos­
ophy of man and the universe, is found among the rational­
ists."1 It could be said of the Victorians in this circle that the 
revelation was both religious and scientific. Intellectually, the 
men and women in my circle are the heirs of British empiri­
cism, sons and daughters of Francis Bacon and John Locke, 
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eighteenth-century rationalism and association psychology. 
Yet they are fascinated by the unknowable, the intuitive, the 
transcendent. They did not consider the material and the spir­
itual irredeemably alienated. Although none were orthodox 
believers (and all were, in varying degrees, denounced as spir­
itually subversive by their critics), every member of this circle 
believed, ardently and unwaveringly, in a via media. For them, 
to explore the mechanisms of the human brain or the progres­
sive development of the natural world was not to deny man's 
moral and spiritual nature. Although their efforts to conciliate 
science and faith are not always persuasive, they are unerringly 
sincere. 
This intellectual temperament had its roots in romantic pre­
cursors of the preceding generation. In his survey of the tran­
sition From Classic to Romantic, Walter Jackson Bate argued 
that "nothing is more characteristic of British thought as a 
whole than its simultaneous confidence, not only in the em­
pirically concrete, but also in an almost intuitional absorption 
of the experience of concrete phenomena, and in the exclusive 
working of that intuition through the empirically known."5 
Bate's work provided a lively formulation of an intriguing par­
adox: the romantic emphasis on feeling and imagination was 
a product of the mechanistic eighteenth-century psychology of 
Locke and Hartley. M. H. Abrams elaborated on these truths 
in The Mirror and the Lamp: "[Although] almost all the im­
portant romantic theorists commented on the disparity be­
tween imagination and scientific perception. . .  . It is im­
portant to realize . . . that by far the greater number refused 
to admit that there is any inherent and inescapable conflict be­
tween science and poetry. . . . The most common procedure 
was to regard these, when properly employed, as parallel and 
complementary ways of seeing."6 But typically, critics of the 
Victorian period have failed to recognize the continuity of this 
romantic sensibility into subsequent decades. Abrams himself 
belies the subtlety of his previous analysis in his desire for a 
tidy ending to both the romantic period and to his book: "It 
was only in the early Victorian period, when all discourse was 
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explicitly or tacitly thrown into the two exhaustive modes of 
imaginative and rational, expressive and assertive, that reli­
gion fell together with poetry in opposition to science."7 In an 
essay on "Moral Problems and Moral Philosophy in the Vic­
torian Period," Jerome B. Schneewind defined these two 
modes in terms of the Utilitarian and Intuitionist schools of 
thought, and traced their conflict from Bentham's Introduc­
tion to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1781) to 
Henry Sidgwick's Methods of Ethics (1874) and F. H. Bradley's 
Ethical Studies (1876). Schneewind's essay provided a useful 
corrective: it revealed that there was a native British intuition­
ist school in the Victorian period, previously neglected by most 
historians of ideas.8 Just as Bate and Abrams revised the ster­
eotype of the emotive, romantic cloud-poet, so Schneewind re­
fined too-exclusive notions of a Gradgrindian Victorian rea­
soning-machine. But Schneewind's polarization of these two 
schools denies the nature of Bate's characteristically British 
bedfellows. Similarly, a recent study of the period titles the col­
lision of the utilitarian / rationalist / empiricist and the intui­
tionist / idealist / mystic an "omnipresent debate," and con­
cludes that any attempt at synthesis was doomed: "The 
premises are irreconcilable."9 
But even a brief survey of some classic works of the Victorian 
period reveals persuasive and powerful urges toward the syn­
thesis of opposing tendencies. John Henry Newman might at 
first seem an unlikely prototype for a Victorian synthesist. 
Newman's Apologia Pro Vita Sua chronicles the cardinal's ill-
fated search for a via media, in the course of which he was to 
"receive a shock which was to cast out of [his] imagination all 
middle courses and compromises forever." His gradual jour­
ney across the slippery ice of church doctrine led him to the 
shore of dogmatic certitude, from which no return was possi­
ble and across which no bridge could be built. "There are two 
alternatives, the way to Rome and the way to Atheism."10 Yet 
in his preface, Newman begs for "acquittal" from his fellow 
countrymen, on the charges of misplaced allegiance to mother 
Rome: "I had rather be an Englishman, (as in fact I am), than 
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belong to any other race under heaven." Newman's professed 
Englishness lends significant overtones to his later description 
of Hurrell Froude: "He had a keen insight into abstract truth; 
but he was an Englishman to the backbone in his severe adher­
ence to the real and the concrete." Newman himself was given 
intuitions of the transcendent in abundance. But he must be an 
English Roman Catholic: "I determined to be guided, not by 
my imagination, but by my reason. . . . Had it not been for 
this severe resolve, I should have been a Catholic sooner than I 
was."" Newman thus paradoxically reaches reason-defying 
dogma by a logically-argued and scrupulously-documented 
empirical record of that progress toward faith. 
In the realm of fiction, Charles Dickens's Hard Times also 
articulates thesis and antithesis. The world of "facts and cal­
culations," in which Gradgrindian utilitarian philosophers 
"weigh and measure any parcel of human nature," stands in 
desolate alienation from the fantasies and hyperbolic heroics 
of Sleary's Horse-riding. The materialistic men of fact and the 
equestrian imaginists quite literally do not speak the same lan­
guage: Gradgrind's gramniverous quadruped and E. W. B. 
Childers's "tight-Jeff" and "slack-Jeff" exist in different lin­
guistic universes. Yet the feckless world of Sleary's, in which 
father deserts child, is hardly a desirable alternative to the ra­
tionalist rigidities that entrap the infant soul. Sissy Jupe leaves 
the circus and comes to live with the Gradgrinds. Her "happy 
children" will be nurtured with "imaginative graces and de­
lights"—but they must also live "lives of machinery and real­
ity."12 
The Victorian poet, too, sought synthesis in a world of an­
tinomies. Alfred Tennyson himself insisted that In Memoriam 
incarnated a Victorian sensibility: " T is not always the author 
speaking of himself, but the voice of the human race speaking 
through him."" The assertive optimism of the poem's "Pro­
logue" (actually written last), "Believing where we cannot 
prove," is persistently undercut by the "wild and wandering 
cries" of the 131 lyrics that follow.14 Tennyson's affirmations 
are inextricably intertwined with his deepest doubts. 
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The contemporary ideas that dominate the poet's reflections 
are among the central intellectual issues of the Victorian pe­
riod. Tennyson's religious quest for belief in immortality, 
prompted by Arthur Hallam's untimely death, seems in direct 
conflict with the new materialist psychology which would ar­
gue that the essence of human nature is not soul, but merely 
matter: 
I trust I have not wasted breath: 
I think we are not wholly brain, 
Magnetic mockeries; not in vain, 
Like Paul with beasts, I fought with Death; 
Not only cunning casts in clay: 
Let Science prove we are, and then 
What matter Science unto men, 
At least to me? I would not stay. 
Let him, the wiser man who springs 
Hereafter, up from childhood shape 
His action like the greater ape, 
But I was born to other things. 
[Lyric 120] 
The nebular hypothesis claimed that the earth was a product 
of "seeming-random forms" and "cyclic storms" (Lyric 118,11. 
9, 10) rather than divine fiat. Was man's appearance on the 
natural scene equally random? Tennyson's nightmares are 
haunted by "Nature, red in tooth and claw" (Lyric 56, 1. 15). 
But ultimately it is evolution itself, translated into spiritual 
terms, that may provide the key to man's transcendence of the 
material: 
Arise and fly 
The reeling Faun, the sensual feast; 
Move upward, working out the beast, 
And let the ape and tiger die. 
[Lyric 118,11. 25-28] 
Tennyson finds further resolution in poetic form. The abba 
In Memoriam stanza skilfully brackets and unites the "fe's" of 
doubt with the "a's" of affirmation: 
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Thou wilt not leave us in the dust: 
Thou madest man, he knows not why, 
He thinks he was not made to die, 
And thou has made him: thou art just. 
[Prologue, 11. 9-12] 
Its elegant order and unerring constancy synthesizes the vast 
range of Tennyson's contrary ideas and emotions over time 
and space. The In Memoriam stanza is to Tennyson's poetry 
what Darwin's theory of natural selection was to nature: a de­
ceptively simple monistic principle that unifies variety yet al­
lows for infinite variation within that fundamental unity. 
The Victorian thinkers in the pages to follow address them­
selves in prose to many of the same contemporary issues as 
Tennyson: the new materialist psychology; the evolutionary 
formation of the cosmos, in which man takes his place as a 
member of the animal kingdom in the great chain of being. 
Although in many other respects their interests were far-
removed from those of Newman, Dickens, and Tennyson, they 
share—and indeed, epitomize—the Victorian frame of mind 
that seeks a synthesis of the empirical and the intuitive, head 
and heart. Newman had Catholic dogma; Dickens, the fantasy-
making imagination; Tennyson, poetic form. Like them, the 
Victorians in my circle seek a monistic principle that will order 
the universe, yoke the multiplicitous particular with the nu­
minous general. 
Although they share many general concerns of the age, I be­
lieve that these Victorians can justly be called a "circle." What 
distinguishes them? They also share a common background 
and a common set of ideologies. Too often, historians of ideas 
are content to account for recurrent ideas by invoking a nebu­
lous "in the air." The biographical portions of my study doc­
ument the direct links by which ideas were transmitted among 
them. My intellectual history will document that those ideas 
share a common lineage as well. 
In his classic History of the English People in the Nine­
teenth Century, Elie Halevy argued that Evangelicalism and 
Utilitarianism were the seminal forces of the Victorian age. 
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When Halevy asked, "Was Utilitarianism in 1815 a growing 
force, Evangelicalism on the verge of decline?" his answer pro­
vided him with "the fundamental paradox of English society": 
"the partial junction and combination of these two forces the­
oretically so hostile." This paradox became the thesis of his 
study: "The Methodist revival . . . was after all less unfavor­
able to the scientific spirit than would appear at first sight"; in 
fact, "the emotional piety of Evangelical religion and the hun­
ger for experimental knowledge developed at the same time, 
with the same intensity, and in the same social milieu."15 Hal­
evy 's milieu is precisely that of this Victorian circle: the new 
industrial cities to the north of London, steeped in noncon­
formity—the England of provincial philanthropist George 
Combe, heir to Scotch Presbyterian Calvinism; of Herbert 
Spencer, offspring of the hosiery towns of the north Midlands, 
with an ancestry of Methodism and Quaker-Socinian ration­
alism; of George Eliot, who moved with relative ease from the 
Evangelical pieties of her girlhood to the Biblical rationalism 
and scientific enthusiasms of Charles Bray and his Coventry 
circle in the early 1840s. When they left the provinces for a 
broader intellectual arena, all carried with them the emotional 
fervor of that Evangelical heritage, combined with the utilitar­
ian spirit. 
Certain ideologies recur like leitmotifs throughout all their 
work: positivism, phrenology, the pre-Darwinian develop­
ment hypothesis, necessitarianism, "force." It will be the cen­
tral task of my study to delineate the common denominators 
among this panorama of systems. They occur abundantly on a 
literal level. For example, phrenology provided Auguste 
Comte with the epitome of his positivist goals: the application 
of scientific method to the realm of psychology, previously the 
province of philosophers and theologians. But in larger terms, 
I am interested in the shape of this Victorian universe, the 
shared cosmology implicit in positivism, necessitarianism, ev­
olutionary theory. 
The shape of my study, like that of the ideologies it investi­
gates, will often of necessity be circular; for many of the ideas 
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I discuss were held simultaneously rather than discovered se­
quentially. The linear structure of this book must thus be to 
some extent an artificial one. The nine Victorians in this circle 
defy simple categorization. In many ways each of them ad­
dresses all of the major themes of the study. They will visit each 
other's chapters frequently. All were prolific writers; in most 
cases I limit myself to a representative major text within the 
historical period during which their common ideas came to 
fruition. 
After introducing Coleridge's Theory of Life as a romantic 
prelude to central Victorian themes, I begin with the founda­
tions, or methodological assumptions, shared by this group, 
as epitomized in Mill and Comte. I then trace two different ap­
plications of this methodology: in natural science (Combe's 
phrenology and Chambers's evolutionary theory); and in mat­
ters of belief, philosophical and religious (Bray's necessitari­
anism and Martineau's mesmerism). Lewes and Spencer are, as 
Spencer would have phrased it, the ultimate "synthetic philos­
ophers"; within the distinctive terms of their shared interests, 
their work draws upon and shapes all of the ideas, explicit and 
implicit, in preceding chapters. My "Finale" is intended to 
suggest that the ideologies that animate abstract philosophical 
debate can be given vivid incarnation in fictional form. This 
Victorian frame of mind was most fortunate in having George 
Eliot as its literary genius. 
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PRELUDE 
Polarities: Samuel Taylor Coleridge's 
Theory of Life (1817-1818) 
as Victorian Cosmology 
Contemplations of nature and of bodies in their simple form 
break up and distract the understanding, while contempla­
tions of nature and bodies in their composition and configu­
ration overpower and dissolve the understanding: a distinction 
well seen in the school of Leucippus and Democritus as com­
pared with the other philosophies. For that school is so busied 
with the particles that it hardly attends to the structure; while 
the others are so lost in admiration of the structure that they 
do not penetrate to the simplicity of nature. These kinds of 
contemplation should therefore be alternated and taken by 
turns; that so the understanding may be rendered at once pen­
etrating and comprehensive.—Bacon, Novum Organum 
Party is Nature too, and you shall see

By force of Logic how they both agree:

The Many in the One, the One in the Many;

All is not Some, nor Some the same as Any:

Genus holds species, both are great or small:

One genus highest, one not high at all:

Each species has its differentia too,

This is not That, and it was never You,

Though this and that are AYES, and you and he,

Are like as one to one, or three to three.—George Eliot, epi­

graph to chapter 51, Middlemarch

"The only Wisdom is that of Ideas, their correlatives (Laws) 
being the only important things in the Universe," George 
Henry Lewes noted in the margin of his copy of Coleridge's 
"Essays on Method" in The Friend.* Lewes could not have 
been more in agreement with Coleridge himself, who wrote in 
his notebooks of "the incalculable Value of Ideas . . . in all 
departments of Knowledge . .  . to the Naturalist no less than 
to the Theologian, to the Statesman no less than to the Mor­
alist—in Philosophy, in Organology, in Psychology, as 
subjective, and in physiological Anatomy as Objective, Ana­
lytique, in Chemistry as the constructive Science de Minimis 
and Astronomy as the correspondent science de Maximis."2 In 
this vision of the whole, embracing science and religion, sub­
ject and object, analysis and synthesis, the smallest molecule 
("de Minimis") and the entirety of the cosmos ("de Maximis"), 
Coleridge provides a characteristically proleptic vantage point 
on a monistic Victorian Zeitgeist. Whether "subjective" or 
"objective," Coleridge's Ideas inhabit the realm of Platonic 
Absolutes. But Lewes wrote an 800-page Biographical History 
of Philosophy (1845-46) in order to disprove the validity of all 
metaphysics, proclaiming the inevitable demise of philosophy 
at the hands of positivism. He staunchly supported the funda­
mentals of British empiricism: "Modern philosophy stated its 
pretensions on the one question: Have we any ideas indepen­
dent of experience? . . . The answer always ends in a nega­
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tive."s Lewes may thus at first seem an unlikely champion of 
the Platonic Idea. It is of just such apparent contradictions that 
the stuff of my history is to be made. 
George Henry Lewes and the other thinkers to be introduced 
in these pages are heirs to the great tradition of British empiri­
cism and its progenitor Francis Bacon. Like Bacon, they found 
themselves in an exciting new age of scientific exploration: "It 
will be disgraceful if, while the regions of the material 
globe . . . have been in our times laid widely open and re­
vealed, the intellectual globe should remain shut up within the 
narrow limits of old discoveries."1 These Victorian Colum­
buses were to sail previously uncharted regions: the new sci­
ences of physiological psychology and evolutionary biology, 
realms intimately (and controversially) linked with a vision of 
human nature untrammelled by the orthodox identification of 
mind with spirit, or the creative Deity of Genesis. "How emi­
nently a scientific spirit is shown in Bacon's separation of Sci­
ence from Theology," Lewes writes in the Biographical His­
tory.5 To effect their scientific expeditions, they eagerly 
embraced the Baconian method, with its marriage of the em­
pirical and the rational. "A Method is the vital principle of all 
science," proclaims Lewes; "from Bacon [comes] the whole 
school of scientific men."6 Empirical tenets of observation and 
experience were ideally suited to the new Victorian view of 
man. In particular, the fascinating new science of physiologi­
cal psychology was to apply scientific method to the mind, 
previously exclusively the domain of philosophic introspec­
tion. In his "Analysis of the Mental Faculties," Charles Bray 
writes: "The more perfect becomes our analysis of the mental 
constitution . . . the more we become struck with the truth of 
Lord Bacon's celebrated aphorism, as the foundation of all rea­
soning, that 'Man can only understand and act in proportion 
as he observes the order of nature.' "7 Herbert Spencer concurs 
in his study of The Principles of Psychology: "It was not until 
Bacon lived, that the generalization of experience was erected 
into a method. Now, however . .  . all educated men are in a 
sense Bacon's disciples."8 
Bacon, argues Lewes, is "justly . . . entitled the Father of 
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Positive Science"; "his mind was antipathetic to all metaphy­
sics."9 But significantly, the nineteenth-century father of Pos­
itive Science, Auguste Comte, took issue with the Baconian 
method on a central point: "All good intellects have repeated, 
since Bacon's time, that there can be no real knowledge but 
that which is based on observed facts. This is incontesta­
ble . . . but . .  . it is equally true that facts cannot be ob­
served without the guidance of some theory. Without such 
guidance, our facts would be desultory and fruitless; we could 
not retain them: for the most part we could not even perceive 
them."10 Although the positivists would discard the order of 
conceptions provided by theology and metaphysics, their sys­
tem was founded upon a monistic cosmology that demanded 
an intuitive faith of its own. Lewes praises Bacon's conception 
of scientific method, but also points to what he considers a 
"radical defect": "its being inductive, and not also deduc­
tive."" Whether exploring the phrenological organs of the 
brain or the developmental hierarchy of the natural world, 
these Victorians unfailingly embraced the theoretical general­
ization as earnestly as the observed fact. They believed in the 
importance of reasoning both inductively from the many to the 
one, and deductively from the one to the many. If they are not 
purely metaphysical idealists, neither are they simply rational 
empiricists. 
Nineteenth-century thinkers would be surprised to discover 
that later academicians transformed them overnight from "Ro­
mantics" to "Victorians." The men and women in this study 
began to shape their ideas in the mid-1830s; the seeds of their 
synthesizing sensibility were sown within a romantic tradi­
tion. I have chosen Samuel Taylor Coleridge as the subject of 
my "Prelude" to this study of a Victorian world view, for he 
incarnates a frame of mind that has much in common with 
that of his Victorian descendents. Although the particular 
ideologies they espoused—such as positivism, or evolutionary 
theory—were distinctively Victorian, the sensibility brought to 
bear upon them within this circle owes much to romantic pre­
cursors. 
I will devote this introductory chapter to Coleridge's Hints 
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Towards the Formation of a More Comprehensive Theory of 
Life. From amidst Coleridge's considerable opus, the choice 
may seem idiosyncratic. It is not my intention to claim the 
Theory of Life as the simple source for a Victorian cosmology; 
many of its central ideas are also embodied in other romantic 
epistemologies, both German and English. But it so happens 
that this small, posthumous volume drew the attention of a 
number of thinkers in this Victorian circle. It thus provides a 
direct frame of reference for the discussions of individual 
thinkers that follow. In addition to introducing a characteris­
tic frame of mind, it serves as an example of the literal links of 
influence among these Victorians. The history of the Theory 
of Life among them offers a fascinating demonstration of the 
extent to which their world was a small one indeed. Ulti­
mately, I wish to examine not so much influence as conflu­
ence; to ask not what they learned from the Theory of Life, but 
why they were so attracted to it. 
Above all, Samuel Taylor Coleridge wanted to make it 
whole. "Is there no communion between the intellectual and 
the moral?" he asked, 
Are the distinctions of the schools separate in Nature? Is there no 
Heart in the Head? No Head in the Heart? Is it not possible to find 
a practical Reason, a Light of Life, a focal power from the union 
or harmonious composition of all Faculties? . . . then we shall 
have a Philosophy, that will unite in itself, the warmth of the mys­
tics, the definiteness of the Dialectician, and the sunny clearness 
of the Naturalist, the productivity of the Experimenter and the 
Evidence of the Mathematician.12 
The nineteenth century was endowed with boundless intellec­
tual energy, free from the snobbery of the specialist. In 1831 
Coleridge's hubris foreshadowed that of the system-making 
Victorians who would come after him: "My system . .  . is the 
only attempt I know, ever made to reduce all knowledges into 
harmony. It opposes no other system, but shows what was true 
in each. . .  . I have endeavoured to unite the insulated frag­
ments of truth."18 Unfortunately, Coleridge never wrote his 
"opus maximum," but his ambition "to reduce all knowledges 
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into harmony" was more than mere table talk. All of Cole-
ridge's later work can be read as versions of this unifying im­
pulse; none more so than the Theory of Life. 
Significantly, this little book was written around 1817-18,l4 
but published by Reverend Seth B. Watson for an enthusiastic 
Victorian audience in 1848. Its Victorian history provides a 
prototypical example of the direct intellectual links that 
bound this circle of thinkers. Before turning to Coleridge's the­
ory in some detail, I would like to trace its history among 
them. That history provides my first example of the character­
istic manner in which a shared frame of mind unites a diverse 
range of ideologies into a single cosmology. 
Herbert Spencer's Autobiography (1904) guaranteed that he 
would be remembered by posterity as not a little boorish in his 
unwillingness to acknowledge the wisdom of his predecessors: 
"I could not bear prolonged reading. . .  . It was as though 
my intellectual digestive system was comparatively small, and 
would not take in heavy meals. Possibly also the tendency 
then, as afterwards, towards independent thought, was rela­
tively so dominant that I soon became impatient of the process 
of taking in ideas set before me." The rich sauces of Kant's Cri­
tique of Pure Reason, for example, proved thoroughly indi­
gestible: "I commenced reading, but did not go far." The 
reader cannot but help be somewhat awed by Spencer's honesty 
(how many, after all, have really chewed and digested Kant?): 
"Being then, as always, an impatient reader . . . it has always 
been out of the question for me to go on reading a book the 
fundamental principles of which I entirely dissent from."15 
But Spencer's cantankerous disclaimers can be misleading if 
one draws the conclusion that he was impervious to the ideas 
of his times. The Autobiography also reveals that he read 
widely if not deeply in major thinkers of his century, and could 
respond positively to other men's ideas—when they were sim­
ilar enough to his own. Like a spider, web-spinning followed 
ingestion: "Material which would be taken in and organized, 
or re-organized, so as to form part of a coherent structure in 
course of elaboration, there was always a readiness to receive." 
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The structure, of course, was Spencer's own grand Synthetic 
Philosophy: "The fabric of my conclusions had in all cases to 
be developed from within—refusing to be built, and insisted 
on growing." One book proved remarkably congenial to his 
assimilation, woven inextricably into the web of his philoso­
phy for the decades to come: "I may have given attention to 
some serious books in 1849 and 50, though I do not remember 
it. One only which I looked into, left an impression. This was 
Coleridge's Idea of Life. . . . The doctrine of individuation 
struck me; and, as was presently shown, entered as a factor into 
my thinking."16 
The Theory of Life figured prominently in Spencer's first 
book, Social Statics (1850). Spencer turns Coleridge's defini­
tion of life to his own purposes, as Coleridge's "tendency to 
individuation" becomes the basis of Spencer's central thesis in 
that study: the "individuality of each" must be "unfolded 
without limit" in a free society.17 Spencer returned to the The­
ory of Life in his second book, The Principles of Psychology 
(1855), devoting an entire chapter of his "General Synthesis" 
to discussion of a "Proximate Definition of Life," along lines 
very similar to Coleridge's.18 In Social Statics Spencer had ap­
plied Coleridge's individuation to political economy, to but­
tress his own general attack on Utilitarianism, which he felt 
was reductive in its vision of the individual man as a mere cog 
in the great social machine. In The Principles of Psychology, 
Coleridge's individuation is transformed into a principle of ev­
olutionary biology: "Life is the tendency to individuation 
. .  . as illustrated by the facts of development, or by the con­
trasts between lower and higher forms of life."19 This transfor­
mation provides an example of the manner in which widely-
divergent academic disciplines take on common shape, unified 
by a Victorian sensibility. 
In the spring of 1850, Spencer met his lifelong friend, 
George Henry Lewes. That summer, the pair took frequent 
country rambles. Spencer claimed that Lewes attributed a new­
found interest in "scientific inquiries" to those excursions.20 
Though Lewes's interest in Coleridge dates back to the late 
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1830s or early 1840s,21 the Theory of Life enters his published 
work in the early years of his friendship with Spencer. In his 
essay on "Goethe as a Man of Science" in the Westminster Re­
view in 1852, we find him writing that "this law of Repetition, 
which is the first law of organic growth, must be coupled with 
another law distinctly announced by Goethe in a very remark­
able passage, and subsequently taken by Schelling and various 
other philosophers, including von Baer, whom Dr. Carpenter 
improperly credits with the discovery: the law we speak of is by 
Coleridge named the Law of Individuation."22 Characteristi­
cally, Lewes modestly traces an intellectual genealogy; Spencer 
engulfs and assimilates. Quite unlike his hubristic friend, 
Lewes was widely-read, attuned to every new idea, well-versed 
in the history of ideas, and remarkably content, during those 
early years, to transmit the ideas of others rather than originate 
his own (perhaps one basis of a long-lived friendship with the 
egomaniacal Spencer?). 
Yet just as Spencer could turn Coleridge to his own ends, so 
Lewes assimilated Coleridge's Theory of Life into preexisting 
concerns. The shared interests of the two men are again clear 
in Lewes's study of Comte's Philosophy of the Sciences (1853), 
as he digresses extensively from his explication of Comte's 
Cours de philosophic positive to discuss the "definition of 
life": 
In that very interesting posthumous essay by Coleridge, Hints To­
wards a More Comprehensive Theory of Life there is a definition 
which though not wholly unobjectionable, gives a point of view 
the student will find extremely useful if thoroughly appreciated— 
and the definition is this, "Life is the principle of individuation," 
or that power which discloses itself from within, combining many 
qualities into one individual thing. To appreciate this, however, 
it must be studied in the commentary.2* 
The commentary Lewes provides is that of Herbert Spencer, as 
Lewes then goes on to quote several pages of Social Statics on 
the Theory of Life. In Victorian hands Coleridge's theory ac­
commodates itself not only to political economy (in Social 
Statics) and the development hypothesis (in the Principles of 
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Psychology); but here, to positivism: "Although wandering 
from Comte by these remarks," Lewes concludes, "I am still 
keeping within the necessities of an exposition of the Positive 
Philosophy."21 
George Eliot met Herbert Spencer and George Henry Lewes 
in the fall of 1851; within the next two years, she was rumored 
to be engaged to Spencer, and fell in love with Lewes. It was 
Charles Bray and his wife Cara who had been Eliot's closest 
friends during the decade prior to those auspicious new ac­
quaintances. The intellectual hostilities between old and new 
friends began as early as 1854, when Bray defended phrenology 
against Lewes's attacks on the science in the Leader; the public 
debate climaxed with Bray's acrimonious counterattack on 
Lewes's second edition of the Biographical History (1857), in 
his own revised edition of The Philosophy of Necessity 
(1863).2f> Lewes always considered Bray on the dangerous meta­
physical fringe of scientific psychology. Bray himself admitted 
in his autobiography that he considered himself an idealist of 
sorts: "The two apparently diverse classes of phenomena, the 
mental and the physical, are only one. Mind is all, and all 
things are known to us only as they exist in our conscious­
ness."2" Although Lewes was sympathetic with many of the 
tenets of phrenology, Bray went entirely beyond the pale of 
Lewes's positivistic sensibilities with his book On Force, Its 
Mental and Moral Correlates; and on That Which is Supposed 
to Underlie All Phenomena; with Speculations on Spiritual­
ism, and other Abnormal Conditions of Mind (1866). Lewes's 
letter to his spouse's oldest friend was scathing: "While I sym­
pathize with the pleasure you must have felt in weaving these 
speculations, I cannot but regret that you should have wasted 
money in printing anything so crude, and am quite sure you 
will get no man of science to pay the slightest attention to it."27 
Bray's "force" is a reformulation of the vitalist theory that 
can be found in England as early as the first decade of the cen­
tury.28 Bray's pantheistic universe is ruled by a power variously 
appearing as "Light, Heat, Electricity, Galvanism, Chemical 
Affinity, Attraction and Repulsion," but all in reality "one 
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simple, primordial, absolute Force." Vitalism offered Bray a 
promised reconciliation of matter and spirit, a sort of spiritual 
physics. Force is an objectively quantifiable fact as well as an 
ethereal inspiration. Bray argues that once mind is "studied as 
all other forces are . . . then Metaphysics may take the place 
to which it is entitled at the head of all other Sciences."29 
Herein lay the seeds of a major development in nineteenth-cen­
tury thought, a psychology that would transform the way man 
regarded mind. 
Lewes's emphatically negative stand on metaphysics in the 
Biographical History would suggest little common ground be­
tween his philosophy and Bray's. But they share an intellectual 
genealogy. When reflecting on the genesis of On Force in his 
autobiography, Bray acknowledged his debt to James Hinton's 
essay on "Physiological Riddles" in the Cornhill Magazine 
(July-December 1860).so This little essay seemed to have caused 
quite a stir in the provinces: Sara Sophia Hennell, Bray's sis­
ter-in-law and a lifelong friend of George Eliot, wrote to Eliot 
to find out more about its author. "The writer of 'Physiolog­
ical Riddles' is a Mr. Hinton," she replied, "Our attention was 
first drawn to [him] by an article in the British and For[eign] 
Medical Review which struck Mr. Lewes as quite marvelously 
similar in style to Mr. Spencer's writings, and which Mr. Spen­
cer himself felt to be so alarmingly near to his own publica­
tions on Organic Form that he hastened to publish these in the 
same Review."1" And what was Mr. Hinton's "physiological 
riddle"?: no less than "What is Life?" His answer, 
that of Coleridge, who in his Essay towards the Formulation of a 
more Comprehensive Theory of Life . . . seems to have antici­
pated . . . almost the entire advance of physiological knowledge 
since his day. His idea is, that physical life is a process, or a mode 
of organization, of the same powers which we recognize under 
other names, as magnetism, electricity, or chemical affinity. 
. . . they are grouped in a special way, the various forms of ac­
tions being so united as to constitute, out of many parts, a mu­
tually dependent whole.12 
"Individuation": "that power which discloses itself from 
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within, combining many qualities into one individual thing," 
wrote Lewes; "so united as to constitute out of many parts, a 
mutually dependent whole," echoes Hinton. In Samuel Tay­
lor Coleridge's own words: 
The unity will be more intense in proportion as it constitutes each 
particular thing a whole of itself; and yet more again, in propor­
tion to the number and interdependence of the parts, which it 
unites as a whole. But a whole composed, ab intra, of different 
parts, so far interdependent that each is reciprocally means and 
end, is an individual, and the individuality is most intense where 
the greatest dependence of the parts on the whole is combined with 
the greatest dependence of the whole on its parts.™ 
We have no way of establishing exactly when George Eliot 
read the Theory of Life, or even that she read it at all; though 
the circumstantial evidence suggested by her proximity to 
Lewes, Spencer, and Bray, would make her knowledge of the 
work highly likely. But Eliot's essay on "Notes on Form in 
Art" affords suggestive evidence that she was familiar with 
Coleridge's theories. Thomas Pinney published this brief man­
uscript essay from a notebook dated 1868 for the first time in 
the Essays of George Eliot (1963). Therein, Eliot illustrates 
once again the way in which these Victorians embodied a di­
verse variety of content in a single form. 
The same principles that Lewes and Spencer adapted to po­
litical economy, evolutionary biology, and positivism, could 
also be transmuted into a formal aesthetic. Throughout this 
essay, George Eliot defines literary form in terms of biological 
metaphors: "The highest Form, then, is the highest organ­
ism." She does so in language that echoes unmistakably the 
cadence as well as the concepts of the Theory of Life. Compare, 
for example, the following passage from "Notes on Form" to 
the passage just cited above from the Theory of Life: 
And as knowledge continues to grow by its alternating processes 
of distinction & combination, seeing smaller & smaller unlike­
nesses & grouping or associating these under a common likeness, 
it arrives at the conception of whole composed of parts more & 
more multiplied & highly differenced, yet more & more absolutely 
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bound together by various conditions of common likeness or mu­
tual dependence. And the fullest example of such a whole is the 
highest example of Form: in other words, the relation of multi­
plex interdependent parts to a whole which is itself in the most 
varied & therefore the fullest relation to other wholes."'1 
I shall return to "Notes on Form" in the context of George 
Eliot's fiction at the conclusion of my study, when I discuss 
Middlemarch as a Victorian finale, at the opposite pole of the 
century from Coleridge's Theory of Life. This quintessentially 
Victorian literary masterpiece is in a number of ways a fic­
tional incarnation—both formally and ethically—of the Cole­
ridgean cosmology. 
But let us now look more closely at the Theory of Life itself, 
in order to explain its appeal to these Victorians. Coleridge 
writes: "I define life as the principle of individuation, or the 
power which unites a given all into a whole that is presup­
posed by all its parts. The link that combines the two, and acts 
through both, will of course, be defined by the tendency to in­
dividuation."*5 I begin by asking two questions suggested by 
the previous discussion: first, how does Coleridge arrive at "in­
dividuation" as his definition of life, and in what ways does 
this definition embody a characteristically British yoking of 
empiricism and intuition? Second, how is it that Coleridge's 
theory of life seems to adapt itself so readily to such apparently 
disparate subjects as social theory, evolutionary biology, and 
positivism on the one hand, and a quasi-mystical apprehen­
sion of pantheistic "force" on the other? 
It is important to note at the outset that individuation is only 
one of two key terms that recur throughout the Theory of Life; 
the other is polarity: "We are now to seek for the highest law, 
or most general form, under which this tendency [to individua­
tion] acts . . . what is its most general law? I answer—polar­
ity, or the essential dualism of Nature, arising out of its pro­
ductive unity."™ In a sense individuation is a misleading term; 
or rather, it is only half of the Coleridgean equation: individ­
uality is inseparable from unity, the part defines itself in terms 
of the whole. In his study of What Coleridge Thought (1971), 
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Owen Barfield draws extensively upon the Theory of Life as 
the key to the Coleridgean cosmos. In the course of his inves­
tigation, Barfield offers a crucial clarification of the unique 
and often misunderstood nature of Coleridgean polarity: 
Most of the much that has been written, in the last few decades, 
concerning the "reconciliation of opposites" in literature, and 
often with express reference to Coleridge as its putative father, be­
trays a lamentable failure to understand what "opposites" and 
their "reconciliation" actually signified in Coleridge's vocabu­
lary. . . . Polarity is dynamic, not abstract. It is not a "mere bal­
ance or compromise," but "a living and generative interpenetra­
tion." Where logical opposites are contradictory, polar opposites 
are generative of each other—and together generative of a new 
product.17 
Near the beginning of the Theory of Life, Coleridge offers a 
brief yet suggestive summary of the history of Western philos­
ophy of science. In the process two polar schools of scientific 
method emerge: one we might call, in Coleridge's own terms, 
"ontological"; the other, "Newtonian." The ontological 
school is historically prior, but still existent: "In the thirteenth 
century the first science which roused the intellects of men 
from the torpor of barbarism, was as in all countries ever has 
been, and ever must be the case, the science of Metaphysics and 
Ontology." This is a science in which spirit takes supremacy 
over matter, reason over observation: "Men continued to in­
voke the oracle of their own spirits. . . . All attempts at phil­
osophical explication were commenced by a mere effort of the 
understanding, as the power of abstraction; or by the imagi­
nation, transferring its own experiences to every object pre­
sented from without. . . . Thus physic became a sort of dull 
poetry." Four centuries later the "sublime discoveries" of Isaac 
Newton "placed the science of mechanism on the philosophic 
throne," as matter reigned supreme, giving "almost a religious 
sanction to the corpuscular system and mechanical theory. It 
became synonymous with philosophy itself. It was the sole 
portal at which truth was permitted to enter. The human body 
was treated of as an hydraulic machine." As in the Biographia 
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Literaria, with its attacks on Coleridge's early mentor, David 
Hartley, who combined Newtonian mechanics with Lockean 
psychology, it is clear from the Theory of Life that Coleridge, 
convinced of the "untenable nature of Materialism," is no 
Newtonian mechanist. But neither is he a spiritualist: "I dis­
tinctly disclaim all intention of explaining life into an occult 
quality."™ 
In the Theory of Life, Coleridge is seeking for a mediating 
position, one that combines "ontology" and "Newtoni­
anism." It is in his own time, Coleridge believes, that new 
scientific discoveries were providing the dynamic unification 
of those two polar opposites, a "living and generative inter­
penetration" of spirit and matter: "The discovery of electricity 
. . . has electrified the whole frame of natural philosophy. . . . 
Henceforward the new path, thus brilliantly opened, became 
the common road to all departments of knowledge."39 Electric­
ity offered Coleridge a model and a metaphor for a power that 
was simultaneously both matter and spirit, quantifiable and 
ethereal, observable yet invisible. But Coleridge does not be­
lieve that electricity equals life (though some scientists did); 
rather, that it provides a vital analogy: "Whether the powers 
which manifest themselves to us under certain conditions in 
the forms of electricity, or chemical attraction, have any anal­
ogy to the power which manifests itself in growth and organi­
zation, is altogether a different question." Ultimately, accord­
ing to Coleridge, we must only assume this power; the human 
mind cannot comprehend it. Thus the principle of organic life 
that is analogous to the inorganic electrical power can only be 
defined by reducing it "to its simplest and most comprehensive 
form or mode of attraction; that is, to some characteristic in­
stinct or tendency, evident in all its manifestations."10 
Yet as he continues to search for this tendency, Coleridge 
seems to suggest that the analogy between the power that rules 
the inorganic world and the organic world at some indefinable 
point becomes the identity of the two. Coleridge argues for a 
wider view, one that sees life evolving out of a "ladder" of mi­
nute gradations in the natural world: "This wider view . . . 
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fills up the arbitrary chasm between physics and physiology, 
and justifies us in using the former as means of insight into the 
latter, which would be contrary to all sound rules of ratioci­
nation if the powers working in the objects of the two sciences 
were absolutely and essentially diverse."11 
Thus Coleridge arrives at his definition of life: "The power 
which discloses itself from the principle of unity in the many"; 
"the principle of individuation, or the power which unites a 
given all into a whole.'"12 But one might question the exact role 
of this power in creating life. However enthusiastically Cole-
ridge may embrace the "physics" of nature, he remains an on­
tologist as well. Coleridge was a devout Christian at the time 
that the Theory of Life was written; but his theory contains no 
Butlerian analogies—Coleridge has virtually nothing to say 
about God here. In another sense the Theory of Life is about 
nothing but God, God active throughout the cosmos, embod­
ied in his creation, the One in the many, the immaterial prin­
ciple that unifies the material world.1* Yet it must be stressed 
that it is fundamentally untrue to Coleridge to deny that the 
Theory of Life is not equally "about" science, the Coleridgean 
polar opposite of God. 
"I cannot separate God from Nature," preaches pantheist 
Charles Bray in On Force, "our Priests must be one with our 
men of science, our Prophets are the Poets."11 Likewise, nei­
ther can we separate man from nature: "In Man the centripetal 
and individualizing tendency of all Nature is itself concentered 
and individualized—he is a revelation of Nature," proclaims 
Coleridge.45 Similarly, Spencer argues that man, at the apex of 
creation, represents the highest manifestation of individua­
tion: "By virtue of his complexity of structure, he is furthest 
removed from the inorganic world in which there is least in­
dividuality." But man's individuality is inseparable from his 
unity with all natural creation. Spencer continues: "Yet must 
this highest individuation be joined with the greatest mutual 
dependence. Paradoxical though the assertion looks, the prog­
ress is at once toward complete separateness and complete 
union."10 Spencer here echoes Coleridge, who writes: 
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In social and political life this acme is inter-dependence; in moral 
life it is independence, in intellectual life it is genius. Nor does the 
form of polarity, which has accompanied the law of individuation 
up its whole ascent, desert it here. As the height, so the depth. The 
intensities must be at once opposite and equal. As the liberty, so 
must be the reverence for law. As the independence, so must be the 
service and the submission to the Supreme Will!17 
Despite their differences of opinion, Charles Bray approvingly 
quotes George Henry Lewes's Biographical History of Philos­
ophy in On Force: "The simplest germination of a lichen is, if 
we apprehend it rightly, directly linked with the grandest as­
tronomical phenomena. . . . Plato had some forecast of this 
when he taught that the world was a great animal; and others, 
since Plato, when they considered the universe the manifesta­
tion of some transcendent life, with which every separate in­
dividual life was related, as parts are to a whole."18 
In the pages that follow, I will explore some of the practical 
implications of these starry generalizations for a circle of Vic­
torian thinkers, the ways in which Mill, Comte, Combe, 
Chambers, Martineau, though they may not have made direct 
reference to Coleridge's cosmology, share with Spencer, 
Lewes, Bray, and Eliot in a larger confluence of views. Auguste 
Comte organizes the universe into a hierarchy of sciences, from 
mathematics and astronomy up to biology and "social phys­
ics," claiming as his goal the representation of "all phenom­
ena as particular aspects of a single general fact."49 Once the 
"chasm between physics and physiology" has been bridged, 
the universality of causality and law established throughout 
the organic as well as the inorganic creation, the doors have 
been opened to a new scientific view of man. "The doctrine of 
the Correlation and Persistence of Forces," writes Bray, "gives 
us a Science of Psychology based on Physiology, by which 
alone we can attain to the same command over mind, as we 
already have over physical force."50 For this circle of Victori­
ans, phrenology embodied just such a would-be science of 
psychology: Combe, Chambers, Bray, and Martineau were 
lifelong believers; Eliot, Spencer, and Comte youthful advo­
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cates; Mill and Lewes offered qualified praise for the system. 
And the physiological psychologist who could view the cre­
ated world as a grand whole in which the mind of man was as 
much a part of nature as the "simplest germination of a li­
chen" or "the grandest astronomical phenomenon" was intel­
lectually prepared for the evolutionary theories that were to 
culminate with Darwin's Origin of Species. It was Robert 
Chambers's proclamation of the "development hypothesis" 
fifteen years prior to the Origin that made the grand synthesis. 
Through his close friendship with leading British phrenolo­
gist George Combe, phrenology taught Chambers how to 
unify physics and physiology, and he carried the analogy to 
the whole of the created universe, claiming that the same fun­
damental laws could be found at work everywhere, from the 
macrocosm of the formation of the solar system to the micro­
cosm of embryological growth. 
Harriet Martineau's Letters on the Laws of Man's Nature 
and Development continues these variations on the theme of 
"the true cosmical view of Nature": "All properties of matter 
are but various conditions of the same: . . . light, heat, elec­
tricity, magnetism, chemical affinity, &c, are convertible, or 
evolved one by the other." Martineau too provides evidence of 
the long shadow cast by Coleridge's Theory of Life over the 
Victorian age, when she asserts "the sense of variety in unity, 
and unity in variety; the whole in the parts, and the parts in 
the whole; all of one growth and origin . . . exhibiting the 
same law under various aspects, and all evolved . . . each 
symbolical of all, and all of each."51 
In my preface to this study, I suggested that this Victorian 
circle provides a case in point of a characteristically British in­
termingling of intuition and empiricism. Halevy's wedding of 
the evangelical and the utilitarian spirit can be reformulated 
in terms of the Coleridgean polarities of "ontology" and 
"Newtonianism," a view that imaginatively connects the parts 
within the vision of the whole, and one that reasons induc­
tively from the particulars of empirical observation. In the 
broadest sense, we might simply call these polarities religion 
and science. 
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With a few notable exceptions, the works of this group have 
not become classics of religious, scientific, or philosophic 
thought. As a result they have not been given their due by in­
tellectual historians. But I believe that the frame of mind they 
embody is highly significant for the history of ideas in nine­
teenth-century England. The conflict between religion and sci­
ence is a truism of Victorian intellectual history. Yet the bio­
graphies and writings of these men and women do not reveal a 
pattern of anguished conflict; but instead, offer repeated evi­
dence of genuinely optimistic conciliation, a true Coleridgean 
unification of polarities. 
In his otherwise splendid chapter on "Coleridge and the 
Cosmology of Science," Owen Barfield speaks incorrectly 
when he categorically claims a "major collision between 
[Coleridge's] cosmology and the cosmology of science." Bar-
field is certainly correct when he says that "if Coleridge is 
right, then for cognition . . . physical process cannot be iso­
lated from mental process, nor natural science from human 
and ethical psychology." ("Is there no communion between 
the intellectual and the moral? Are the distinctions of the 
schools separate in Nature? Is there no Heart in the Head? No 
Head in the Heart?" Coleridge asks.) Barfield's error comes 
from the vantage-point of disenchanted twentieth-century 
man, light-years away from any possibility of belief in a Cole­
ridgean synthesis of natural science and ethical psychology: 
"The contrary assumption is of course implicit today in every 
observation, every choice of experiment, every laboratory, 
every scientific textbook on which the young are reared," he 
writes in 1971.M Quite the contrary was true for this Victorian 
circle. When the reader opens their books, he will find abun­
dant evidence of and faith in (and for them, evidence and faith 
went hand-in-hand) the harmony of heart and head, and the 
complex ethical implications of that harmony. "There is not a 
more pernicious fallacy afloat in common parlance," wrote 
George Eliot in 1855, "than the wide distinction made between 
intellect and morality. Amiable impulses without intellect, 
man may have in common with dogs and horses; but morality, 
which is specifically human, is dependent on the regulation of 
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feeling by intellect."53 Eliot's beliefs on this subject remained 
consistent throughout her lifetime; twenty years later she of­
fered the other half of the equation, copying into her note­
books a phrase from her first full-length novel, Adam Bede 
(1859): "Feeling is a sort of knowledge." "What seems emi­
nently wanted is a closer comparison between the knowledge 
which we call rational and the experience which we call emo­
tional," she goes on to say.54 Samuel Taylor Coleridge would 
surely have agreed. 
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CHAPTER ONK 
Foundations: John Stuart Mill and 
Auguste Comte 
// man have thought so much of some one particular discovery 
as to regard him as more than man who has been able by some 
benefit to make the whole human race his debtor, how much 
higher a thing to discover that by means of which all things 
else shall be discovered with easel—Bacon, Novum Organum 
I. UNIVERSAL CAUSATION—JOHN STUART MILL:

SYSTEM OF LOGIC (1843)

This is my Idea that if we could once attain the logical perfec­
tion of all we know we should pass by easy stages to all attain­
able knowledge.—George Henry Lewes, marginalia on Cole-
ridge's Essays on Method, The Friend 
In his Autobiography John Stuart Mill wrote of the process 
whereby the prodigious young disciple of his father's bloodless 
Utilitarianism discovered that his education "had failed to cre­
ate . . . feelings in sufficient strength to resist the dissolving 
impulse of analysis." Mill's crisis led him to the revivifying 
poetry of the romantics, in particular Coleridge, "in whom 
alone of all writers I have found a true description of what I 
felt." In the new beliefs that emerged, Mill sought to balance 
the claims of head and heart, utility and romanticism, the ab­
stract needs of mankind and the demands of self. He was re­
deemed from the arid life of a reasoning machine by his vital 
discovery of "the internal culture of the individual."1 
Mill turned again to the romantic thinker in an essay on 
"Coleridge's Works" for the London and Westminster Review 
as a complement to his earlier piece on Jeremy Bentham. In 
that 1840 essay, Mill unknowingly revealed considerable affin­
ity with Coleridge's already-written but not-yet-published 
Theory of Life: "Contraries, as logicians say, are but quae in 
eodem genere maxime distant, the things which are farthest 
from one another in the same kind." Bentham epitomizes the 
empirical school, Coleridge the intuitive; Mill proclaims them 
not "enemies" but "allies": "The powers they wield are oppo­
site poles of one great force of progression." And Mill also rec­
ognizes this polarity within the Coleridgean doctrine itself: "It 
is less extreme in its opposition, it denies less of what is true in 
the doctrine it wars against, than has been the case in any pre­
vious philosophic re-action." Coleridge, Mill argues, has 
much to offer the empirical successors to the psychology of 
Locke and Hartley: "His writings . . . are the richest mine 
from whence the opposite school can draw materials for what 
has yet to be done to perfect their own theory."2 
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There can be no doubt that Mill's essay on Coleridge had at 
least one admirer among the Victorian circle that this study 
depicts, particularly if one regards imitation as a sincere form 
of admiration. In the essay on Coleridge, Mill offers his classic 
definition of the "Germano-Coleridgean doctrine": "It ex­
presses the revolt of the human mind against the philosophy 
of the eighteenth century. It is ontological, because that was 
experimental; conservative, because that was innovative; reli­
gious, because so much of that was infidel."3 In one of his ear­
liest essays, "Modern Metaphysics and Moral Philosophy of 
France," published in the British and Foreign Review in 1843, 
young George Henry Lewes adapts Mill's definition to Lewes's 
own exploration of another reaction against the eighteenth 
century, Auguste Comte's Cours de philosophic positive. The 
echo of Mill is unmistakable: that positivist reaction, writes 
Lewes, "is dogmatical and constructive, where [the eighteenth 
century] was skeptical and destructive: it is spiritual where that 
was material; religious where that was opposed to religion."1 
Psychologist Alexander Bain first met George Henry Lewes 
(then 25) in 1842, and recalled that "he sat at the feet of Mill, 
read the Logic with avidity, and took up Comte with equal 
avidity. These two works, I believe, gave him his start in phi­
losophy."5 Mill's letters to Lewes provide ample documenta­
tion of the student-teacher relationship in the early 1840s, as 
Mill criticizes young Henry's fledgling essays ("I return your 
Ms. with a good deal of pencil scratching at the back, for I have 
been, & intend to be, /lyper-critical"; 1 March 1841). He also 
writes letters of introduction for Lewes to French savants (to 
Victor Cousin, 27 April 1842: "Celui que je vous adresse est 
beaucoup plus jeune: mais il a des connaissances et une capa­
cite qui donnent de grandes experences"; and in a similar vein 
to Auguste Comte, 9 June 1842) and British publishers (to the 
editor of the British and Foreign Review, who published 
Lewes's first essay, "Hegel's Aesthetics: Philosophy of Art," in 
1842: "He is rather a good writer, has ideas (even in the Cole­
ridgean sense) & he is a contributor worth having," 7 May 
1841(i). It was Mill who introduced Lewes to John William Par­
ker, the publisher of his first book, the Biographical History 
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of Philosophy (1845-46), using his influence to help the un­
known young writer.7 The dates of Mill's Logic coincide with 
the period of Lewes's discipleship: it was completed at the end 
of 1841 and published—also by Parker—in the spring of 1843.8 
In his introduction to the Biographical History, Lewes pro­
claimed it "perhaps the greatest contribution to English spec­
ulation since Locke's Essay."9 He was to cite the Logic as an 
authority again in his second book, Comte's Philosophy of the 
Sciences (1853).10 
The case of John Stuart Mill's Logic belies any simplistic 
arguments to be made about the influence of Lewes on his life's 
partner, George Eliot; Mill provides a strong example of the 
remarkable confluence of interests that Lewes and Eliot must 
have discovered when they met in 1851. George Eliot's enthu­
siasm for the Logic is evident in her letters. We have no idea 
when she first read the book herself, but she was eager to share 
the discovery with her closest friends. In October of 1849, she 
writes to Charles Bray that her old Foleshill acquaintance, 
John Sibree, had her copy, "which you will do well enough to 
ask him for—he keeps books long enough to take a manuscript 
copy of them." The Brays were evidently successful at retriev­
ing the Logic (and may have been equally remiss in returning 
it), for two years later Eliot requests that Mrs. Bray "ask Mr. 
Bray to let me have Mill's System of Logic, which I don't sup­
pose he wants at present. I shall be glad to have it by me for 
reference."" Unlike Lewes, Eliot never shared a personal 
friendship with Mill; but her essays and notebooks provide fur­
ther evidence of her continuing interest in the book from be­
ginning to end of her career. Writing on "The Future of Ger­
man Philosophy" for the Leader in 1855, Eliot's review of Otto 
Friedrich Gruppe's Gegenwart und Zukunft der Philosophic 
in Deutschland (1855) has as much to say about Mill as it does 
of Gruppe, since she contends that the "gist" of Gruppe's ar­
gument is an effort "to map out the road which John Mill (to 
whose work he seems to have given imperfect attention) has 
actually wrought out and made available."12 
George Eliot was introduced to Herbert Spencer in August 
1851, and began to see him frequently after September of that 
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year. It seems likely that one reason for her request of the Logic 
from the Brays in October was to share it with Spencer. Al­
though he had first encountered the Logic shortly after its pub­
lication, in his provincial days at the Derby Philosophical So­
ciety, and remembered vaguely agreeing with Mill (largely in 
sympathy with his "dissent from an orthodox doctrine"), 
Spencer dated his real acquaintance with the book to sometime 
in early 1852, when George Eliot presented him with a copy. 
In March 1852 Spencer wrote to his father that he was begin­
ning the Logic as a "first step towards preparing for my 'Intro­
duction to Psychology' which I mean to begin vigorously by 
and by."13 Spencer was still digesting the Logic in the summer 
of 1852, as he and Marian Evans strolled along the Kentish 
coast at Broadstairs, discussing his pians for the new work.11 
Spencer's introduction was to become the Principles of Psy­
chology (1855), whose earliest formulations are to be found in 
his essay on "The Universal Postulate." This essay appeared 
in the Westminster under Eliot's editorship in 1853, and was 
reprinted almost verbatim as chapters 2 and 3 of the Princi­
ples. Spencer claimed that it was written in large part in direct 
response to the Logic.1* 
My readers will remember that Spencer had met George 
Henry Lewes in the spring of 1850; the rapid development of 
their friendship was founded on eagerly shared intellectual in­
terests. Typically, the mutual intellectual influences among 
this circle are circular rather than linear. Spencer dated the in­
ception of his interest in psychology to a reading of the 
Biographical History: "I had not, up to 1851, made the phe­
nomena of mind a subject of deliberate study. I doubt not that 
the reading of Lewes's book . . . gave me an increased inter­
est in psychology . .  . at the same time that it served, proba­
bly, to give more coherence to my own thoughts."16 Thus 
Mill's Logic figures both directly in Spencer's intellectual de­
velopment, via George Eliot; and indirectly, mediated by 
Lewes, himself inspired to the study of philosophy and psy­
chology by Mill. In dissecting the loving friendships and 
friendly love affairs of both heart and head among Spencer, 
Lewes, and Eliot, it is often difficult to define cause and effect; 
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the role played in their lives and thought by Mill's Logic is 
typical of the strong mutuality of ideas that links them all. But 
the Logic was indisputably a shared interest, and, I will dem­
onstrate, a consequent influence on all three. 
Indeed, it was a text that provided a foundation for the frame 
of mind shared by all the members of this Victorian circle. 
When it appeared in the 1840s, John Stuart Mill's System of 
Logic set off reverberations that spread extensively beyond the 
philosophic academy. Looking back upon the previous cen­
tury, intellectual historian A. W. Benn eloquently summarized 
the book's revolutionary appeal to the early Victorians. The 
Logic 
explained to English readers what they had never been taught be­
fore . . . how the vast edifice of physical science on which they 
had been accustomed to gaze with stupid wonder, as on a fairy 
palace, raised by magic arts, really owed its existence to a more 
systematic application of the same processes by which we find our 
way about in everyday life . .  . by carrying into the study of mind 
and morals, of society and government, the same method by which 
the properties of space, the mechanism of the heavens, the com­
position of matter, and the conditions of animal life had been so 
successfully unravelled.17 
Mill himself announced that the Logic was intended to 
counteract the influence of "the German, or a priori view of 
human knowledge" with "a text-book of the opposite doc­
trine—that which derives all knowledge from experience, and 
all moral and intellectual qualities principally from the direc­
tion given to the associations." The belief that truth can be 
known by intuition rather than through observation and ex­
perience is, Mill feels, "the great intellectual support of false 
doctrines and bad institutions." In the Logic Mill hoped to 
meet the intuitive philosophers on their own ground, and to 
offer an "explanation, from experience and association, of the 
peculiar character of what are called universal truths."18 Mill's 
position was not, of course, an original one. Lewes's compar­
ison of Mill and Locke in the Biographical History is no casual 
juxtaposition. Much of the Logic is a rewriting of Lockean 
philosophy in a distinctly Victorian vein. 
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It is not to my purposes here to scrutinize the more technical 
formulations of the Logic, or to attempt a comprehensive read­
ing of this formidable academic classic. But the Logic offers 
much to the historian of Victorian ideas.19 Let me begin with a 
notion that may seem self-evident, but that was to have far-
reaching implications for Mill and his contemporary follow­
ers: a comprehensive logic can be formulated only if one be­
lieves in a world that operates according to rational, consis­
tent, universal principles of cause and effect. Inductive 
reasoning, generalizations founded upon observation and ex­
perience, cannot take place unless nature's course is governed 
by universally applicable laws. Mill makes this point emphat­
ically and repeatedly: "The ultimate major premise of all in­
ductions" is "the uniformity of the course of nature." 
Like Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Mill aspires to a monistic 
world view, searching for "separate threads of connection be­
tween parts of the great whole which we term nature." Mill 
finds his unification of part and whole, observed particular 
and reasoned generalization in the "general character of regu­
larity" which "along with and in the midst of infinite diver­
sity, pervades all nature." These uniformities he calls "Laws 
of Nature." Much like Coleridge, Mill seeks for a single law 
that will subsume unto itself all of the multiplicitous laws of 
nature. This ultimate law is "the Law of Causation": "The 
truth that every fact which has a beginning has a cause is so co­
extensive with human experience." Mill reminds his reader 
that this law of causation is really but "the familiar truth that 
invariability of succession is found by observation to obtain 
between every fact in nature and some other fact which has pre­
ceded it, independently of all considerations respecting the ul­
timate mode of production and phenomena."20 
Mill's dry academic prose may seem far from incendiary to 
the twentieth-century reader. But his disregard for any "ul­
timate mode of production" was quickly recognized by the Vic­
torians as a denial of the active presence of God in the world. 
Universal causation goes hand-in-hand, if not with atheism, 
then with a negation of the traditional ontological pieties, the 
creative God of Genesis. When George Eliot wrote her first es­
 31 UNIVERSAL CAUSATION
say for the Westminster, a review of R. W. Mackay's The Prog­
ress of the Intellect, in 1850, she showed herself fully aware of 
the theological implications of the law of causation. Eliot 
finds in Mackay a new, and quite heterodox, version of divine 
revelation: "The master key to this revelation, is the recogni­
tion of the presence of undeviating law in the material 
world. . .  . It is this invariability of sequence which can 
alone give value to experience and render education in the true 
sense possible."21 Ten years later, writing on "The Influence 
of Rationalism" for the Fortnightly Review, Eliot reiterates 
her belief in Mill's causal, ungodly universe, emphasizing "the 
supremely important fact, that the gradual reduction of all 
phenomena within the sphere of established law, which carries 
as a consequence the rejection of the miraculous. . . . The 
great conception of universal regular sequence . .  . is the 
most potent force at work in the modification of our faith."22 
Similarly, Herbert Spencer claims in his Autobiography that 
he was predisposed to Mill's logical version of heterodoxy vir­
tually from infancy, its message inwrought with his deepest 
sensibility: "The notion of causation was thus rendered much 
more definite in me than in most of my age, there was estab­
lished a habit of seeking for causes, as well as a tacit belief in 
the universality of causation. Along with this there went ab­
sence of all suggestion of the miraculous."23 
It is important to emphasize here, however, that although 
Mill's Logic may have seemed inimical to conventional reli­
gious beliefs, it provided a credo of its own. Mill's affirmations 
of faith are most clearly stated in the concluding book of the 
Logic, "On the Logic of the Moral Sciences," where he makes 
the first practical applications of his theoretical views on cau­
sality. In Book 6, as throughout the Logic, Mill is indebted to 
John Locke. In the Essay on Human Understanding, Locke 
had declared himself "confident . . . that if Men would in the 
same method, and with the same indifferency, search after 
moral, as they do mathematical Truths, they would find them 
to have a stronger Connection one with another . . . and to 
come nearer perfect Demonstration, than is commonly imag­
ined."21 Mill opens his discussion of the logic of the moral sci­
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ences with a question: "Are the actions of men like all other 
natural events, subject to invariable laws? Does the constancy 
of causation, which is the foundation of every scientific theory 
of successive phenomena, really obtain among them?" The an­
swer to this rhetorical question leads directly to the conclusion 
that Mill embodies in his title for chapter 3: "That There is, or 
May Be, A Science of Human Nature."25 
This disarmingly simple assertion was to have profound ide­
ological implications. If mind is subject to the same universal 
laws as matter, psychology more properly belongs to the sci­
entist than to the philosopher; scientific method may be ap­
plied both to the mechanism of the individual mind and to its 
aggregate manifestation, society. It is in the Victorian age that 
psychology proper enters the realm of natural science. And 
also in this period that social science as we know it today is 
born. In a wide variety of ways, every Victorian thinker in this 
circle addresses himself to the implications of what Herbert 
Spencer calls the "universality of law—law in the realm of 
mind as in matter—law throughout the life of society as 
throughout individual life . . . [and] the correlative idea of 
universal causation."26 George Eliot speaks for all her Victo­
rian compatriots when she asserts in "The Progress of the In­
tellect" that "undeviating law" is present in the moral as well 
as the material world. She urges a plan of action to be adopted 
in a wide variety of ways by the Victorian sages who surround 
her: the "invariability of sequence which is acknowledged to 
be the basis of physical science" must no longer be "perversely 
ignored in our social organization, our ethics, and our reli­
gion."27 
I began my discussion of the System of Logic with Mill's 
own assertion of its grounding in the British empiricist tradi­
tion. But Mill is more than a Victorian Locke; we find in this 
admirer of Bentham and Coleridge a true sense of Coleridgean 
polarity and a desire for that dynamic interpenetration Cole-
ridge emphasizes in the Theory of Life. In "The Future of Ger­
man Philosophy," George Eliot defends Mill against Gruppe's 
objection to his methodological emphasis on deduction: "De­
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duction, as Mill shows, is not properly opposed to induction 
but to experiment," she writes.28 This passage, which Eliot is 
paraphrasing from the Logic, made a deep impression on 
George Henry Lewes as well; he quotes it in the introduction 
to his Biographical History: "The opposition is not between 
the terms Inductive and Deductive, but between Deductive and 
Experimental."29 Mill believed that induction and deduction 
can, in fact, operate in tandem. Throughout the Logic Mill 
presents his reader with a series of polarities: they are titled, 
variously, induction and deduction, the experimental and the 
analytical methods of investigation, science and philosophy, 
the chemical and the geometrical models—but all have in com­
mon the fundamental opposition of the particular vs. the gen­
eral. The scientist concerns himself with the observation of 
particulars; he begins with effects, and experiments in order to 
arrive inductively at causes. His method is "chemical," or con­
crete. In contrast the philosopher deals in abstract or "geo­
metrical" propositions. He works deductively, from analysis of 
causes to an understanding of their effects. The scientist moves 
from the many to the one, the philosopher from the one to the 
many; the scientist's universe is Copernican, the philoso­
pher's, Ptolemaic. 
Mill hopes to reconcile these polarities through the "con­
crete deductive method," a method that he intends as both a 
science and an art: "science . . . following one cause to its 
various effects, while art traces one effect to its multiplied and 
diversified causes and conditions." This method attempts to 
sophisticate our notions of linear cause and effect, working 
"deductively indeed, but by deduction from many, not from 
one or a very few original premises; considering each effect as 
(what it really is) an aggregate result of many causes, operating 
sometimes through the same, sometimes through different 
mental agencies, or laws of human nature."30 
The concept of a science of psychology provides Mill with a 
perfect model for his new method, a discipline that draws 
upon the skills of both philosopher and scientist. In order to 
achieve this balance, Mill proposes to add an entirely new sci­
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ence, which he calls "ethology," as a companion to psychol­
ogy. Mill defines psychology as the "science of the elementary 
laws of mind"; ethology as the "ulterior science which deter­
mines the kind of character produced, in uniformity to those 
general laws, by any set of circumstances, physical and moral." 
Psychology is based on observation and experiment, the dissec­
tion of those "mechanic" laws whereby the individual mind 
functions; ethology is to be a deductive science, placing the in­
dividual within the larger social whole (it would be impossible 
to put heredity, environment, society under a microscope—the 
elements involved are too vast and too complex). The princi­
ples of ethology, writes Mill, lie somewhere between induction 
and deduction; they are the "axiomata media . .  . of the sci­
ence of mind: as distinguished, on the one hand from the em­
pirical laws resulting from simple observation, and on the 
other from the highest generalizations."" 
Without exception, these Victorians embraced Mill's doc­
trine of universal causation. It provided the cornerstone of 
their intellectual foundations. But unanimity of response 
stopped there: some felt Mill went too far with his new method; 
and some, not far enough. Mill's inclusion in my circle must 
be qualified. For all his theoretical claims of axiomata media, 
Mill finally remains firmly entrenched in Cartesian cogita­
tions rather than donning a laboratory coat and approaching 
the dissection table. His assertion of law in the realm of mind 
as well as matter stops short of the next logical step: mind as 
matter. "Whilst we are destitute of senses acute enough, to dis­
cover the minute particles of Bodies, and to give us Ideas of 
their mechanical Affectations, we must be content to be igno­
rant of their properties and ways of Operation," wrote Locke 
in the Essay on Human Understanding.*2 Despite the interven­
ing generations of scientific progress, Mill essentially re­
mained in agreement with Locke, stopping short of a physio­
logical psychology: "The successions . . . which obtain 
among mental phenomena, do not admit of being deduced 
from the physiological laws of our nervous organization. "M 
Mill's "science of mind" still owes more to the philosopher 
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than to the biologist, to the seventeenth century than to the 
nineteenth. 
Both phrenologists and evolutionists were to disagree, and 
take Mill's law of nature one logical step further. Phrenologist 
Charles Bray, for example, bemoaned the tendency of his con­
temporaries to stray from "the right path of the true cerebral 
physiology," and placed blame squarely on Mill as "prin­
cipally responsible for turning a whole generation out of the 
way."34 Evolutionist Herbert Spencer also qualified his admi­
ration: "Though in Mr. Mill's System of Logic, the doctrine of 
causation receives full and critical exposition; yet by him, as 
by the Utilitarians generally, there has not been that full study 
of physical science at large which conduces to an ever-present 
and vivid consciousness of cause."35 
Yet when Spencer's essay on "The Universal Postulate," in­
spired in opposition to Mill, is juxtaposed to his above com­
ments on the Logic, an apparent paradox is revealed; and in 
that paradox we can recognize the distinctive nature of these 
synthetic Victorian thinkers. Spencer himself would have 
found no inconsistency in the fact that he could condemn Mill 
in the Autobiography for his lack of practical scientific inves­
tigations on one hand; and, in "The Universal Postulate," 
controvert Mill's empiricism in favor of the more intuitive phi­
losophy of William Whewell, Mill's arch-opponent in matters 
philosophical. 
Herbert Spencer, an early believer in phrenology and later 
in the pre-Darwinian development hypothesis, sought to 
know (in a scientific spirit) but also to believe (if not necessar­
ily in accord with the Thirty-Nine Articles). He writes "The 
Universal Postulate" in search of "some primordial belief of 
which no proof can be given."36 Spencer claimed to have found 
that belief in Whewell's Philosophy of the Inductive Sci­
ences—or rather, in reading Mill's criticisms of Whewell's phi­
losophy in the Logic.*1 In "The Universal Postulate," Spencer 
quotes Mill quoting Whewell: "A necessary truth is a propo­
sition the negation of which is not only false but inconceiva­
ble." The "universal postulate" as defined by Spencer scarcely 
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differs: "A belief which is proved, by the inconceivableness of 
its negation, to invariably exist, is true."™ 
Spencer agrees with Mill's empirically-based universal cau­
sation, but it is not adequate to satisfy him: "In passages con­
troverting the doctrine enunciated by Dr. Whewell, he had . . . 
ignored that criterion of belief to which we all appeal in the 
last resort, and further, he had not recognized the need for any 
criterion." Though he has no use for God, Spencer, unlike 
Mill, does quest for "ultimate modes of production," some ver­
sion of a final cause, a belief that transcends empirical proof: 
"Belief is the fact which . .  . is antecedent to, and inclusive 
of, all other facts."39 (Let me note here that in another turn of 
the Victorian screw, Spencer attempts to turn Whewell's intu­
ition back upon empiricism by means of evolutionary biol­
ogy—and herein lies the genesis of the Principles of Psychol­
ogy, of which I shall have much more to say in chapter 4.) 
In October 1853 George Eliot, the young editor of the West­
minster Review, wrote to her friend Sara Sophia Hennell: "I 
hope you will be pleased with our present number. If you don't 
think the Universal Postulate first-rate, I shall renounce you as 
a critic."101 shall return later to the early intellectual relation­
ship between Eliot and Spencer; but if we remember here that 
Eliot was a sympathetic audience for "The Universal Postu­
late," it will help in understanding why she chose the three 
epigraphs she did for her notebooks in the late 1870s, from 
Mill's Logic, Aristotle's Ethics, and Locke's Essay on Human 
Understanding. I reprint the three passages here in full, for 
they have a great deal to tell not only about George Eliot's re­
sponse to the Logic, but also of her attitude towards a scientific 
psychology of the sort Mill proposes. 
The generation of one class of mental phenomena from another, 
whenever it can be made out, is a highly interesting fact in psycho­
logical chemistry; but it no more supersedes the necessity of an 
experimental study of the generated phenomenon, than a knowl­
edge of the properties of oxygen & sulphur enables us to deduce 
those of sulphuric acid without specific observation & experiment. 
[Mill, Logic, 2:637] 
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We must not look for equal exactness in all departments of study, 
but only such as belongs to the subject matter of each, and in such 
a degree as is appropriate to the particular line of enquiry. . . . 
Nor again must we in all matters alike demand an explanation of 
the reason why things are what they are; in some cases it is enough 
if the fact that they are so is satisfactorily established. This is the 
case with first principles; and the fact is the primary thing—it is a 
first principle. [Aristotle, Ethics, 1.7.18] 
If by the help of microscopical eyes (if I may so call them) a man 
could penetrate farther than ordinary into the secret composition 
& radical texture of bodies, he would not make any great advan­
tage by the change, if such an acute sight should not conduct him 
to the market & exchange; if he could not see things he was to 
avoid at a convenient distance, nor distinguish things he had to do 
with, by those sensible qualities others do. He that was short­
sighted enough to see the configuration of the minute particles of 
the spring of a clock, 8c observe upon what particular structure & 
impulse its elastic motion depends, would no doubt discover 
something very admirable; but if eyes so framed could not view at 
once the hand and the characters of the hour-plate, & thereby at a 
distance see what o'clock it was, their owner could not be much 
benefited by that acuteness, which while it discovered the secret 
contrivance of the parts of the machine, made him lose its use. 
[Locke, Essay, 2:23, par. 12]41 
Mill, Aristotle, and Locke are three philosophers who share 
much common ground. But it seems to me that the passages 
from Aristotle and Locke also provide an implicit—and correc­
tive—commentary on the first passage, from the Logic. 
True to the mediating impulse of the concrete deductive 
method, Mill emphasizes the necessary coexistence of deduc­
tion and induction, general laws (those of "psychological 
chemistry"), and observed particulars ("experimental study"). 
But his primary emphasis is on the importance of the empiri­
cist's observation and experiment. Mill makes a case for an em­
pirical science of psychology: we can study the "chemical" 
workings of the human mind just as we do the "properties of 
oxygen & sulphur." From her earliest days as a believer in 
phrenology, Eliot would remain in agreement with Mill's ap­
plication of empiricism, according to the tenets of universal 
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causation, to the study of the human mind. Long after her ad­
vocacy of phrenology had been qualified, she would remain 
convinced of the necessity of a truly scientific psychology. 
The passages from Locke and Aristotle do not so much con­
trovert as refine the passage from Mill. "We must not look for 
equal exactness in all departments of study," says Aristotle; the 
"whys" of the human mind are considerably more complex 
than the principles of a chemical equation, even if we do be­
lieve that it operates according to empirically verifiable scien­
tific laws. And not only is the science of psychology—more 
particularly, when it enters the realm of ethics—an immensely 
difficult one to formulate with exactness, as the passage from 
Aristotle suggests: suppose we did have the "microscopical 
eyes" to give us, with perfect accuracy, every detail of observa­
tion and experiment? Locke, confident empiricist as he is, 
nonetheless emphasizes that a lucid view of every part does not 
equal the larger vision, "at a distance," of the whole; without 
universals we can make no sense of particulars; the detail is 
meaningless without the generalization. The final line of the 
passage from the Essay is particularly provocative: "That 
owner could not be much benefited by that acuteness, which 
while it discovered the contrivance of the parts of the machine, 
made him lose its use." 
Remembering Spencer's universal postulate: knowledge 
must not stifle belief; one must allow for an intuitive formu­
lation of the whole as well as a reasonable dissection of every 
part; scientific understanding of a man's mind must not dis­
place a sympathetic apprehension of his heart. The opening 
paragraphs of Eliot's own notes that follow these three epi­
graphs provide variations on the same theme. Eliot's first state­
ment asserts the necessity of a scientific study of man: "Ethics 
is a mixed science to which conduct is the corresponding art. 
From the scientific point of view you have to consider the 
forms of force or energy concerned. . . . Hence it seems an 
unfruitful attempt now to consider ethics apart from social & 
psychological evolution." This is followed by an apparently 
antithetical statement, a Coleridgean polar opposite: "A great 
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deal of 'right action' is sure to be done . . . from sympathetic 
impulses." So much for a "scientific" ethics; Eliot explicitly 
disavows the rational Utilitarian analysis of human behavior: 
"Why have multitudes of mankind been tender to their moth­
ers"?: "Not because they were contemplating the greatest hap­
piness of the greatest number of mankind." Thus Eliot's thesis 
and antithesis. The synthesis follows; it is here that we find 
that notebook quotation from Adam Bede with which I closed 
my prelude: "Feeling is a sort of knowledge."12 But George 
Eliot's emphasis here is not the supremacy of feeling over 
knowing; rather, their complementarity. These Victorians 
would find in John Stuart Mill's universal causation the 
"microscopical eyes" they needed for their quest; but Auguste 
Comte could promise the vision of the cosmic clock. 
II. THE POSITIVE PLAN—AUGUSTE COMTE:

COURS DE PHILOSOPHIE POSITIVE (1830-1842)

In that essay on "The Modern Metaphysics and Moral Phi­
losophy of France" which echoed Mill's "Coleridge," George 
Henry Lewes concluded with an extended summary of Au­
guste Comte's recently-completed Cours de philosophic posi­
tive (which had appeared in six successive books: 1830, 1835, 
1838,1839,1841,1842). It was the first of many glowing reports 
that Lewes would write of the French philosopher in the de­
cade to come, and one of the earliest English expositions of 
Comte.13 Young Lewes enthusiastically predicted that Comte's 
Cours would "be the most memorable work of the nineteenth 
century. He will have founded a science and furnished its fun­
damental law. He will be at once the Bacon and the Newton of 
the nineteenth century." On the same page, Lewes footnotes as 
his authority his mentor John Stuart Mill's Logic: the Cours 
was "at once the most profound, the most complete, and the 
most masterly in its exposition of any work on the subject, and 
is invaluable to every cultivation of philosophy," Mill avows.11 
Although the first public notice of Comte in England did 
not come until 1838, with physicist Sir David Brewster's review 
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of the first two volumes of the Course Mill wrote privately to 
John Pringle Nichol in December 1837 that "this said book is, 
I think, one of the most profound books ever written on the 
philosophy of the sciences. . .  . I shall be much astonished if 
this book of Comte's does not strike you more than any logical 
speculations of our time."46 In his Autobiography Mill ex­
plains that he had encountered the Cours while in the process 
of writing the Logic, arriving at his own theory of induction 
"by a different road," yet acknowledging that Comte's book 
"was essential service to me in some of the parts which still 
remained to be thought out," particularly Book 6, "On the 
Logic of the Moral Sciences." Significantly, Mill claimed his 
indebtedness to Comte for the important conception of the in­
verse deductive method, discussed above.47 After Mill's disci­
pleship waned in the early 1850s, he would return to the 
French thinker in a more critical vein in two extended essays 
for the Westminster Review (April and July 1865), which took 
book form as Auguste Comte and Positivism in 1865. But in 
the earlier blush of enthusiasm, Mill had written in his first 
letter to Comte, 8 November 1841: "Je le lis et le relis avec une 
veritable passion intellectuelle."48 
Seven months later, 9 June 1842, Mill was to write Comte an 
ingratiating letter of introduction on behalf of 
mon jeune ami Lewes, qui se rejoit tres vivement de vous avoir vu. 
Je n'ai pas ose demander pour lui cet avantage parce qu je savais 
qu'avec d'excellentes dispositions, et une certaine force d'esprit, il 
manque des bases essentielles d'une forte education positive. Je 
trouve tres honorable a son caractere et a son intelligence la vive 
admiration qu'il eprouve pour vous, avec des moyens si imparfaits 
d'apprecier votre superiority scientifique.™ 
Lewes quickly acquired that "education positive," and by 1848 
had briefly taken Mill's place in Comte's eyes as the new apos­
tle of positivism in England.50 The Biographical History of 
Philosophy (1845-46) heralded the advent of the Comtean age 
in its concluding "Eleventh Epoch: Philosophy finally relin­
quishing its Place in favor of Positive Science"; Lewes ex­
panded a series of Leader articles into Comte's Philosophy of 
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the Sciences: Being an Exposition of the Cours de Philosophic 
Positive of Auguste Comte (1853), the first full-length discus­
sion of Comte in England, which appeared in the same year as 
Harriet Martineau's English translation.51 Though by the mid­
18508, Lewes's relations with Comte had also cooled, he too 
returned to Comte in the next decade in a series of essays for 
the Fortnightly Review. He there confessed himself a "reverent 
heretic," but Lewes's later views of Comte were far less nega­
tive than Mill's.52 One critic has even called Lewes's tempered 
later critique "an excess of charity": "If anything was likely to 
popularize Positivism, it was Lewes's two articles of 1866 in 
the Fortnightly."** 
Herbert Spencer's vehement disavowal of Comte's influence 
on his thought were loud and long; Spencer even went to the 
trouble of printing a lengthy fifty-year-old letter to George 
Henry Lewes as "Appendix B" to his Autobiography, chroni­
cling an ongoing argument wherein Lewes levelled at Spencer 
the psychologically sophisticated accusation that his "antag­
onistic attitude toward Comte has tended to suppress the 
growth of any consciousness of indebtedness." Be that as it 
may, Spencer could honestly claim that the only source of 
Comte's ideas for him was Mill's Logic, which he had read two 
years after the "positivistic" Social Statics was written.51 
In this appendix Spencer parenthetically reminds his reader 
that the Logic was lent him by George Eliot; and turning back 
to 1852, we find that Spencer's companion was urging the 
Cours upon him at the very same time: "In the course of the 
spring the name of Comte came up in conversation. She had a 
copy of the Philosophy Positive, and at her instigation, I read 
the introductory chapters of 'Exposition.'" Though admitting 
to an inadequate knowledge of French and a "neutral" attitude 
to Comte's doctrine of the three stages, Spencer expressed a 
"pronounced dissent" from the other major tenet of the Cours, 
Comte's classification of the sciences. He found young Marian 
Evans "greatly surprised: having, as she said, supposed the 
classification perfect." It was Spencer who prevailed in the de­
bate (as he remembered it!): "She was but little given to argu­
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ment; and finding my attitude thus antagonistic, she forthwith 
dropped the subject of Comte's philosophy, and I read no fur­
ther."55 
But George Eliot most certainly did not drop the subject in 
the simultaneously emergent friendship with George Henry 
Lewes, which turned to love during the same era in which 
Lewes held forth on Comte for the Leader. She became more 
intimate with both the manuscript of Comte's Philosophy and 
its author than she cared to admit publicly, chiding publisher 
John Chapman: "How came you to mention to Miss M. that 
you saw the proof of Mr. Lewes' book 'in [my] Miss Evan's 
room'} I think that you must admit that your mention of my 
name was quite gratuitous. So far you are naughty—but never 
mind."56 
The intrigue involved here was professional as well as sex­
ual, for "Miss M.," Harriet Martineau, was engaged in some­
thing of a rival work: the translation of the Cours, to be pub­
lished by Chapman, Eliot's coeditor at the Westminster. The 
plan for a translation had been in the works even before Eliot's 
editorship officially began (29 September 1851), and her early 
opinions of Martineau's qualifications for the undertaking 
were not generous.57 However, as relations between Eliot and 
Martineau—and Martineau's mentor George Henry Atkin­
son—warmed, Eliot's position changed considerably. Marti­
neau herself went so far as to make Eliot "joint trustee" with 
Atkinson of a fund for Comte's publication, in March 1852.58 
It was Eliot herself who reviewed Martineau's translation for 
the Leader (3 December 1853), and confessed (in editorial plu­
rality) that as she read, "Our misgivings changed into appro­
bation."59 Comte himself thought so highly of the translation 
and abridgement that he had the work retranslated into French 
and proclaimed it the official text of the Coursl Martineau's 
work encouraged Eliot to tackle Herbert Spencer on the subject 
of Comte once again; we find him writing to his father in Feb­
ruary 1854 that "I am reading Miss Martineau's abridged trans­
lation of Comte . .  . as two of my friends, Mr. Lewes and 
Miss Evans, were in large measure adherents of Comte's views, 
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I was curious to learn more definitely what these were."60 
George Eliot's first published reference to Comte is to be 
found in the opening paragraph of her first essay for the West­
minster Review, on "The Progress of the Intellect" (January 
1851), in which she claims the truth of Comte's view "that the 
theological and metaphysical speculation have reached their 
limit, and . . . the only hope of extending man's sources of 
knowledge and happiness is to be found in positive science, 
and in the universal application of its principles." Eliot did 
qualify her agreement with the warning that positivism 
should not obviate the necessity of an historical viewpoint, a 
study of the "true process of development"—a point later to be 
reiterated by her evolutionary friend Herbert Spencer.61 Eliot 
had concluded her review of Martineau's translation of the 
Cours with an exhortation: "May this work find its way to 
every sincere student of philosophy!"62 As with her enthusiasm 
for Mill's Logic, George Eliot was a "sincere student" of 
Comte well before her first meeting with his English disciple, 
George Henry Lewes. It seems a likely possibility that her first 
acquaintance with Comte came through Mill's Logic.™ 
Having established the biographical interweaving of these 
two, I would now like to turn more directly to the relationship 
between the System of Logic and the Cours de philosophic 
positive, to trace both some sympathetic resonances between 
the two works and some very consequent areas of disagree­
ment.64 These Victorians were attracted to Comte's positivism 
for many of the same reasons they read Mill; but it is in the 
significant differences between the two thinkers that they 
found much of what was in fact most attractive to them in 
Comte. Like Mill's Logic, the Cours made the radical claim 
that the scientific method could be extended far beyond the lab­
oratory—to psychology, ethics, social science. Unlike Mill, 
Comte was willing to carry the implications of this claim to 
their logical limits. 
In Auguste Comte and Positivism, Mill provides an excel­
lent starting point for any discussion of the major tenets of the 
Cours. By juxtaposing Mill's definition of the fundamental 
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doctrine of positivism with my above discussion of the Logic, 
it becomes clear just why Mill read and re-read the Cours with 
such "passion intellectuelle": 
We have no knowledge of anything but Phaenomena; and our 
knowledge of phaenomena is relative, not absolute. We know not 
the essence, nor the real mode of production, of any fact, but only 
its relations to other facts in the way of succession or of similitude. 
These relations are constant; that is, always the same in the same 
circumstances. The constant resemblances which link phaeno­
mena together, and the constant sequences which unite them as 
antecedent and consequent, are termed their laws. The laws of 
phaenomena are all we know respecting them. Their essential na­
ture, and their ultimate causes, either efficient or final, are un­
known and inscrutable to us.65 
Comte's positivism, like Mill's logic, is predicated upon "the 
uniformity of the course of nature." Like Mill, Comte seeks for 
methodological unity in the midst of nature's diversity: Mill's 
universal causation is essentially one with Comte's positive 
law. Comte's method, like Mill's, has significant theological 
implications; just as Mill denies we can know the "ultimate 
mode of production of phaenomena," Comte disclaims "ul­
timate causes." Comte makes the heterodox consequences of 
his philosophy more explicit than does Mill, however, in as­
serting the fundamental positivistic law of the three stages. Ac­
cording to Comte, every branch of our knowledge "passes suc­
cessively through three different theoretical conditions: the 
theological, or fictitious; the metaphysical, or abstract; and the 
scientific, or positive."66 Once the positivistic apotheosis is 
reached, the outmoded theology and metaphysics of past ages 
will be easily jettisoned. 
The second central tenet of the Cours, Comte's famous hi­
erarchy of the sciences, is closely linked to this three-stage pro­
cess. Each book of the Cours is devoted to one of the six sci­
ences, in an ascending hierarchy: mathematics, astronomy, 
physics, chemistry, biology, and "social physics." Comte's 
principles of organization can be categorized in several ways: 
he moves along a spectrum from the most abstract (mathemat­
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ics) to the most concrete (the social sciences); or from the most 
deductive to the most inductive; or from the inorganic to the 
organic. Comte believes that each science, at its own pace, 
must go through the three stages: again, one can range 
Comte's sciences along a spectrum, from mathematics, which 
was always purely "positive," to Comte's own newly-defined 
science of "social physics," which according to him had yet to 
emerge from the murky metaphysical realm—that is, prior to 
Comte. Like Mill, Comte believes that man—both individ­
ually, through a scientific psychology; and collectively, by 
means of "social physics" (Mill's "ethology")—can be studied 
according to the same "positive" or empirical experimental 
principles as constellations or chemical reactions. 
But this brief summary must emphasize that Comte's fun­
damental concern is with identity rather than diversity. After 
all, Comte's positivist is engaged in much the same essential 
occupation as his theologian or his metaphysician: "to repre­
sent all phenomena as particular aspects of a single general 
fact"; "to find the one rational order among a host of possible 
systems." The difference merely lies in the monistic principle 
of explanation: the theologian's God has been transformed 
into Comte's Law. This same impulse toward unity character­
izes the Comtean hierarchy: the sciences are "branches from a 
single trunk." Once they reach the positive stage, all science 
becomes one: "The only necessary unity is that of method."67 
Induction and deduction will work together in the concrete 
deductive method; observed scientific particulars find true har­
mony with reasoned generalizations. Lewes sums up this pos­
itive promise in the Biographical History: 
In the present state of things the speculative domain is composed 
of two very different portions,—general ideas and positive sci­
ences. The general ideas are powerless because they are not posi­
tive; the positive sciences are powerless because they are not gen­
eral. The new [Positive] Philosophy . .  . is destined to put an 
end to this anarchy, by presenting a doctrine which is positive, 
because elaborated from the sciences, and yet possessing all the de­
sired generality of metaphysical doctrines, without possessing 
their vagueness, instability, and inapplicability."8 
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Social science stands at the apex of Comte's hierarchy; it de­
serves its exalted rank because it is at once the most general and 
the most particular of sciences. As Eliot writes in her essay on 
"The Natural History of German Life" (1856), "Social science, 
while it has departments which in their fundamental general­
ity correspond to mathematics and physics, namely, the grand 
and simple generalizations which trace out the inevitable 
march of the human race as a whole . . . has also, in the de­
partments of government and jurisprudence, which embrace 
the conditions of social life in their complexity, what may be 
called its Biology."69 According to Comte, social science effects 
the fullest identity of organic and inorganic. It is the study of 
"man or humanity," in which "sociology is subordinated to 
the whole of organic philosophy, which discloses to us the 
laws of human nature," but equally addresses the "medium or 
environment" in which man lives, a subject that "is connected 
with the whole system of inorganic philosophy." Thus social 
science takes the via media, between man and his environment, 
organism and medium: "The study of the external world and 
of man is the eternal business of philosophy, and there are two 
methods of proceeding: by passing from the study of man to 
that of external nature or from the study of external nature to 
that of man. Wherever philosophy shall be perfect, the two 
methods will be reconciled."70 
Herein, I believe, lies Comte's potent appeal to a Victorian 
frame of mind characterized by a strong mediating sensibility. 
In reconciling psychology and natural history, attempting to 
study man the organism within a social medium, Comte par­
allels Coleridge's notion of individuation, the idea that the 
highest form of development is that in which each individual 
is most uniquely himself, yet simultaneously most fully inte­
grated into the whole: "The superiority of the social to the in­
dividual organism is . .  . the more marked speciality of the 
various functions fulfilled by organs more and more distinct 
but interconnected, so that unity of aim is more and more com­
bined with diversity of means."71 The foundations are laid for 
a cosmology in which universal causation unifies the macro­
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cosm and the microcosm within a single model. 
Lewes summarizes it well in his chapter on "Passage from 
Inorganic to Organic" in Comte's Philosophy: "Thus in an 
ascending series of evolutions from the simple to the com­
plex . .  . we learn to gather the phenomena of the universe 
into one majestic Whole, and learn that all lines of demarca­
tion are subjective only."72 
Lewes's choice of the word "subjective" provides the clue to 
Mill's ultimate divergence from Comte. Mill recognized in the 
Cours a foreshadowing of the more mystical tendencies of 
Comte's later work, the attempt "to systematize . . . 
knowledge from the human or subjective point of view, the 
only one, he contends, from which a real synthesis is possible." 
Mill objects on two grounds: to the subjectivity, and to the syn­
thesis, both of which are entirely too near a monistic mysticism 
for Mill's reasoned empiricist taste. Mill finds Comte's "ethical 
science" dangerously "metaphysical." He even goes so far as to 
claim that Comte relies on the "a priori philosophy," "erecting 
a mere creation of mind into a test or norma of external 
truth."73 
Significantly for my purposes here, Mill detects a fundamen­
tal sympathy with Comte's departure from a posteriori empir­
ical reasoning in Herbert Spencer's "Universal Postulate." In 
Auguste Comte Mill bemoans this peculiar hybrid—what we 
might call a positivist metaphysics—as it manifests itself, not 
in "those who still adhere to the old opinions," but in "one of 
the most vigorous as well as the boldest thinkers . . . full of 
the scientific spirit, Mr. Herbert Spencer"; and, "following in 
his steps," that "able expounder of the positive philoso­
phy . . . Mr. Lewes," both of whom contend "that the ulti­
mate test of the truth of a proposition is the inconceivableness 
of its negative." Mill ruefully concludes that "when those from 
whom it was least to be expected" turn from the objective to 
subjective grounds of proof, "we must admit that the meta­
physical mode of thought still rules in higher philosophy, 
even in the department of inorganic nature, and far more in all 
that relates to man as a moral, intellectual, and social being."74 
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Thus John Stuart Mill finally remains more fundamentally 
Benthamite than Coleridgean, strongly committed to the as­
sociation psychology of his empiricist predecessors. Comte's 
position is quite different: when he turns to the "Intellectual 
and Moral, or Cerebral Functions" in the Cours, he launches 
a direct attack on the "fundamental principles of interior ob­
servation" of the association psychologists; "the absurdity of 
the supposition of a man seeing himself think." Furthermore, 
says Comte, this approach to psychology has another "radical 
fault": "a false estimate of the general relations between the 
affective and the intellectual faculties." Comte contends that 
all prior approaches to psychology have erred in making "the 
intellect . . . almost exclusively the subject of their specula­
tions." To the contrary, Comte asserts, "daily experience 
shows that the affections, the propensities, the passions, are 
the great springs of human life."75 The opposition between 
Comte and Mill on this point is striking: "To say that men's 
intellectual beliefs do not determine their conduct, is like say­
ing that the ship is moved by the steam and not by the steers­
man," counters Mill.76 
Let me pause here. I have traveled some distance from the 
point at which this discussion of the Cours de philosophic pos­
itive began: Mill's summary of the fundamental doctrine of 
positivism, with its reasoned, constant sequences of antecedent 
and consequent, its positivist laws that had so much in com­
mon with Mill's universal causality, its promise of the positiv­
istic millennium in which the scientific or experimental 
method will rise newborn from the dead husks of outmoded 
theology and metaphysics. Yet are not the "affections," "pro­
pensities," and "passions" more at home in the sanctuary of 
the Christian theologian or the metaphysical speculations of 
the romantic nature-worshipper? 
This same potential confusion can be found in Comte's crit­
ics. After accusing Comte of "concessions to the metaphysical 
method," "following] Kant" in admitting the unknowable, 
"essences beyond our comprehension," A. W. Benn then goes 
on to claim positivism as nothing new to England, but rather 
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"resuscitating old ideas originally peculiar to this island and 
afterwards discredited by the religious revival." Benn finds 
Comte's philosophy presaged in Hume's Essay on Human Un­
derstanding and Brown's Treatise on Cause and Effect, and 
considers positivism an offshoot of eighteenth-century empiri­
cism rather than romantic transcendentalism.77 Conversely, in 
defining positivism for The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Ni­
cola Abbagnano begins by stating that "it opposes any kind of 
metaphysics and . . . any procedure of investigation that is 
not reducible to scientific method," but goes on to point out 
that positivism has affinities with the "absolute idealism" of 
the nineteenth century, and "belongs with it in the general 
range of romanticism."78 As early as 1860, Lewes summed up 
the characteristic confusion of the Comtean critic: "Comte is 
frequently written against by those who know him only at sec­
ond hand, as offensively dry, hard, materialistic, and irreli­
gious; while by those who have more or less acquainted them­
selves with his writings, he is frequently condemned as a 
mystical, sentimental, and despotically moral pontiff."79 What 
is Comte?—a pantheistic idealist, or an empirical logician—or 
both? 
Let me first present the simple solution, which has had con­
siderable currency among both Comte's contemporaries and 
later historians, disciples and critics alike. This explanation 
could be termed "the two Comtes." It accounts for the diver­
gence temporally: the early Comte of the Cours, with its em­
phasis on science and philosophy, and the later Comte of the 
Politique Positive (1851-54) and beyond, the "moral pontiff" 
of the "Religion of Humanity" (a religion replete with all the 
ceremonial trappings, including prayers to the new 
"Father"—Auguste Comte!).80 W. M. Simon has recounted the 
inbred warfare among Comte's English disciples after the first 
wave of philosophical and scientific Comteans, led by Mill and 
Lewes, gave way to the more "religious" leadership of Richard 
Congreve. The religion of humanity is "Catholicism minus 
Christianity," sneered T. H. Huxley; on the contrary, retorted 
Congreve: it is "Catholicism plus science."81 
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There was, undeniably, a considerable distance between the 
Cours and Comte's later, more messianic, thought. Lewes pro­
vides an apt analogy from the annals of the Oxford movement 
to suggest the wide range of applications for the term "posi­
tivist": "It is as if the disciples of Dr. Newman who refused to 
follow him to Rome, were confounded with the disciples who 
followed him everywhere."82 Lewes may have been an early be­
liever in the via media, but he never went over to Rome. Yet as 
early as 1852, reviewing the recently-published Systeme de Po­
litique Positive for the Westminster Review, Lewes himself 
suggested that the seeds of the "second" Comte were already 
present in the "first": "This regeneration, though extremely 
important, is only a development, not a change of view: all 
that he now preaches he preached before. . .  . In his [Cours 
de] 'Philosophic Positive,' he elaborated from the sciences a 
philosophy of science; in his Tolitique Positive,' he aspires 
to convert that philosophy into a religion." Although his ob­
jections to the more literal realizations of Comte's religion 
were legion, Lewes praised the Systeme for its consistent reiter­
ation of the same view of human nature to be found in the 
Cours: "that intellect is not the highest aspect of humanity, 
and that it must be the servant, not the lord, of the heart."88 
Indeed, Auguste Comte was capable of inspiring an emo­
tional conversion experience long before his post-Cours proc­
lamations of positivist priests and prophets. In 1851 Harriet 
Martineau finished her Letters on the Laws of Man's Nature 
and Development, a book predicated on "the grand concep­
tion,—the inestimable recognition,—that science, (or the 
knowledge of fact, inducing the discovery of laws) is the sole 
and the eternal basis of wisdom—and therefore of human mo­
rality and peace." Thus predisposed she opened the Cours de 
philosophic positive for the first time. As she recounts the 
"rapture" she experienced in the process of her translation, 
Martineau provides a case in point of Comte's affective su­
premacy: "Many a passage of my version did I write with tears 
falling into my lap." Writing to Maria Weston Chapman, 
Martineau states explicitly that her positivism was a product 
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of faith, not doubt: "Positive philosophy is at the opposite 
pole to skepticism . .  . it issues in the most affirmative (not 
dogmatical) faith in the world, and excludes unbelief as abso­
lutely as mathematical principles do . .  . positive philoso­
phy is, in short, the brightest, clearest, strongest, and only ir­
refragable state of conviction that the human mind has ever 
attained."81 In her preface to the translation, Harriet Marti­
neau speaks directly to the emotional needs fulfilled by the 
Cours in an age "alienated for ever" from the old faiths, find­
ing in Comte a tonic "to retrieve a vast amount of wandering, 
of unsound speculation, or listless or reckless doubt, and of 
moral uncertainty and depression." Yet Martineau's preface re­
veals at the root of this emotive salvation a set of beliefs as in­
tellectual, as rational, as logical as Mill's universal causality 
could require. The redemption that Comte offers Martineau 
takes a distinctly reasoned tone: "We find ourselves suddenly 
living, not under capricious and arbitrary conditions, uncon­
nected with the constitution and movements of the whole, but 
under great, general, invariable laws, which operate on us as 
part of the whole," she writes.85 
Thus the appeal of the Cours to these Victorians in the 1840s 
and early 1850s was on one hand identical with that of the 
Logic: the promise that regular, rational laws rule the universe 
and that thus the methods of natural science could be extended 
to new human sciences. This new positive plan would account 
for the particularity of the individual at the same time that 
each individual could be viewed as part of the larger whole— 
both the whole of society, and even more important, the whole 
of inorganic and organic creation. But Auguste Comte does 
not so much controvert John Stuart Mill as he goes one step 
further: where Mill, like Comte, seeks to reconcile deductive 
with inductive methods, experiment and observation with ab­
stract reasoning, particular with general, Comte extends the 
mediating impulse even further, to attempt a more fundamen­
tal reconciliation of intellect and emotion. 
Comte's philosophy was as likely to be repudiated by the sci­
entist as by the theologian. "Men of science will reject with a 
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sneer the subordination of the Intellect to the Heart,—of Sci­
ence to Emotion," writes Lewes, "and the unscientific, feeling 
the deep and paramount importance of our Moral Nature, will 
be repelled from a philosophy which rests solely upon a sci­
entific basis." It is Comte, not Mill, who is finally the true heir 
to the Coleridgean communion of intellectual and moral. 
"Logic and Sentiment—to use popular generalizations—have 
long been at war, and men reject Comte's system, because it 
seeks to unite them," asserts Lewes in his preface to Comte's 
Philosophy.*6 Coleridge's description of his ideal system could 
be grafted neatly onto Comte's: "a Philosophy, that will unite 
in itself, the warmth of the mystics, the definiteness of the Di­
alectician, and the sunny clearness of the Naturalist, the pro­
ductivity of the Experimenter and the Evidence of the Mathe­
matician." 
Basil Willey has written that "Comte is, in a sense, the cen­
tury in epitome, so that to study him is to find the clue to much 
that the Zeitgeist . . . was doing."87 Mill's universal causa­
tion articulated a fundamental premise upon which this Vic­
torian world view was founded. But Auguste Comte both qual­
ifies and extends that premise. In so doing he provides the 
prototype of both the temperamental and the intellectual foun­
dations for the applied science, new faiths, and synthetic phi­
losophies shared by this Victorian circle. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Applied Science—Phrenology and Evolution: 
George Combe and Robert Chambers 
/ form a history and tables of discovery for anger, fear, shame, 
and the like; for matters political; and again for the mental 
operations of memory, composition and division, judgment 
and the rest; not less than for heat and cold, or light, or vege­
tation, or the like.—Bacon, Novum Organum 
I. A "POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY" 
"Agir par affection, et sentir pour agir: such is the motto of 
[Comte's] system, which indicates the predominance given to 
the emotive over the merely intellectual—in opposition to the 
old psychology which always subordinated the emotions to the 
intellect." George Henry Lewes singled out this aspect of 
Comte's philosophy as its most potent appeal. The emotive 
bias that suffused Auguste Comte's thought from its earliest 
exploration of positivistic method to the later manifestations 
of messianic fervor originated in and was founded upon a sci­
entific source: the phrenological system of Franz Joseph Gall. 
Lewes argued that Gall provided Comte with "a bias and 
point of departure."1 In the Cours de philosophie positive it­
self, Comte makes abundantly clear his debt on the subject of 
affective supremacy to Franz Joseph Gall, whose Recherches 
sur le systeme nerveux en general et sur celui du cerueau en 
particulier (Paris, 1809-11), coauthored with Johann Caspar 
Spurzheim, became the first textbook of the science of phrenol­
ogy: 
A full contemplation of Gall's doctrine convinces us of its faithful 
representation of the intellectual and moral nature of Man and an­
imals. All the psychological sects have misconceived or ignored 
the preeminence of the affective faculties, plainly manifest as it is 
in all the moral phenomena of brutes, and even of Man; but we 
find this fact placed on a scientific basis by the discovery that the 
affective organs occupy all the hinder and middle portions of the 
cerebral apparatus, while the intellectual occupy only the front 
portion, which, in extreme cases, is not more than a fourth, or 
even a sixth part of the whole. The difference between Gall and his 
predecessors was not in the separation of the two kinds of faculties, 
but that they assigned the brain to the intellectual faculties alone.2 
Contemporary critics of the Cours made no secret of their dis­
approval of Comte's affiliations with the new cerebral psy­
chology. W. H. Smith's 1843 essay on Comte, the first on the 
complete Cours to appear in England, bemoaned the fact that 
Comte was a phrenologist. Smith's orthodox piety was might­
ily offended by the heretical implications of the science: what 
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was to become of the soul if mind was reduced to mere mat­
ter?—such regions were better left a sacred mystery: "Upon the 
dial of a watch the hands are moving, and a child asks why? 
Child! I respond, that the hands do move is an ultimate fact."3 
Two decades later, in Auguste Comte and Positivism, John 
Stuart Mill responded with equal disapprobation: "And what 
Organon for the study of 'the moral and intellectual functions' 
does M. Comte offer, in lieu of the direct mental observation 
which he repudiates? We are almost ashamed to say, that it is 
Phrenology!" But the bias of Mill's objection is antithetical to 
Smith's: "The later course of physiological observation has 
not tended to confirm, but discredit, the phrenological hy­
pothesis."1 It was to be phrenology's fate, as it was positiv­
ism's, that it antagonized both men of religion and men of sci­
ence; its heterodoxy was equally theological and phys­
iological. 
But there were many in the intellectual vanguard who ap­
proached phrenology with respect. Mill himself in 1842 had 
taken up Gall's second major work, the six-volume Sur les 
fonctions du cerveau (1825), at Comte's instigation: "J'ai com­
mence l'etude de Gall: il me parait un homme d'un esprit su­
perieur. Je le lis avec plaisir et j'espere aussi avec fruit." A 
month later Mill submitted a lengthy progress report on his 
study, confessing his difficulty with Gall's physiological spec­
ifications, and finding his map of the brain premature, "vague 
et anti-scientifique." But yet a month later, Mill wrote again, 
and tempered his earlier objections: "Pour parler maintenant 
de Gall, je crain de vous avoir donne* une ide* e exage* re* e de mon 
£loignement actuel de sa doctrine. Je suis bien loin de ne pas 
la trouver digne d'etre prise, selon votre propre expression, en 
se*rieuse consideration; bien au contraire, je crois qu'elle a 
irre'vocablement ouvert la voie a un ordre de recherches vrai­
ment positives, et de la premiere importance."5 
Mill had introduced his young friend Lewes to Comte in the 
same letter in which he criticized phrenology. The juxtaposi­
tion of the two subjects was more than casual, for Lewes too 
was intrigued by the new science. When Lewes himself turned 
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to a series of essays on "Phrenology and Phrenologists" in the 
Leader between December 1853 and January 1854, he echoed 
Mill's reservations as well as his praise of phrenology for intro­
ducing "positive" researches into the human mind. "We be­
lieve in Phrenology, but not in the Phrenologists. . . . We be­
lieve in Phrenology and Physiology, both as sciences having a 
positive basis," asserts Lewes; "we admit the tentative [claims] 
made by Gall as the first and greatest step towards the positive 
psychology."6 
Psychology was to be the proving-ground of positivism; or, 
as Comte put it, "the last battleground, in the popular view, 
between the positive philosophy and the ancient."7 Man's be­
liefs about his "intellectual and affective phenomena" were the 
final stronghold of the theologians—with their talk of soul— 
and the metaphysicians—with their notions of consciousness. 
Comte believed that he had found in Gall's phrenology the 
perfect organon of a purely positive psychology. He wrote in 
the Cours: 
It was not till our own time that modern science, with the illus­
trious Gall for its organ, drove the old philosophy from this last 
portion of its domain and passed on in the inevitable course from 
the critical to the organic state. . . . Neither enmity nor irra­
tional advocacy has hindered the continuous spread, in all parts 
of the scientific world, of the new system of investigation of intel­
lectual and moral man. All the signs of the progressive success of 
a happy philosophical revolution are present in this case.8 
Phrenology's premier English advocate, George Comte, 
echoes Comte in his ecstatic vision of the positivist millen­
nium: "Before the appearance of Drs. Gall and Spurz­
heim . . . the science of Mind was very much in the same state 
as that of the heavenly bodies prior to the times of Copernicus 
and Newton."9 
The founder of phrenology, Franz Joseph Gall, was born in 
Baden in 1758; about 1800, he began his physiological re­
searches, dissecting human and animal brains with his student 
and disciple, Johann Caspar Spurzheim. Official displeasure 
led to their departure from Vienna in 1805, whence they em­
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barked on a successful lecture tour of Europe, settling in Paris 
in 1807; their jointly-authored Recherches appeared in 1809. 
The two parted ways when Spurzheim added philosophy to 
Gall's physiology and broke with the master in 1814. Gall, un­
like his follower, was wary of emphasizing ideology over anat­
omy. In that same year, Spurzheim arrived in England to 
preach the new gospel, touring and lecturing extensively 
throughout the British Isles until his death in 1832.l0 
Franz Joseph Gall summarized the four chief tenets of this 
new positive psychology in the Anatomie et physiologic. "The 
moral and intellectual dispositions are innate; their manifes­
tation depends on organization; the brain is exclusively the or­
gan of the mind; the brain is composed of as many particular 
and independent organs, as there are fundamental powers of 
the mind;—these four incontestable principles form the basis 
of the whole physiology of the brain."" Of Gall's four princi­
ples, it is the fourth that has remained in the memory of the 
twentieth century as "phrenology": the "crainioscopy" prac­
ticed by the phrenologists, bump-reading, the art of divining 
character by the contour of the skull (fig. 1.1). Admittedly, 
among a certain segment of the populace (particularly in the 
English provinces and in America), this aspect of phrenology 
had a large and popular following. But among the more intel­
lectual observers of phrenology, adversaries and advocates 
alike were critical of the cruder populist applications of the 
science. Writing on "Phrenology in France" for Blackwood's 
in 1857, George Henry Lewes scoffed, "As the general public 
knows not fear, it buys treatises, attends lectures, collects 
skulls, and manipulates heads."12 On this point, at least, ar­
dent phrenologist Charles Bray was in agreement: "The pub­
lic, however, consider that manipulating the head is phrenolo­
gy, and we cannot too much reprobate the practice of those 
persons who aid thus to deceive them, and who have brought 
the science into disrepute by their presumptions and confident 
assumption of accuracy which has not yet been attained," Bray 
wrote in an open letter to Lewes published in the Leader." 
Despite his reservations about phrenology as a fad, Lewes 
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FIG. 1. From O. S. Fowler, Fowler's Practical Phrenology, 22d ed. (New York, 
1845). 
was fascinated by it as a science. In his Biographical History of 
Philosophy, he made an eloquent plea for phrenology as a 
seminal influence on the development of physiological psy­
chology: 
The day for ridiculing Gall has gone by. Every impartial compe­
tent thinker, whether accepting or rejecting Phrenology, is aware 
of the immense services Gall has rendered to Physiology and Psy­
chology, both by his valuable discoveries, and by his bold, if ques­
tionable hypothesis. He revolutionized Physiology by his method 
of dissecting the brain, and by his bold assignment of definite 
functions to definite organs. To verify or refute his hypotheses, 
vast researches were undertaken . . . and now there is no phys­
iologist who openly denies that mental phenomena are directly 
connected with nervous structure." 
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Gall's first three principles may not seem particularly origi­
nal, or even controversial—so much were they shared by the 
luminaries of later nineteenth-century psychology, and to such 
an extent as they are scientifically accepted today. But in Vic­
torian England, it was these aspects of phrenology that were, 
in fact, the most truly controversial and profoundly signifi­
cant. To British intellectuals of the 1830s and 1840s, the heirs 
of philosophical psychology, for whom mind meant a Lock­
ean tabula rasa and for whom the psychologist was a medita­
tive Cartesian cogitator, the ideological implications of phre­
nology were radical, whether or not one agreed with the 
specifics of Gall's cerebral localization (such as the exact loca­
tion of the "organ" of "amativeness" or "veneration"). 
Despite the inadequacies and inaccuracies of Gall's system, 
his contribution to psychology was extremely significant: not 
in terms of the physiological specifics of brain structure (where 
he erred grossly), but rather as a new method for studying the 
mind, a method that liberated psychology from the confining 
discipline of philosophy. Gall believed in psychology as a 
physical science, not a branch of epistemology.15 Quite simply, 
phrenology claimed that since the brain is the organ of the 
mind, mind is matter. As such, it can be subjected to the same 
scientific methods that might apply in investigating any other 
human organ—or any organic being—or inorganic nature as 
well. According to the Comtean hierarchy, the method of bi­
ology becomes that of psychology, just as the method of chem­
istry became that of biology; and so on, back to the cosmology 
of astronomy and the pure laws of mathematics. Universal 
causation reigns supreme throughout organic and inorganic 
creation. 
For my purposes it is the broader assumptions informing the 
phrenological world-view that are of greater interest than the 
specific scientific strengths or weaknesses of phrenology's "or­
ganology." In his 1835 preface to The Constitution of Man, 
the most widely-read British gospel of this new philosophy, 
phrenologist George Combe himself admitted that his work 
"may be instructive even to those who contemn Phrenology as 
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unfounded," insofar as it demonstrates the more fundamental 
assertion that "we are physical, organic, and moral beings, act­
ing under the sanction of general laws, whether the connection 
of different mental qualities with particular portions of the 
brain, as taught by Phrenology, be admitted or denied."16 
Comte's statement suggests that phrenology would have a po­
tent ideological appeal to the Victorian intellectual immersed 
in Mill's universal causation and Comte's positivism. 
Under Spurzheim's missionary tutelage, phrenological en­
thusiasm had flourished; by the year of his death, there were 
twenty-nine phrenological societies in Great Britain. From its 
earliest arrival in England, phrenology intrigued many think­
ing men and women. Appropriately, we find Spurzheim tak­
ing a phrenological reading of Samuel Taylor Coleridge at 
Highgate in 1816; a year later, the poet proclaimed him "be­
yond all comparison the greatest Physiognomist who ever ap­
peared," praising "the undoubted splendor and originality of 
his and Gall's Anatomical Discoveries to the Structure of the 
Brain."17 Spurzheim's lecture tours in the provinces were to 
have a seminal effect on Herbert Spencer as well; he recalls in 
his Autobiography that in about 1830 "Gall's disciple, Spurz­
heim . . . went about the country diffusing knowledge of the 
system. Derby was among the towns he visited. Being then per­
haps 11 or perhaps 12, I attended his lecture." Despite the 
"considerable repugnance" the lad felt for the "grinning 
skulls" that accompanied Spurzheim, young Herbert "became 
a believer, and for many years remained one." Spencer contin­
ued to take considerable interest in the science throughout the 
1840s: phrenologist J. Q. Rumball came to Derby in 1842 and 
made a reading of Spencer's head, which Spencer published in 
full in the Autobiography. In 1843 and 1844, Spencer pub­
lished phrenological essays in the Zooist, a journal devoted to 
phrenology and mesmerism: "Partially dissentient though I 
was concerning special phrenological doctrines, I continued 
an adherent to the general doctrine." Ultimately, after he be­
gan new psychological inquiries in the late 1850s, Spencer was 
led "to conclude that, though the statements of phrenologists 
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might contain adumbrations of truths, they did not express the 
truths themselves."18 Yet Gall's theories were to have a pro­
found influence on Spencer's later thought. 
Phrenology was eagerly received by the aspiring intellec­
tuals of the provinces, removed from traditional centers of 
learning and hungry for the latest knowledge. Despite the fact 
the phrenologists had little praise for the female brain— 
"Women do not extend their reasonings beyond the range of 
the visible world," noted the Phrenological Journal, "nor do 
they make any great or daring excursions into the regions of 
fancy"—over half the audience for these provincial lectures 
was often female.19 A visiting phrenologist provided the edu­
cationally disenfranchised woman with a rare opportunity for 
instruction in the natural sciences. One such woman was Mar­
ian Evans, twenty years before she became novelist George 
Eliot: the mind of a genius in the body of a Warwickshire 
spinster, housekeeper for an ailing father, a woman with no 
formal education beyond provincial "dame" schools; a mind 
that devoured any of the all-too-scarce ideas (or "reasonings 
beyond the range of the visible world") afloat in the provinces. 
George Eliot's first reference to phrenology—"my organs of 
ideality and comparison"—comes in one of her earliest extant 
letters, in November 1838.20 Her correspondent was teacher 
Maria Lewis, an ardent Evangelical (as was Eliot herself at that 
time); their interest in the science gives proof to the claim of 
many phrenologists that phrenology and religion were not 
necessarily mutually exclusive (I will have more to say on that 
subject in my discussion of George Combe). The two women 
continued to share this keen interest: "It was very kind of you 
to remember my requests about phrenology," Eliot writes a 
year later; "I have not at this moment any phrenological 
thoughts but when I have I will endeavour to tell you fully all 
I have been able to opine on the matter." Phrenological refer­
ences recur in Eliot's letters of 1840 to Martha Jackson: the 
"superior development of a certain region of your brain"; the 
"paucity of my cerebrum in a certain part."21 
Her meeting in 1841 with Charles Bray, ribbon manufac­
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turer and resident philosopher of Coventry, was certainly cen­
tral to George Eliot's continuing interest in and advocacy of 
phrenology. In his autobiography Charles Bray described the 
"free and easy mental atmosphere, harmonizing with the ab­
sence of all pretension and conventionality" that prevailed at 
his Rosehill home, with its "peculiar charm" for all who vis­
ited there. "Every one who came to Coventry with a queer mis­
sion, or a crochet, or was supposed to be a 'little cracked,' was 
sent up to Rosehill," he mused.22 Welcome above all were ad­
vocates of phrenology, a science that Bray saw as the sole basis 
of "the Natural Laws of Mind," and "surely the most interest­
ing of all studies." Phrenology provided the foundation for all 
of Bray's pet reforms and for his philosophy of necessity. Even 
in the final years of his life, he devoted a large proportion of 
his autobiography to a defense of the science, asserting that his 
discovery of phrenology had changed his life.23 
Phrenology must have been an immediate bond between the 
Coventry circle and Marian Evans; within three months of her 
first meeting with the Brays, she writes Maria Lewis: "Having 
had my propensities sentiments and intellect gauged a second 
time, I am pronounced to possess a large organ of 'adhesive­
ness,' a still larger one of 'firmness,' and as large of conscien­
tiousness." It is probable that both readings were made by Bray 
himself; later that year Eliot writes of her "lessons from the 
arch-phrenologist." Bray too was an eager pupil, for in Feb­
ruary 1844 Cornelius Donovan, principal of the London 
Phrenological Institution, gave both Bray and George Eliot 
some phrenological tutelage. That summer Eliot accompanied 
Bray to London to have her head cast by phrenologist James 
Deville.21 
In 1851 George Eliot left the provinces for London, to begin 
her career as editor of the prestigious and radical Westminster 
Review. But she did not leave phrenology behind in Coventry; 
nor did she desert the friends of her youth. On 29 August 1851, 
the Brays introduced George Eliot to the heir to phrenology's 
English throne, George Combe, who stopped frequently at 
their Rosehill home en route to Scottish proselytizing.25 The 
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intellectual attraction between Combe and Eliot was instanta­
neous, strong, and mutual. Combe immediately pronounced 
Eliot "the most extraordinary person of the party," on the basis 
of their conversation on religion, economy, and politics. He 
went on to a detailed phrenological description of her brain.26 
A warm friendship quickly ensued: "The Combes are com­
ing again on Tuesday!" Eliot noted enthusiastically in a letter 
to John Chapman on 14 September 1851. She traveled to visit 
the Combe family in Edinburgh in October of the following 
year (a visit that was also to take her to new friend Harriet Mar­
tineau's Ambleside home), and enthused to Sara Sophia Hen­
nell: "Yes, he is an apostle. An apostle, it is true, with a back 
and front drawing room, but still earnest, convinced, consis­
tent, having fought a good fight and now peacefully enjoying 
the retrospect of it. I shall leave these good friends on Wednes­
day evening with regret." Emotion and intellect were insepa­
rable for Marian Evans; her mentors—Spencer, Lewes, and 
Combe—were always, in some sense, her lovers, the recipients 
of her emotions as well as her ideas. "I often think of you," she 
effuses to Combe, "when I want some one to whom I could 
confess all my difficulties and struggles with my own nature, 
as the person, among all I have known, who is, as Madame de 
Stael said of her friend, the most completely 'de son avis'—hav­
ing a profound faith in his principles and acting them out."27 
A rash of phrenological descriptions in her letters to the 
Brays coincides with the most intense period of Eliot's 
friendship with George Combe: of W. R. Greg (27 April 1852): 
"His brain is large, the anterior lobe very fine and a moral re­
gion to correspond"; of Charles Dickens (5 May 1852): "His 
appearance is certainly disappointing—no benevolence in the 
face and I think little in the head—the anterior lobe not by any 
means remarkable"; of William George Spencer (Herbert's fa­
ther) (23 June 1852): "a large-brained, highly informed man, 
with a certain quaintness and simplicity"; and finally, the re­
port from George Henry Lewes of a conversation with Profes­
sor Robert Owen, "in which the latter declared his conviction 
that the cerebrum was not the organ of the mind [contrary to 
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Comte's belief] but the cerebellum rather! . . . The professor 
has a huge anterior lobe of his own. What would George 
Combe say if I were to tell him?"28 
In fact, George Combe was to have a great deal to say over 
the next few years on the subject of George Henry Lewes's 
phrenological heresies, and of the seduction of his prize pupil 
from what he considered the true path of cerebral physiology. 
For Combe was not the only cause of Eliot's renewed interest 
in phrenology in the early 1850s. Within a month of her first 
meeting with Combe, George Eliot was introduced to George 
Henry Lewes; her friendship with Combe was to wane as her 
love for Lewes grew. The explanation of this is perhaps as 
much intellectual as it is emotional. 
Lewes was a "reverent heretic" on the subject of phrenology 
as well as positivism. His own acquaintance with phrenology 
began as early as July 1836, the date he inscribed on his copy 
of George Combe's System of Phrenology.29 Lewes's study of 
Comte's Cours in the early 1840s would again have brought 
phrenology to his attention. But significantly, it was not until 
the early 1850s and the blossoming of his friendships with 
Spencer and Eliot that Lewes took a greater and more contro­
versial interest in the science. His critique of phrenology in the 
1850s climaxed with his new chapter on the subject in 1857 re­
vised edition of the Biographical History. Although he there 
gave Gall his due for having revolutionized physiology, he 
also had harsher words for phrenology's premature conclusive­
ness and its methodological weaknesses: "We find Physiology 
confessing its incompleteness . . . whereas Phrenology 
claims to be complete, equipped, full-statured!"; "If Phrenol­
ogy is the Physiology of the nervous system, it must give up 
Gall's approximative method for a method more rigorously 
scientific."50 
I would suggest that George Eliot's elopement to Germany 
with Lewes in 1854 was as offensive intellectually as it was 
morally to her phrenological friends. The editorial policies of 
the Westminster Review towards phrenology and mesmerism 
between 1851-54 became the focal point of increasing acri­
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mony between Eliot and Combe.sl But her personal relation­
ship with the apostle remained on apparently amicable terms; 
as late as 9 June 1854, she was politely refusing Combe's invi­
tation to visit him in Kingston. The very next month, she did 
indeed choose to travel—to Weimar, alone, with the married 
George Henry Lewes. A heated correspondence on the subject 
ensued between the Brays and the Combes. Although Charles 
Bray loyally defended Eliot's conduct, George Combe was un­
appeased: "I should like to know whether there is insanity in 
Miss Evans's family; for her conduct, with her brain, seems to 
me like morbid mental aberration."32 
Combe's moral indignation was as much a product of intel­
lectual rivalry as it was of outraged morality. For as George 
Eliot's relationship with Lewes continued, she began to qual­
ify her acceptance of phrenology along lines similar to his. On 
10 July 1855, Bray's visit to the pair led to an ugly argument 
with Lewes, in which Eliot, to the dismay of her old mentor, 
sided with her new mate. Bray, outraged, accused her of desert­
ing the cause.*1 Her ensuing apologetic letter of 16 July quickly 
grew into a staunch defense of Lewes: 
Mr. Lewes begs me to say that he never meant to deny that size was 
a measure of power [in the brain], all other things being 
equal. . .  . I am not conscious of falling off from the 'physio­
logical basis." I have never believed more profoundly than I do 
now that character is based on organization. . . . But I do not, 
and I think I never shall, consider every man shallow or uncon­
scientious who is unable to embrace all Mr. Combe's views of or­
ganology and psychology.34 
George Eliot still retained her interest in the organization of 
the brain that phrenology had inspired; but Lewes was intro­
ducing her to methods of physiological investigation that were 
more firmly based on scientific fact than the crainioscopy of 
the phrenologists.85 
In concluding this biographical summary, however, I 
would stress the continuity of Eliot's and Lewes's commitment 
to the essential methodology and doctrine behind the science 
of phrenology, their conviction that Gall was fundamentally 
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correct in claiming psychology as a natural science. A few 
months after the unhappy visit from Charles Bray, noted 
above, George Eliot writes to Sara Sophia Hennell: "We are 
reading Gall's Anatomie et Physiologie du Cerveau, and 
trying to fix some knowledge about plexuses and ganglia in 
my soft mind!"™ 
In October 1854 Eliot wrote an essay on "Women in France" 
for the Westminster Review. "I think [it] would please you 
much," Bray conciliatorily pointed out to Combe, "as having 
the 'physiological basis.' "37 In that essay George Eliot provides 
ample documentation of her belief in Gall's tenets that the 
moral and intellectual dispositions are innate, their manifes­
tation dependent on organization: 
What were the causes of this earlier development and more abun­
dant manifestation of womanly intellect in France? The primary 
one, perhaps, lies in the physiological characteristics of the Gallic 
race: the small brain and vivacious temperament which permit the 
fragile system of woman to sustain the superlative activity requi­
site for intellectual creativeness; while, on the other hand, the 
larger brain and slower temperament of the English and the Ger­
mans are, in the womanly organization, generally dreamy and 
passive. . . . Throughout the animal world, the higher the or­
ganization the more frequent is the departure from the normal 
form.™ 
But it was not merely the "physiological basis" that drew Vic­
torians to phrenology; it was a world view, with powerful ap­
peal to a Victorian sensibility. 
II. THE THIRD APOSTLE AND HIS TWO GOSPELS:

GEORGE COMBE'S THE CONSTITUTION OF MAN

IN RELATION TO EXTERNAL OBJECTS (1835)

And had we such a Knowledge of the Constitution of Man, 
from which his Faculties of Moving, Sensation, and Reason­
ing, and other Powers flow; and on which his so regular shape 
depends, as 'tis possible Angels have, and 'tis certain his Maker 
has, we should have quite other Idea of his Essence, than what 
now is contained in our Definition of that Species, be it what 
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it will: and our Idea of any individual Man would be as far 
different from what it now is, as is his, who knows all the 
Springs and Wheels, and other contrivances within, of the fa­
mous Clock at Strasburg, from that which a gazing Country­
man has of it, who barely sees the motion of the Hand, and 
hears the Clock strike, and observes only some of the outward 
appearances.—Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understand­
ing 
At the time of Johann Caspar Spurzheim's death in 1832, 
Scotsman George Combe "was left as the sole chief of phrenol­
ogy," writes his biographer. As the heir apparent to Gall and 
Spurzheim, he was "the last of its three first apostles."39 
Among a prolific outpouring of tracts and treatises through­
out his lifetime, The Constitution of Man was unquestionably 
the received gospel of phrenology's creed. Harriet Martineau's 
memoir of Combe for the Daily News opened: "A man must be 
a conspicuous member of society who writes a book approach­
ing in circulation to the three ubiquitous books in our lan­
guage—the Bible, 'Pilgrim's Progress,' and 'Robinson Cru­
soe.' "40 This was not simply the hyperbole of the eulogist. As 
a point of comparison, it took over fifteen years for Darwin's 
Origin of Species to sell 16,000 copies in England; The Con­
stitution of Man sold 2,000 copies in ten days. Combe's biog­
rapher, Charles Gibbon, prints some of the astounding pub­
lishing statistics for the book: the first edition, published in 
June 1828, sold a mere 1500 copies; by October 1836, 11,000 
copies of the first through fourth English editions of the book 
had been printed. "The People's Edition" at Is. 6d. sold 59,000 
copies (including a "school edition") in England between No­
vember 1835 and October 1838.41 
The Constitution of Man was firmly grounded in the science 
of phrenology, but it was much more than a mere handbook 
of the science. Its appeal clearly extended to an audience be­
yond the phrenological faithful. "Upon the physiological 
studies of Gall had been erected a mighty superstructure, var­
iously termed a social science, a universal philosophy, a guide 
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to reform life itself," writes historian John D. Davies;42 phre­
nology contained "a scientific philosophy applied to the 
whole progress of man," David deGiustino concurs.48 The 
Constitution of Man was the textbook of that philosophy, and 
its Victorian students were legion. Having established the 
strong ties between this Victorian circle and the science of 
phrenology, I would now like to explore the more specialized 
appeal of its philosophy to a group of intellectuals steeped in 
the universal causation of John Stuart Mill and the positivistic 
promise of Auguste Comte. 
Combe's gospel of phrenology was to have a seminal influ­
ence on some of the finest scientific minds of the century. In 
the early 1840s, Alfred Russel Wallace—a decade later to "dis­
cover" evolution at the same time as Charles Darwin (and I 
shall address myself later to the close relationship between 
phrenology and evolution)—read Comte's Constitution of 
Man and other works on phrenology. Wallace remained a life­
long believer; when he looked back upon his times in 1899 in 
The Wonderful Century, he heralded "The Neglect of Phre­
nology" as the premier failure of the age, avowing it to be "a 
Science of whose substantial truth and vast importance I have 
no more doubt than I have of the value and importance of any 
of the great intellectual advances already recorded," and com­
mending Combe as "the best English advocate of the science, 
and probably one of the best practical phrenologists of any 
country."44 Similarly, Alexander Bain, leading psychologist of 
the mid-Victorian age, whose work represented the culmina­
tion of association psychology and the beginnings of respect­
able physiological psychology, studied the Constitution at the 
Mechanics' Mutual Instruction Class in Aberdeen from 1835­
38. In his extensive discussion of Bain's work in Mind, Brain, 
and Adaptation, Robert M. Young persuasively presents evi­
dence of phrenology as an important early source of Bain's in­
terest in physiological psychology.45 
We have both direct and indirect evidence that the Consti­
tution was well-known to the Victorian circle that this study 
delineates. Writing to George Henry Lewes on 15 December 
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1853 (a letter that Lewes published in the Leader), Charles 
Bray declared Combe's Constitution of Man "a more perfect 
system of psychology than any other."46 The opening sentence 
of Bray's 1841 preface to his Philosophy of Necessity contains 
an unmistakable echo of Combe: "The object of the present 
Work is to inquire into the nature of the constitution of man; 
to ascertain his place in creation, the object and aim of his ex­
istence, and the boundaries of his mind."47 In light of Herbert 
Spencer's conversion during the 1830s, it seems likely that he 
was well-versed in the leading gospel of phrenology's third 
apostle.48 And what of George Eliot? I have documented her 
eager belief in phrenology throughout the 1840s and her per­
sonal friendship with Combe in the early 1850s. As with Her­
bert Spencer, it seems unthinkable that she would not have 
known the Constitution well, although her only direct refer­
ence to the book is a casual one, in an extended and fairly tech­
nical letter to Combe dated 22 January 1853, on the subject of 
Biblical criticism (perhaps its very casualness belies her com­
fortable acquaintance with the work): "By the bye, I wonder if 
you have read a clever work on 'Jesus-Christ et sa doctrine,' by 
Salvador, a free-thinking Jew, in which the writer attempts to 
shew that the Mosaic system presented the quintessence of po­
litical and social wisdom, and that, morally, it was an adum­
bration of the doctrine contained in The Constitution of 
Man'."49 The Constitution of Man is a work extremely signifi­
cant to this Victorian frame of mind. Mill, Comte, Combe, 
Chambers, Bray, Martineau, Lewes, Spencer, Eliot: one of the 
key common denominators among them all was some degree 
of interest in the science of—and more important, the philos­
ophy that grew out of—the study of phrenology. And George 
Combe's Constitution of Man was the Bible of this new faith. 
After the fanfare of the preceding pages, let me state at the 
outset of this discussion that I do not intend to claim the Con­
stitution as a neglected masterpiece of Victorian intellectual 
prose. In fact, one suspects that it was its considerable weak­
ness as a work of philosophy that was paradoxically the source 
of its immense popularity with the general reading public. In 
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her sketch for the Daily News, Harriet Martineau had an ac­
curate fix on both the limitations and the value of Combe's 
work: "If he did not advance his own department of science, 
but rather hindered its development by his own philosophical 
incapacity, he prepared for its future expansion by opening the 
minds of millions to its conception."50 Later critics were to be 
less charitable: "Combe, benignly rhetorical, had only par­
tially reached a scientific synthesis, and could not compass a 
philosophic one," wrote John M. Robertson in the History of 
Free Thought in the Nineteenth Century.™ George Eliot her­
self said what perhaps is the most that can be said on Combe's 
behalf, in the course of offering the phrenological philosopher 
her editorial commentary on his Relation of Religion of Sci­
ence in 1853. Her comments there apply equally well to the 
Constitution of Man: "We wish to know the moral and reli­
gious views of a thoughtful, experienced and distinguished 
man, not because we expect him to tell us something new on 
these subjects, but because he is himself a new fact—a new 
mind which has gone through the steps of the great prob­
lem."52 
And indeed, much of The Constitution of Man is nothing 
new. We will find its message in the rational divines of the 
eighteenth century—Paley, Bishop Butler—whom Combe 
quotes generously throughout the book: "The system of sub­
lunary creation, so far as we perceive it, does not appear to be 
one of optimism, yet benevolent design, in its constitution, is 
undeniable."53 Whatever is, is right; this is the best of all pos­
sible worlds; the hand of God is to be seen in his creation. The 
Constitution of Man offered deism for the masses; a populist 
Victorian version of tenets once held by an eighteenth-century 
intellectual elite. There is considerable irony implicit here: the 
heterodoxy of one century was to become the best-selling or­
thodoxy of the next; to find God in nature rather than in the 
sacraments might be shocking to the eighteenth century; to 
many Victorians, it was a comfort to find him anywhere. 
J. D. Y. Peel writes in his study of Herbert Spencer that The 
Constitution of Man "furnished a bridge between traditional 
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religion and purely secular amelioration . .  . a deistic, this-
worldly, natural religion . .  . it was one of the agencies of 
popular secularization."54 
But once we strip away the comforting trappings of Butler 
and Paley, just how religious is The Constitution of Man} 
This is a question that aroused considerable controversy. 
Among the pious conservatives, phrenology was inextricably 
associated with atheism. If one believed that mind was matter, 
surely little room was left for an immortal soul or divine inspi­
ration. But George Combe himself would not have agreed. In 
fact, he opens with the unequivocal pronouncement that 
"there is not one practical result of the natural laws expounded 
in the subsequent pages, which does not harmonize precisely 
with the practical aspects of the New Testament." Yet Combe 
closes with a provocative (and characteristically egotistical) 
comparison of himself to Galileo. In any clash between the 
Church and Nature, the latter will win, says Combe, "because 
the evidence of physical nature is imperishable and insupera­
ble, and cannot give way to any authority whatever. The same 
consequence will evidently happen in regard to phrenology. If 
it were possible that any facts in physiology did not actually 
and directly contradict any interpretation of Scripture, it is not 
difficult to perceive which must yield."55 So much for the 
Church! 
In fact, The Constitution of Man consists of two arguments 
that have little to do with each other. What I will call its first 
gospel, the pious deistic veneer, the optimistic "handbook of 
natural religion," undoubtedly accounted for the book's mass 
appeal. What it offered that seemed new and attractive to the 
Victorian reader was this: Combe apparently places eigh­
teenth-century deism within the context of nineteenth-century 
science, a new, positivistic world-view; exemplified-for Combe 
by phrenology. The Constitution of Man teased the Victorian 
reader with the assurance that the old religion could continue 
to exist side-by-side with the new science. 
Bur a closer look at the Constitution reveals that Robertson 
was absolutely correct in his accusation that Combe failed to 
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achieve a philosophic or scientific synthesis. Combe never of­
fers any convincing arguments to explain how phrenology and 
faith coexist. He persistently shirks the Galilean clash between 
religion and science, avoiding any real explanation of the re­
ligious implications of his second gospel: that is, the genu­
inely radical view of human nature and the relation between 
man and his environment predicated on the science of phre­
nology. 
"I do not intend to teach that the natural laws, discerned by 
unassisted reason, are sufficient for the salvation of man with­
out revelation," equivocates Combe. Actually, he will eschew 
the other-worldly altogether: "To enjoy this world, I humbly 
maintain, that man must discover and obey the natural laws." 
Combe's real subject in The Constitution of Man has nothing 
to do with religion at all: "My object, I repeat, is to investigate 
the natural constitution of the human body and mind, their 
relations to external objects and beings in this world, and the 
causes of action that, in consequence, appear to be beneficial 
or hurtful in this life.56 
It would remain for the two thinkers to whom I turn in the 
next chapter, Charles Bray and Harriet Martineau, to confront 
more honestly the theological and ethical implications of these 
natural laws; to face uncomfortable words like "determinism"; 
and to receive (in contrast to the mass popularity that greeted 
Combe's opus) outraged accusations of atheism.57 But here I 
wish to look more closely at Combe's second gospel, his inves­
tigation of "the natural constitution of the human body and 
mind, their relations to external objects and beings in this 
world." This was the book, I believe, that was read by and had 
a significant influence on this circle of Victorian intellectuals; 
not Combe's vague and optimistic rehash of eighteenth-cen­
tury deism. 
As I have suggested above, Combe had little of real interest 
to say about religion, or about the relationship between science 
and belief. But he did have a great deal that was more revolu­
tionary to offer on the subject of man's place "in this world." I 
will shortly argue that through the work of Combe's close 
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friend Robert Chambers, who possessed in abundance just 
what Combe lacked—a brilliant ability to synthesize— 
Combe's notions of "the constitution of the human body and 
mind" and their implications for man's place in nature would 
pass into the mainstream of Victorian evolutionary thought. 
But first, let me explicate Combe's second gospel. Chapter 1 
of The Constitution of Man is entitled "Of Natural Laws"; it 
contains much that should strike the reader as familiar after 
Mill and Comte. Combe begins with the premise that the laws 
of nature "are universal, unbending, and invariable in their 
operation." These laws "have formed an interesting subject of 
inquiry to philosophers of all ages," admits Combe; "but, so 
far as I am aware, no author has hitherto attempted to point 
out, in a combined and systematic form, the relations between 
those laws and the constitution of man."58 Reviewing Combe's 
book On The Relation Between Science and Religion for the 
Westminster Review in 1857, H. B. Wilson offers a good sum­
mary of the phrenologist's logical progression from "laws of 
mind" to "universal law": "If it could indeed be sufficiently 
established, that there exists an uniform relation between cer­
tain ascertained forms of the brain, in its parts, and certain in­
tellectual and moral powers . . . this would certainly furnish 
an illustration of the general laws of uniformity, order, and 
mediate action in the universe."59 The final bastion has fallen: 
mind too is subject to universal causation. For Combe, as for 
Auguste Comte, a science of psychology is the last battle­
ground, the ultimate proof that law reigns everywhere. 
The Constitution of Man can be read as a practical exercise 
in Mill's ethology or Comte's social physics: "The present Es­
say," writes Combe, "is an attempt, (a very feeble and imper­
fect one indeed), to arrive, by the aid of phrenology, at a dem­
onstration of morality as a science." "We are physical, organic, 
and moral beings, acting under general laws," he asserts. Like 
Comte, Combe organizes his system hierarchically: "The or­
ganic law rises above the physical, and the moral and intellec­
tual law above the organic."60 We can translate for Combe's 
"physical" Comte's astronomy and chemistry; for "organic," 
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biology; for "moral and intellectual," "social physics." But 
like Comte, Combe stresses the fundamental unity of this hi­
erarchy: it is the same law that rules on all levels. Man himself 
embodies the living proof of this unity: at the apex of creation, 
he is a walking synthesis of the physical, the organic, and the 
moral. Like Comte, Combe desires to unite the parts into the 
whole, to formulate the grand synthesis, in which the many 
become the one: "Hence it is only after ultimate principles 
have been discovered, their relations ascertained, and this 
knowledge systematized, that science can attain its full char­
acter of utility."61 Combe's claim that phrenology will do for 
the human sciences what Copernicus and Newton did for the 
physical sciences may seem almost comically hubristic; but 
this systematizing and unifying impulse is absolutely central 
to the phrenological philosophy. 
And after all, what better model for the many in the one, the 
one in the many than phrenology's chart of the human brain, 
"that unhappy continent on which Gall had already put more 
federated faculties than there are states in the German Bund," 
as James Martineau once sarcastically observed.62 In The Con­
stitution of Man Combe offers the classical phrenological out­
line of the human mind (fig. 2.1). There are two "orders": 
"feelings" (significantly first) and "intellectual faculties"; the 
former broken down into two "genus(es)": "propensities" and 
"sentiments," containing a total of eighteen separate "or­
gans," from "amativeness" and "philoprogenitiveness" 
through "veneration" and "hope," to "conscientiousness" 
and "firmness"; the latter, into four "genus(es)": "external 
senses," "intellectual faculties" (of two sorts), and "reflecting 
faculties"; the four breaking down into a total of fifteen differ­
ent "organs." But ultimately, of course, we are talking about a 
single human mind, that living personality that is the sum of 
its many parts. 
And thus we come to the other pole of the phrenological phi­
losophy, that aspect of the science that entitles it with certainty 
to rank as a Victorian yoking of polar opposites. For as surely 
as phrenology was a monistic cosmology, it was also a science 
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9 CONSTITUTION OF MAN. 
Order I FEELINGS.

Genaf I. PROPENSITIES— Common to Man untk

the Lower Anxmali

1. AMATIVENB** ; Produces sexual love. 
5.	 PHILOPROOENITIVENESS.—U$et: Love of offspring. 
—Abuses : Pampering and spoiling children. 
3.	 CONCBNTBATIVENBS*.—V*t»: It gives the desire 
for permanence m place, and for permanence of 
emotions and ideas in the mind.—Abuses: Aver­
sion to move abroad ; morbid dwelling on inter­
nal emotions and ideas, to the neglect of external 
impressions. 
4.	 ADHESIVENESS.—Uses : Attachment; friendship, 
and society result from it.—Abuait: Clanship for 
improper object*, attachment to worthless individu­
als. It is generally large in women. 
6.	 COMBATIVENESS.—Uses: Courage to meet danger, 
to overcome difficulties, and to resist attacks.— 
Abuses : Love of contention, and tendency to 
provoke and assault. 
0.	 DESTBUCTIVE.NESS.—Ute$: Desire to destroy noi­
ious objects, and to kill for food. It is very dis­
cernible in carnivorous animals.—Abuses: Cruel­
ty, desire to torment, tendency to passion, rage, 
harshness and severity in speech and writing. 
7.	 CONSTBUCTIVENESS.—Uses: Desire to buiId and 
construct works of art.—Abuses: Construction of 
engines to injure or destroy, and fabrication of ob­
jects to deceive mankind. 
8.	 ACQUISITIVENESS.—Uses: Desire to possess, and 
tendency to accumulate articles of utility, to pro­
vide against want.—Abuses: Inordinate desire for 
property ; selfishness ; avarice. 
9.	 SECEETIVENESS —Uses: Tendency to restrain with­
in the mind the various emotions and ideas that 
involuntarily present themselves, until the judg­
ment has approved of giving them utterance; it 
also aids the artist and the actor in giving expres­
sion ; and is an ingredient in prudence.—Abuses : 
Cunning, deceit, duplicity, lying, and, joined with 
Acquisitiveness, theft. 
Genus II SENTIMENTS. 
1. Sentiments common to Man with the Lower Animals. 
10.	 SELF-ESTEEM.—Uses: Self-interest, love of inde­
pendence, personal dignity—Abuses: Pride, dis­
dain, overweening conceit, excessive selfishness, 
love of dominion. 
11.	 I/OVE or APPBOBATION.—Uses: Desire of the es­
teem of others, love of praise, desire of fame or 
glory —Abuses . Vanity, ambition, thirst for praise 
independent of praiseworthinens. 
12.	 CAUTIOUSNEKS —Uses : It gives origin to the sen­
timent of fear, the demrc to shun clanger, to cir­
cumspection ; and it is an ingredient in prudence. 
—Abuses : Excessive timidity, poltroonery, un­
founded apprehensions, despondency, melancholy. 
13.	 BENEVOLENCE.—Uses: Desire of the happiness of 
others, universal charity, mildness of disposition, 
and a lively sympathy with the enjoyment of all 
animated beings.—Abuses : Profimion, injurious 
indulgence of the appetites and fancies of others, 
prodigality, facility of temper. 
II. Sentiments proper to Man. 
14.	 VENEBATION.—Uses: Tendency to worship, adore, 
venerate, or respect whatever is great and good ; 
gives origin to the religious sentiment.—Abuses : 
Senseless respect for unworthy objects consecra­
ted by time or situation, love of antiquated cus­
toms, inject subserviency to persons in authority, 
superstition 
16	 HOPE —Uses : Tendency to expect and to look for­
ward to the future with confidence and reliance ; 
it cherishes faith —Abuses: Credulity, absurd ex­
pectation* of felicity not founded on reason. 
10.	 IDEALITY.—Uses : Love of the beautiful and splen­
did, the desire of excellence, poetic feeling — 
Abuses: Extravagance and absurd enthusiasm, 
preference of the showy and glaring to the solid 
and useful, a tendency to dwell in the regions of 
fancy, and to neglect the duties of life. 
WONDEB.—Uses: The desire of novelty, admiration 
of the new, the unexpected, the grand, and extra­
ordinary.—Abuses: \jove of the marvellous, as­
tonishment.—Note. Veneration, Hope, and Won­
der, combined, give the tendency to religion ; their 
abuses produce superstition and belief in false 
miracles, in prodigies, magic, ghosts, and all su­
pernatural absurdities. 
17.	 CoN8ciousNP.ss—Uses: It gives origin to the 
sentiment of justice, or respect for the rights of 
others, openness to conviction, the love of truth. 
Alnises : Scrupulous adherence to noxious princi­
ples when ignorantly embraced, excessive refine­
ment in the views ol duty and obligation, excess 
in remorse, or self-condemnation. 
18.	 FIRMNESS.—Uses: Determination, perseverance, 
steadiness of purpose—Abuses : Stubbornness, 
infatuation, tenacity in evil. 
Order II INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES

Genus I. EXTERNAL SENSES.

Uses: To bring man into com­
munication with external objects, FEELING or TOUCH 
TASTE. and to enable him to enjoy them 
SMELL. Abuses: Excessive indulgence 
HEARING. in the pleasures arising from the 
senses, to the extent of impair-LIOHT. ing the organs and debilitating 
the mind.

Genus II. INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES—ichch

perceive existence.

19.	 INDIVIDUALITY—Takes cognizance of existence 
and simple facts 
EVENTUALITY—Takes	 cognizance of occurrences 
and events. 
20.	 FOBM—Renders man observant of form. 
21.	 SIZE—Renders man observant of dimensions, and 
aids perspective. 
22.	 WEIGHT—Communicates the perception of momen­
tum, weight, resistance, and aids equilibrium. 
23. COLOURING—Gives perception of colours. 
Genus III. INTELLECTUAL FACULTIES— 
which perceive the relations of external objects. 
24.	 LOCALITY—Gives the idea of space and relative 
position. 
25.	 ORDER—Communicates the love of physical ar­
rangement. 
26.	 TIMK—Gives rise to the perception of duration. 
27.	 NUMBER—Gives a turn for arithmetic and algebra. 
28.	 TUNE—The sense of Melody arises from it 
29.	 LANOUAOK—f iives a facility in acquiring a know­
ledge of arbitrary signs to exprws thoughts—a 
felicity in the use of them—and a power of invent­
ing them. 
Genus IV REFLECTING FACULTIES—*>AKA 
compare, judge, and discriminate. 
30.	 COMPARISON—Gives the power of discovering ana­
logies and resemblances. 
31.	 CAUS\LITV—To trace the dependencies of pheno­
mena, and thi' relation of cause and effect. 
32.	 WIT—Gives th« feeling and the ludicrous 
33.	 IMITATION—To copy tho manners, gestures, and 
actions of others, and nature generally. 
The first glance nt these faculties suffices to show, 
that they are not all equal in excellence and elevation ; 
that some are common to man with the lower animals ; 
and others peculiar to man. In comparing the human 
mind, therefore, with its external condition, it become* 
Fu;. 2. From George Combe, The Constitution of Man (New York, 1835). 
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of human nature that took into account, more fully than any 
previous attempts at such a science had done, the intense par­
ticularity of the individual personality. Just as seriously as 
phrenology proclaimed the deductive abstraction, it investi­
gated the empirical detail. 
Each individual, according to phrenology, is a highly vari­
able and absolutely unique combination of these multiple 
"propensities," "sentiments," and "faculties." Phrenology 
was the first psychology to focus on individual differences 
rather than normative faculties; Gall is thus "the first modern 
empirical psychologist of character and personality." With 
phrenology, psychology took a giant step toward the science as 
we know it today; Gall and his followers found evidence for 
their theories not in the library, or even entirely in the labora­
tory, but also in the living world of human society, as they 
turned "away from speculations and toward common society, 
family life, schools, the jails and asylums, medical cases, the 
press, men of genius, and the biographies of great or notorious 
men."6S If phrenology was biology, it was also natural history. 
Needless to say, this vision of human nature had a wealth to 
offer the would-be novelist, George Eliot, who wrote on "The 
Natural History of German Life" for the Westminster Review 
in 1856 in scorn of the tendency created by "the splendid con­
quests of modern generalization, to believe that all social ques­
tions are merged in economic science, and that the relations of 
men to their neighbours may be settled by algebraic equa­
tions," championing instead the same "natural history" she 
would herself employ as a novelist: "a real knowledge of the 
People, with a thorough study of their habits, their ideas, their 
motives."64 Nothing could seem more rational than the ele­
vated abstractions of the phrenological cosmology; yet as we 
have already seen, phrenology placed emotion above intellect 
(topologically as well as ideologically!). "In my view," writes 
George Combe, in words worthy of sympathetic novelist 
George Eliot, "knowledge by itself is comparatively worthless 
and impotent, compared with what it becomes when vivified 
by elevated emotions. It is not enough that Intellect is in­
formed; the moral faculties must simultaneously cooperate."65 
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One other aspect of the phrenological view of human nature 
is also worth noting here: "No faculty is bad, but, on the con­
trary, each has a legitimate sphere of action." The infinite var­
iables into which the mental faculties could combine, and the 
infinite shadings of the use and abuse of each (no faculty is 
necessarily good, either), in conjunction with phrenology's 
emphasis on the primacy of emotion and the "moral facul­
ties," led to a philosophy with a rich potential for exploration 
of the intricacies of human nature without the reductive onus 
of good and evil to inhibit the investigation. 
"This is the doctrine of Phrenology exactly: that the endow­
ments of men are unequal; and that, as their circumstances 
vary, their faculties for the cultivation of their powers, vary 
also; and consequently, that their responsibility varies."66 
With this statement Combe introduces a new and crucial vari­
able into the investigative process: circumstances. Thus far I 
have focused my discussion on the first half of Combe's title: 
"the constitution of man." But with the second half of the title 
of this work, "in relation to external objects," Combe removes 
phrenology from the eighteenth-century realm of static, innate 
mental endowment where it had begun with Gall, and places 
it within the changeful Victorian cosmos. 
I conclude by returning to the distinction with which my 
discussion of The Constitution of Man began: the two gospels 
of George Combe; one, of the eighteenth century, the other, of 
the nineteenth. This dichotomy reappears when we turn to the 
question of the relation between "the constitution of man" and 
"exterrial objects." I will indulge in a vast generalization for 
the purposes of sorting out Combe's two arguments: from the 
eighteenth-century viewpoint, the static world is benevolently 
adapted to "the constitution of man," "it is constituted in har­
mony with the whole faculties of man"; in the nineteenth-cen­
tury view, man is adapted to the constitution of the world: "It 
is obvious that the very scheme of creation which I have de­
scribed, implies that man is a progressive being."67 As the re­
mainder of this chapter will illustrate, phrenology and the pre-
Darwinian development hypothesis were to prove remarkably 
compatible. 
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III. MORE THAN METAPHOR: PHRENOLOGY AS MENTAL GEOLOGY 
The Bedesman ought to profit by such a journey; whether any glimpse 
of beauty will irradiate my Physiology may be more confidently ques­
tioned. It was so very amusing to find myself thinking of 'nerve cells' 
amid the grand mountains, and of physiological processes on the shores 
of a lake. But after all the two went perfectly well together.—G. H. 
Lewes to John Blackwood, Dresden, 19 July 1858 
Although she was to chide Aristotle for his praise of meta­
phor, indulging in a "lamentation that intelligence so rarely 
shows itself in speech without metaphor that we can so seldom 
declare what a thing is except by saying it is something else," 
George Eliot herself was an inveterate employer of metaphors 
long before she put them to brilliant novelistic use.68 In Eliot's 
letters of the late 1830s and 1840s, the young and self-conscious 
phrenological enthusiast repeatedly describes the human mind 
in physical, chemical, biological, and geological metaphors. 
Since George Eliot here speaks vividly for herself, let me 
simply list some examples. Physics: "The poor girl's brain is 
fast loosing its little specific gravity and is flying off to Mil­
ton's limbo."69 Chemistry: "He is evidently a character made 
up of natural crystallization, instead of one turned out of a 
mould" (1:98); "My brain is a very wishy-washy material 
. . . the ideas are like the imperfect crystallizations from thin 
salt and water" (1:210); "Yours was a sort of alkali nature 
which would detect the slightest hint of falsehood" (1:243); 
"My thoughts are all aquaeous—they will not crystalize—they 
are as fleeting as ripples on the sea" (1:274). Biology and "nat­
ural history": "I take too much mental food to digest" (1:47); 
"I should like to send you an abstract of his argument. I have 
gulped it (pardon my coarseness) in a most reptile-like fashion; 
I must chew it thoroughly to facilitate its assimilation with my 
mental frame" (1:64); "The intellectual errors which we once 
fancied were a mere incrustation have grown into the living 
body and . .  . we cannot . . . wrench them away without 
destroying vitality" (1:162); "I have been in a sort of mollus­
cous-animal state without voluntary motion" (1:172); "I have 
been a horrid stagnant pool where you can hear nothing but 
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croakings of miserable batrachian reptiles" (1:244); "I have 
gone through a trial of the same genus as yours, though rather 
differing in species." (1:260). 
Eliot similarly frames a number of brief geological meta­
phors: "a few struggling animals of the new formation in the 
early strata of the new [mental life]" (1:144); the "extinct vol­
canoes of one's spiritual life" (1:282). But the most extended, 
elaborate, and fully-developed of all George Eliot's mental 
metaphors drawn from the natural sciences grounds itself in 
the vocabulary of contemporary geology. In a letter to Maria 
Lewis, dated 4 September 1839, she writes: 
My mind, never of the most highly organized genus, is more than 
usually chaotic, or rather it is like a stratum of conglomerated 
fragments that shews here a jaw and rib of some ponderous quad­
ruped, there a delicate altorelivo of some fernlike plant, tiny 
shells, and mysterious nondescripts, encrusted and united with 
some unvaried and uninteresting but useful stone. My mind pre­
sents just such an assemblage of disjointed specimens of history, 
ancient and modern, scraps of poetry picked up from Shakespeare, 
Cowper, Wordsworth, and Milton, newspaper topics, morsels of 
Addison and Bacon, Latin verbs, geometry entymology and chem­
istry, reviews and metaphysics, all arrested and petrified and 
smothered by the fast thickening every day accession of actual 
events, relative anxieties, and household cares and vexations. May 
I hope that some pure metallic veins have been interjected, that 
some spiritual desires have been sent up, and spiritual experience 
gained? (1:29) 
"It was very kind of you to remember my requests about Phre­
nology," George Eliot goes on to say in this same letter; "I 
have not at this moment any phrenological thoughts but when 
I have I will endeavour to tell you fully all I have been able to 
opine on the matter" (1:30). 
In these early letters, George Eliot reveals herself an enthu­
siastic student of physics, chemistry, biology, and geology. But 
it is phrenology, I would suggest, that provides a rationale for 
her metaphor-making; a more than casual, or purely imagi­
native, basis for analogy between psychology and the natural 
sciences of the day. In her mental metaphors, Eliot implicitly 
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reveals her adherence to phrenology's claim to be a science of 
mind which is fully analogous to the other sciences, both in­
organic and organic. 
"Phrenology is a science of observations as truly as is geol­
ogy itself," wrote Alfred Russel Wallace;70 Wallace, signifi­
cantly, was an ardent believer in phrenology at the same time 
that he developed his theory of evolution. John Stuart Mill 
added an extended expository footnote to a later edition of the 
Logic, offering two examples of the concept "hypothesis," in 
what may prove more than a random juxtaposition: "The at­
tempt to localize in different regions of the brain the physical 
organs of our different mental faculties and propensities was, 
on the part of its original author, a legitimate example of a 
scientific hypothesis"; "Mr. Darwin's remarkable speculation 
on the origin of species is another unimpeachable example of 
a legitimate hypothesis."71 Over a century later, historian Rob­
ert M. Young makes the identical point: "The analogy between 
the theory of evolution and that of crainiology is instruc­
tive. . . . Logically [evolution] was in the same position as 
phrenology for most of the nineteenth century. It rested on nat­
uralistic observations and a mass of anecdotes collected more 
or less systematically. Doubt remained whether the causal re­
lations proposed by the theory were real, or only mistaken ref­
erences from correlations reflecting the union of chance cir­
cumstances."72 
But I will go one step beyond Wallace, Mill, and Young, to 
claim that the analogy between phrenology and geology or 
natural history was not merely formal or logical; similar meth­
ods were to lead to similar conclusions. Phrenologist Charles 
Bray made the point with an appropriate metaphor in The Ed­
ucation of the Feelings (1849): "As geologists show the forma­
tion of the earth to have been gradual, layer after layer being 
added, more perfect plants, and animals of a higher order of 
feeling and intelligence appearing, as the world was prepared 
for them, so has the mind of man been developed, region added 
to region."73 The phrenologist could excavate that "stratum of 
conglomerated fragments" that constitute the human brain 
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and arrive at the same developmental conclusions as the geol­
ogist with fossil in hand. 
For all his assertions of the world's benevolent adaptation to 
the constitution of man, George Combe is finally as much of a 
Victorian in his views of nature as he is in his religious beliefs 
(or lack thereof). Combe's cheerful assertion of man's capabil­
ity of determining his own "progression" ("Intelligent beings 
are capable of observing nature and of modifying their ac­
tions") is only the reasonable eighteenth-century half of the 
picture. As early as page four of The Constitution of Man, 
Combe reveals that he has been reading the geological specu­
lations of Sir Humphrey Davy, Charles Lyell, and Dr. Buck-
land: "Physical nature itself has undergone many revolutions, 
and apparently has constantly advanced. Geology seems to 
show a distinct preparation of it for successive orders of living 
beings, rising higher and higher in the scale of intelligence 
and organization, until man appeared."741 would suggest that 
new discoveries in geology did not so much reveal to Combe 
the existence of the evolutionary process, as harmonize per­
fectly with the evolutionary notions already implicit in the sci­
ence of phrenology. 
Phrenology stressed man's physical and organic as well as 
his moral nature; his oneness with the natural world was im­
plicit in phrenology's assertion that mind was also matter. Al­
though the "intellectual faculties" on phrenology's chart 
were man's alone, all thirteen faculties of the first genus of 
"feelings," entitled "propensities," come under the heading 
"Common to Man with the Lower Animals"; half of the sec­
ond genus, "sentiments," are similarly categorized. Darwin might 
suggest how man was related to the ape, but that he was so 
related should come as no surprise to the phrenologist.75 
"The physical world [is] gradually improved and prepared 
for man," blurbles Combe in a bit of Butlerian balderdash.76 
But George Combe had also read Malthus as early as 1805,77 
and made a statement based on phrenology's credo, three de­
cades before The Origin of Species, that was uncannily pro­
phetic of the conclusions to which Malthus combined with ge­
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ology and natural history would lead Charles Darwin: "Man is 
to a certain extent an animal in his structure, powers, feelings, 
and desires, and is adapted to a world in which death reigns, 
and generation succeeds generation."78 
George Combe opens The Constitution of Man not with 
homo sapiens, but with a discussion of contemporary geology: 
"The crystalline rocks, or, as they are called by geologists, the 
primary rocks, which contain no vestiges of a former order of 
things, were the result of the first consolidation on its surface"; 
"Five successive races of plants, and four successive races of an­
imals, appear to have been created and swept away by the phys­
ical revolutions of the globe, before the system of things be­
came so permanent as to fit the world for man." This 
geological history is a necessary backdrop for The Constitu­
tion of Man's more original subject: "Let us now contemplate 
Man himself." Phrenology complements geology: "The order 
of creation seems not to have been adapted at his introduc­
tion:—he appears to have been adapted to it. He received from 
his Creator an organized structure, and animal instincts." 
Phrenology recognizes both man's similarity to the animal 
kingdom—the continuity of creation— and man's higher cer­
ebral development. Hence the conclusion: "Man is evidently a 
progressive being; . . . the Creator having designed a higher 
path for him than for the lower creatures. . . . Time and ex­
perience are necessary to accomplish these ends, and history 
exhibits the human race only in a state of progress towards the 
full development of their powers."79 
In 1844 an anonymous amateur scientist, man of letters, and 
synthetic philosopher was to explore these "vestiges of a for­
mer order of things," in a work animated by unmistakable 
similarities to the progressive optimism of The Constitution 
of Man: "There is, nevertheless, a general adaptation of the 
mental constitution of man to the circumstances in which he 
lives, as there is between all parts of nature to each other."80 
The author of these words was Edinburgh publisher Robert 
Chambers; the book, Vestiges of the Natural History of Crea­
tion. I reserve my wider analysis of the Vestiges for the follow­
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ing section of this chapter. But here, I would like to stress the 
important links between phrenology and geology in this clas­
sic Victorian evolutionary cosmology. 
Chambers proclaims Franz Joseph Gall's system of mind 
"the only one founded upon nature." He goes on to summarize 
phrenology's chart of the mental faculties, and in that chart, 
finds evidence of evolution: "Bound up as we thus are by an 
identity in the character of our mental organization with the 
lower animals we are yet, it will be observed, strikingly distin­
guished from them by this great advance in development." Cit­
ing studies from the Phrenological Journal, Chambers gives 
evidence that "when the human brain is congenitally imper­
fect or diseased, or when it is in the state of infancy, we see in 
it an approach towards the character of the brains of some of 
the inferior animals." The author of the Vestiges finds this re­
semblance not degrading to man, but rather elevating evidence 
of the "wonderful unity of the whole system, the grades of 
mind, like the forms of being, are mere stages of develop­
ment." This "wonderful unity" does not limit itself to the 
structure of the brain. Like Combe, Chambers finds analogous 
evidence of progressive development in the macrocosm as well 
as the microcosm: "Geology and physiology exhibit lively ves­
tiges or traces of that [usual natural order in the organic crea­
tion] having actually been followed."** 
George Combe and Robert Chambers have both been chron­
icled by twentieth-century historians: Combe, in David 
deGiustino's Conquest of Mind (1975); Chambers, in Milton 
Millhauser's full-length study, Just Before Darwin: Robert 
Chambers and the Vestiges (1959). But it is regrettable that they 
were not better-acquainted with one another's subject matter. 
Millhauser's book is a wide-ranging exploration of the Ves­
tiges itself, its role in Victorian evolutionary thought, and its 
public reception, all within the context of main currents of 
Victorian biology, zoology, geology. But Millhauser knows 
little of the science of phrenology, and suffers from embarrass­
ment that the discussion above should have shown to be un­
necessary. As a result he seriously underestimates the im­
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portance of phrenology to the Vestiges: "Chambers would 
have liked to draw upon phrenology for further evidence as to 
the materiality of mind. He does not quite do so (recognizing, 
no doubt, that his 'science' was not highly regarded by his con­
temporaries); he does however, refer to it in passing, and he 
cites some of the more technical studies of the great Dr. Franz 
Joseph Gall."82 Conversely, deGiustino is equally dismissive 
and bemused on the subject of geology: "Later editions of The 
Constitution of Man provided a definition of geology (which 
Combe spelled with a capital 'g') and quotations from contem­
porary geologists. Everyone was fascinated by the study of nat­
ural history in the 1830s and forties, and the phrenologists 
were no exception."83 But I would argue that phrenology plays 
far more than a passing role in the Vestiges of Creation; the 
link between phrenology and geology is more than a faddish 
simultaneity. 
Outraged contemporary critics of the Vestiges had no diffi­
culty in recognizing the connections between that book and 
phrenology: "If all the mental phenomena in man result from 
organization, in the same way as they do in animals, of what 
is the author's 'immortal spirit' to consist? . .  . As to where 
such a philosophy could come from few men can have little 
doubt," insinuates the British Quarterly Review.™ "For the 
sake of his argument, we cannot but regret the stress which 
[Chambers] has laid on the details of Gall's and Spurzheim's 
phrenology," mourns Francis Newman in The Prospective 
Review.™ The most infamous and vituperative reviewer of 
them all, Adam Sedgwick of the Edinburgh Review, spends 
seven full pages of attack on the phrenological basis of the Ves­
tiges: 
He believes that he is a great metaphysician—that mind and soul 
(as our fathers understood the word) are all a dream—that material 
organs are all in all—that he can weigh the mind as a butcher does 
a joint, by a steelyard . . . that Gall and Spurzheim are the only 
mental philosophers since the days of Plato—that he can swallow 
their whole system without any grumblings among his digestive 
organs. . . . He believes that the human family may be (or ought 
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to be) of many species, and all sprung from apes—that while he 
bestializes men and humanizes beasts, he is a great moralist. 
Sedgwick concludes: "We turn away from the material and 
phrenological jargon of this author with feelings somewhat 
like those which would be raised within us by the impertinen­
cies of a guide who could talk only of ladders and scaffolds, 
hammers, chisels, and mortar-hods, while we were first gazing 
at one of the most glorious monuments of human art."86 
Robert Chambers's acquaintance with phrenology was 
much closer than Franz Joseph Gall and Johann Caspar 
Spurzheim. George Combe's biographer, Charles Gibbon, 
counts Chambers among Combe's "intimate friends."87 Pub­
lisher Chambers was converted by Comte to phrenology in 
1834, and claimed that sales soared after he covertly introduced 
the doctrines of The Constitution of Man into Chambers' 
Edinburgh Journal.88 Gibbon offers direct evidence of the conver­
sion in process (or rather, the proselytization in process), print­
ing an 1833 letter from Combe to Chambers, in which Combe 
enumerates "the leading principles of 'The Constitution of 
Man,' " its promise of a truly "scientific" "moral philosophy," 
its exhortation that men must "modify their conduct system­
atically to adapt it to external nature." Combe was eager to en­
list the powerful publisher of the popular Chambers' Journal 
on his side: "I am induced to express myself thus freely to you 
on account of the immense power which you wield over opin­
ion."89 
Chambers's role in disseminating the new philosophy did 
prove an important one. Gibbons notes that Chambers took a 
strong interest in the Constitution: the first four editions of the 
book sold only 11,000 copies between 1828-36; it was Cham­
bers's more accessible "People's Edition" that sold 59,000 cop­
ies between 1835-38. ("Oh Mr. Chambers, how can you print 
that abominable book?" cried one distressed citizen; "If you 
had only heard our minister on it last Sunday you would have 
burned it! "!K)) 
Chambers's own venture into the constitution of man, Ves­
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tiges of the Natural History of Creation, was published anon­
ymously (by Chambers's friend and fellow-phrenologist, Alex­
ander Ireland) in anticipation of its scandalized reception. 
Among the least likely authors suggested by a curious public 
was Prince Albert (!); among the more likely, George Combe 
himself.91 The Constitution of Man helped prepare Victorian 
readers for the controversial Origin of Species; but it also laid 
the foundations for the Vestiges. "There were many in fact 
who felt justified in seeing an antireligious conspiracy; they 
were now quite certain that Combe's great essay of 1828 was 
consciously designed as a prelude to the evolutionary ideas of 
the Vestiges.*'92 
But Combe was not the only member of this Victorian circle 
with whom Robert Chambers was acquainted. Nor was the 
Vestiges of Creation simply an evolutionary reformulation of 
the Constitution of Man. George Combe had failed to unify his 
two gospels. Unlike him, Robert Chambers moved irrevocably 
into the nineteenth century, to build a confident Victorian cos­
mology that truly "made it whole." 
IV. "ONE MAJESTIC WHOLE":

ROBERT CHAMBERS'S VESTIGES OF CREATION (1844)

The Development Hypothesis is an inevitable deduction from 
the Monistic conception of the world.—G. H. Lewes, "Mr. 
Darwin's Hypothesis" 
Robert Chambers was a lifelong friend of George Henry 
Lewes. After Lewes's scandalous elopement with George Eliot 
to Weimar in 1854, Chambers was one of the few to whom he 
wrote to explain his actions.93 His brief but dramatic entrance 
in George Eliot's biography rests in part on the basis of his 
friendship with George Combe. Combe, as we have seen, was 
aghast at the liaison, and John Chapman attempted to placate 
Combe's moral outrage by "commissioning] Mr. Robert 
Chambers to say a few words to you concerning Miss Evans." 
Chapman also wrote to Chambers himself, begging that their 
more intimate knowledge of Eliot's situation "be regarded as 
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strictly confidential," and indulging in a little moral hand-
wringing of his own: "I think [Lewes] much the most blame­
worthy in the matter. Now I can only pray, against hope, that 
he may prove constant to her; otherwise she is utterly lost."94 
But Chambers's role in this circle as a harbinger of new ideas 
was destined to be far more consequent than his entrance as a 
bearer of bad tidings. The Origin of Species came as little sur­
prise to George Eliot; she viewed it simply as a more intellec­
tually respectable but less compellingly readable version of 
The Vestiges of Creation: 
We have been reading Darwin's book on the 'Origin of Species' 
just now: it makes an epoch, as the expression of his thorough 
adhesion, after long years of study, to the Doctrine of Develop­
ment—and not the adhesion of an anonym like the author of the 
'Vestiges,' but of a long-celebrated naturalist. The book is ill-writ­
ten and sadly wanting in illustrative facts. . . . This will prevent 
the work from becoming popular, as the 'Vestiges' did.9r> 
The subject of Herbert Spencer's first conversation with 
George Henry Lewes was to set the tone of their shared inter­
ests in the early 1850s (although Spencer, characteristically, re­
acted to Lewes's advocacy of Chambers in much the same way 
he had received George Eliot on Comte's hierarchy of the sci­
ences): "One of our topics was the development hypothesis; 
and I remember surprising Mr. Lewes by rejecting the interpre­
tation set forth in the Vestiges of The Natural History of Cre­
ation: he having supposed that that was the only interpreta­
tion."96 But just as Herbert Spencer could never quite detach 
himself from Comte, so subsequent critics of Spencer have sug­
gested that Chambers's evolutionary philosophy ultimately 
has more in common with Spencer than it does with Darwin.97 
Spencer's own earliest pronouncements on "The Develop­
ment Hypothesis" were published in the 20 March 1852 
Leader, under Lewes's editorship. Although it was not Spen­
cer's first essay, he later reprinted it at the head of Essays Sci­
entific, Political, and Speculative, "because it came first in or­
der of thought, and struck the keynote of all that was to 
follow."98 Chambers initiated Herbert Spencer's interest in ev­
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olutionary psychology, which culminated in The Principles 
of Psychology. 
George Henry Lewes's shared fascination with the subject at 
this time was carried on in print as well as in private conver­
sation. When Lewes wrote on "A Precursor of the Vestiges" for 
Fraser's in November 1857, he claimed to "have been long col­
lecting materials for the history of this and similar concep­
tions."99 Always the historian of ideas, Lewes traced the devel­
opment hypothes i s through "Lyel l and Owen on 
Development" (Leader, 18 October 1851) and "Von Baer on the 
Development Hypothesis" (Leader, 25 June 1853). But even in 
those essays, he had words in defense of the Vestiges of Crea­
tion: "There are faults in that delightful work; errors both in 
fact and philosophy; but compared with the answers it pro­
voked, we cannot help regarding it as a masterpiece."100 
Lewes's evolutionary essays climaxed with a series of four ar­
ticles for the Leader on the Vestiges itself, on the occasion of 
the tenth edition of the work.101 Despite his characteristic res­
ervations about the "metaphysical" dimensions of Chambers's 
philosophy, Lewes was still able to find, nine years after its 
first publication, "novelty to startle, grandeur to enlarge and 
satisfy the intellectual longings of meditative minds."102 Even 
this early in his career, long before writing on "Mr. Darwin's 
Hypothesis" in the Forthnightly Review (1868), Lewes was be­
coming known as a champion of the controversial concept of 
evolution.IOS 
In an essay on "The Argument for Organic Evolution Before 
the Origin of Species, 1830-1858," A. O. Lovejoy claims that 
much of the disrepute into which the Vestiges retrospectively 
fell among historians of science can be traced to T. H. Huxley's 
attacks on the book. Lovejoy is attuned to the rich ironies that 
the history of ideas can offer: Huxley was later to champion 
Darwin on many of the same grounds for which he earlier at­
tacked Chambers. Lovejoy argues that in the early 1850s Hux­
ley's real objections to the Vestiges were more emotional than 
intellectual, a product of "religious tradition or tempera­
mental conservatism." Furthermore, Huxley overlooked the 
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forest for the trees; he was "so shocked by minor breeches of 
scientific propriety in the Vestiges," writes Lovejoy, "that he 
forgot the weightier matters of the law of scientific method. In 
his irritation at Chambers's incidental slips in zoology, he be­
came blind to the importance and suggestiveness of the general 
outline of the writer's reasoning."101 
Lovejoy's analysis of Huxley's attack comes very close to 
Robert Chambers's self-defense in the 1846 "Explanations" 
that he offered his critics as a "sequel" to the Vestiges of Crea­
tion.105 Admittedly, much of Chambers's amateur biology and 
zoology appeared as outlandish in his time as it does today. 
Furthermore, Chambers's critics, like Darwin's, were imme­
diately wont to fasten with alarm on the ghastly theological 
implications of man's brotherhood with lower forms of life.106 
Yet the Vestiges of Creation, explains Chambers, was not pri­
marily intended to be a work of scientific fact; the accuracy of 
particular details finally does not undermine its broader thesis. 
The true precursors of the Vestiges are not to be found in trea­
tises of the naturalists or geologists of the day, but in works 
like Auguste Comte's Cours de philosophie positive and John 
Stuart Mill's Logic. Darwin is above all a scientist; Chambers 
is a philosopher. Chambers's book seeks to incarnate a Victo­
rian world view; its evolutionary theory is subservient to a 
larger monistic credo: 
I must start with a more explicit statement of the general argument 
of Vestiges, for this has been extensively misunderstood. The book 
is not primarily designed, as many have intimated in their criti­
cisms, and as the title might be thought partly to imply, to estab­
lish a new theory respecting the origin of animated na­
ture. . . . The object is one to which the idea of an organic 
creation in the manner of natural law is only subordinate and 
ministrative, as likewise are the nebular hypothesis and the doc­
trine of a fixed natural order in mind and morals. This purpose is 
to show that the whole revelation of the works of God presented to 
our senses and reason is a system, based on what we are compelled, 
for want of a better term, to call LAW.107 
For Robert Chambers organic creation in the manner of nat­
ural law, the nebular hypothesis, and a fixed natural order in 
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mind and morals are unified under one principle: "LAW." 
These three phrases contain the essence of Chambers's monis­
tic synthesis. The nebular hypothesis (the formation of the 
universe) stands at one pole of creation: the macrocosm, inor­
ganic nature. The fixed natural order in mind and morals (em­
bodied for Chambers in the science of phrenology) is the other 
pole: the microcosm of the human mind, organic nature in its 
highest form. As a student of Mill and Comte, George Henry 
Lewes understood Chambers's intentions perfectly: "Life, and 
life in its most complex form, society, are as amenable to rig­
orous Law as any of the phenomena of the inorganic world," 
he wrote in summary of the Vestiges.10* All of Chambers's sci­
ence—his astronomy, geology, zoology, embryology, psychol­
ogy—is quite frankly borrowed (and much of it is of dubious 
worth). What was revolutionary and unique in the Vestiges of 
Creation was its methodological synthesis: "The book, as far 
as I am aware, is the first attempt to connect the natural 
sciences into a history of creation," Chambers accurately 
claims.I(W 
The Vestiges opens with a consecutive account of creation, 
from "the Bodies of Space," formation of the earth, beginnings 
of organic life, to the "commencement of the present species." 
Chambers argues that all these processes, this endless creative 
variety, are manifestations of a single mode: "One set of laws 
overspread them all with life. The whole productive or creative 
arrangements are therefore in perfect unity."110 Like Mill and 
Comte, Chambers believed that the same scientific method that 
informed geology could be applied to biology. As might be ex­
pected, Chambers is an enthusiastic reader of Mill's Logic: 
"There is . .  . no more interesting or valuable testimony to 
universal causation than that presented in the System of Logic 
of Mr. Stuart Mill.""1 His advocacy of phrenology led Cham­
bers to agree with Mill that universal causation reigned in 
mind as well as matter. In the Vestiges Chambers simply ex­
tended the notion to the whole of natural creation. Like Dar­
win, Chambers saw the conceptual link between geological 
uniformitarianism and biological evolutionism. Lewes sum­
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marized Chambers's radical insight: "the novelty consists in 
linking on the hypothesis of Laplace [the nebular hypothesis] 
to a modification of Lamarck [biological evolution], thus 
bringing the inorganic and organic worlds under one magnif­
icent generalization of progressive development.""2 Phrenol­
ogy, the geology of the mind, helped Chambers make this vital 
connection between the inorganic and the organic. "s 
It should be readily apparent, even from this brief summary 
of the Vestiges, that Chambers's attempt "to connect the natu­
ral sciences into a history of creation" would harmonize read­
ily with the interconnected Comtean hierarchy of the sciences, 
from astronomy through biology and "social physics." On 18 
July 1845, John Stuart Mill sent Auguste Comte Sedgwick's 
review of the Vestiges from the Edinburgh Review, and intro­
duced the French philosopher to a man who was in many ways 
his British counterpart: "Sous le titre de 'Vestiges of the Natu­
ral History of Creation' il tache de deviner une sorte de cos­
mogonie positive," Mill writes Comte. Though Mill was no 
more a convert to Chambers's development hypothesis than he 
was to Gall's phrenology, he was sympathetic with its larger 
implications: "Quoique d'une valeur purement negative, cet 
ouvrage n'a pas laisse de faire ici une sensation assez pronon­
cee, et je crois qu'il tend a preparer un peu les esprits pour le 
positivisme.""1 
In this review of the Vestiges, Sedgwick passes directly from 
his discussion of phrenology to an attack upon the nebular hy­
pothesis. The transition is a logical one: the nebular hypothe­
sis is to the cosmos as phrenology is to the mind; it is the other 
pole of a positivistic creation. Though it owed its genesis to 
Kant and Swedenborg, and was further developed by Laplace 
and Comte, the nebular hypothesis became inextricably linked 
in the public mind with Robert Chambers."5 George Eliot 
demonstrates this association when she ridicules Dr. Cum-
ming in her essay on "Evangelical Teaching" (1855), in de­
fense of the Vestiges of Creation: 
He tells us that "the idea of the author of the 'Vestiges' is, that man 
is the development of a monkey, that the monkey is the embryo 
man, so that if you keep a baboon long enough, it will develope 
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itself into a man." How well Dr. Cumming has qualified himself 
to judge of the ideas in "that very unphilosophical book," as 
he pronounces it, may be inferred from the fact that he implies 
the author of the "Vestiges" to have originated the nebular hy­
pothesis.116 
Herbert Spencer examined the nebular hypothesis "that 
stars, and their attendant planets, have been formed by the ag­
gregation of nebulous matter" in his essay "The Nebular Hy­
pothesis" (1858). Spencer opens this abstruse and technical es­
say with a statement that clearly places his scientific interest in 
the subject within the larger context of a Victorian cosmology: 
"Science has been proving uniformities of relation among 
phenomena which were before thought either fortuitous or su­
pernatural in their origin. . . . Each further discovery of Law 
has increased the presumption that Law is everywhere con­
formed to. And hence, among other beliefs has arisen the belief 
that the solar-system originated, not by manufacture but by ev­
olution."117 
"And hence . . . evolution." Chambers added something 
revolutionary to Mill's universal causation and Comte's hier­
archy of the sciences, and Herbert Spencer and George Henry 
Lewes took the conceptual leap with him. In discussing Mill 
and Comte, I attempted to suggest how the notion of universal 
law leads inevitably to positivism, a universal method; and to 
show how phrenology became a proving-ground for such a 
method, what Mill called its "ultimate point": a law of human 
volitions. Such a universal method in turn suggests an inter­
connected hierarchy of the sciences. That hierarchy provides a 
model for a unified natural creation, inorganic and organic, 
the one in many. What Chambers makes explicit is the neces­
sary process that attends the unifying method: development. 
"The doctrine of the universality of natural causation, has 
for its inevitable corollary the doctrine that the Universe and 
all things in it have reached their present form through succes­
sive stages physically necessitated," writes Spencer in his Au­
tobiography."* Spencer and Lewes were to find more reliable 
biology or geology in other scientists of the day (Lyell, Owen, 
Lamarck); but it was Chambers who first provided the ideolog­
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ical synthesis. In my discussion of Coleridge's Theory of Life, 
I pointed out that Lewes sustained a digression on the subject 
of the Theory of Life in the midst of his explication of Auguste 
Comte's Cours. Recall Lewes's fascination there with Cole-
ridge's "definition of life": " 'The principle of individuation,' 
or that power which discloses itself from within, combining 
many qualities into one individual thing."1™ If we remember 
that Lewes was writing on Comte in the summer of 1852, in the 
midst of his series of essays on the development hypothesis, we 
can appreciate the fact that Coleridge was not the only inspi­
ration for Lewes's exposition of positivism: "Thus in an as­
cending series of evolutions from the simple to the com­
plex . .  . we learn to gather the phenomena of the universe 
into one majestic Whole, and learn that all links of demarca­
tion are subjective only. In a word, we learn that Life is an 
evolution, not a separate creation."120 "Thus the whole is com­
plete on one principle," Chambers concludes similarly in the 
Vestiges of Creation, 
the masses of space are formed by law; law makes them in due time 
theatres of existence for plants and animals; sensation, disposition, 
intellect are all in like manner developed and sustained in action 
by law. It is most interesting to observe into how small a field the 
whole of the mysteries of nature thus ultimately resolve themselves. 
The inorganic has one final comprehensive law, GRAVITATION. 
The organic . . . rests in like manner on one law, and that is— 
DEVELOPMENT. Nor may even these be after all twain, but only 
branches of one still more comprehensive law, the expression of 
that unity which man's wit can scarcely separate from Deity itself.121 
It was that hovering Deity behind Chambers's creation, a 
Deity essentially one with George Combe's eighteenth-century 
Artificer, that persistently bothered Lewes. The "primary er­
ror" of the Vestiges, wrote Lewes in 1853, "is the quiet assump­
tion of Nature's growth and development being a pre-ordained 
'Plan.' " Such an assumption, Lewes believed, seduced Cham­
bers into "treacherous metaphysics."122 But Lewes characteris­
tically advocates a conciliatory middle ground between matter 
and spirit: "While Lamarck is too much of a 'materialist,' the 
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author of the^  Vestiges is too much of a 'metaphysician'; one 
lays the whole stress of his argument on 'external circum­
stances,' the other on a pre-ordained plan."l2H 
Fifteen years later Lewes was still chastizing Chambers for 
"the helplessness of such metaphysical explanations," in his 
Fortnightly Review essay "Mr. Darwin's Hypothesis." Yet 
Lewes there affirms a more fundamental affinity between him­
self and Chambers: "The Development Hypothesis is an inev­
itable deduction from the Monistic conception of the world; 
and will continue to be the battle-ground of contending 
schools until the opposition between Monism and Dualism 
ceases. For myself, believing in the ultimate triumph of the for­
mer, I look on the Development Hypothesis as one of the great 
influences which will . . . hasten that triumph."121 No work 
of nineteenth-century thought better exemplifies a monistic 
conception of the universe than the Vestiges of the Natural 
History of Creation. 
Before he turns more specifically to "Mr. Darwin's hypoth­
esis," Lewes offers a provocative definition of what he calls the 
Monistic "Weltanschauung": "It reduces all phenomena to 
community, and all knowledge to unity. This conception, un­
der its various forms of Pantheism, Idealism, Materialism, 
Positivism, is irreconcilable with the rival, or Dualistic, con­
ception, which in phenomena separates and opposes Force 
and Matter, Life and Body, and which in knowledge destroys 
unity by its opposition of physical and final causes."125 With 
this deceptively simple categorization, Lewes offers an impor­
tant key to a Victorian cosmos that may at times seem self-con­
tradictory: the reconciling principle behind Auguste Comte's 
simultaneous idealism and positivism, or George Combe's and 
Robert Chambers's pantheism and materialism. They are em­
braced within a larger monistic synthesis of "Force and Mat­
ter," "Life and Body"—the same synthesis that was to be the 
subject of Lewes's own psychological magnum opus, Prob­
lems of Life and Mind (1874-79)—which could take a Protean 
variety of forms, yet still retain its essential monistic identity. 
It is with this in mind that I turn briefly in conclusion to a 
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later chapter of Robert Chambers's intellectual biography. On 
10 February 1867, Chambers wrote to Alfred Russel Wallace: 
"It gratifies me much to receive a friendly communication 
from the Mr. Wallace of my friend Darwin's 'Origin of Species' 
and my gratification is greatly heightened on finding that he 
is one of the few men of science who admit the verity of the 
phenomena of spiritualism. I have for many years known that 
these phenomena are real."126 At the end oljust Before Darwin, 
Milton Millhauser lifts the veil from Chambers' authorship in 
the 1850s and 60s of a series of anonymous articles and an un­
published manuscript on the subject of spiritualism. Millhau­
ser suggests that the manuscript's inaccessibility accounts for 
its scholarly neglect. He offers a tantalizing hint of its contents, 
and argues that it is not an aberration, but a significant devel­
opment in Chambers's thought.127 
On the face of it, Chambers's conversion in the 1850s to spir­
itualism was a radically disjunctive shift from his earlier ma­
terialistic scientific study of geology, zoology, psychology: 
"His conversion left the Chambers of 'Testimony' at the op­
posite pole from the Chambers of Vestiges.11129 Millhauser con­
veniently employs the Coleridgean metaphor of polarity, and 
counters with a conclusion that interprets Chambers's later be­
liefs as a reconciliation of polar opposites, suggesting that 
Chambers's conversion from scientific theory to mesmeric 
mysticism was an evolution rather than a revolution. "My idea 
is that the term 'supernatural' is a gross mistake," Chambers 
wrote Wallace. "We have only to enlarge our conceptions of 
the natural and all will be right."129 Chambers believed that his 
later spiritualism was just as "scientific" as his earlier materi­
alism; he continued to publish later editions of the Vestiges 
after his conversion, and saw no conflict between old and new 
beliefs ("Into how small a field the whole of the mysteries of 
nature thus ultimately resolve themselves"). 
In both the Vestiges of Creation and the later spiritualistic 
manuscript, Chambers concerns himself with "the general up­
ward progress" of the "great chain of nature." Electricity and 
magnetism were the bridge between the simple laws of matter 
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and the more complex rules of spirit.IS0 In the true spirit of Vic­
torian monism, Chambers's spiritualism is the logical coun­
terpart of his materialism, since force and matter are funda­
mentally one, subject to the same physical laws; life and mind 
are inseparable. And, of course, these are the same assumptions 
that inform the science of phrenology, simply taken to their 
ultimate logical conclusion. 
It should thus come as no surprise that phrenology was to 
wed magnetism, mesmerism, and "electro-biology" in the 
1840s, and that many phrenologists were as likely to be found 
at a seance as in a laboratory. In my next chapter, I turn to two 
other converts, Charles Bray and Harriet Martineau. Like Rob­
ert Chambers, their conversions were really continuities, as 
they walked a conciliatory line between matter and spirit. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
New Faiths—The Philosophy of 
Necessity, "Force," and Mesmerism: 
Charles Bray and Harriet Martineau 
The chain of causes cannot by any force be loosed or broken, 
nor can nature be commanded except by being obeyed. 
—Bacon, Novum Organum 
I. NECESSITY: VICTORIAN HEADACHES AND

EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY OPTIMISM

They must necessarily reject all Principles of Vertue, who can­
not put Morality and Mechanism together; which are not very 
easy to be reconciled, or made consistent.—Locke, Essay on 
Human Understanding 
On 12 August 1838, young Charles Darwin read Sir David 
Brewster's review of the first two books of Auguste Comte's 
Cours de philosophic positive, the first public notice of 
Comte's work in England; the response he recorded in his note­
books was as much visceral as it was cerebral: "At the Athenae­
um Club was very much struck with an intense head­
ache . . . which came on from reading (review of) M. Comte 
Phil." I suggest that this headache was a product of the consid­
erable mental turmoil that Comte aroused in Darwin. Darwin 
was both intrigued and appalled by certain implications of M. 
Comte's philosophy. He clearly recognized both the theologi­
cal and the psychological implications of Comte's universal 
causality: "Now it is not a little remarkable that the fixed laws 
of nature should be/universally/thought to be the will of a su­
perior being . . . one suspects that our will may/arise from/ 
as fixed laws of organization.—M. le Comte argues against all 
contrivance—it is what my views tend to." Darwin's logic re­
luctantly leads him to conclude that, in this godless world of 
cause and effect, man himself is determined by the "fixed laws 
of nature," laws analogous to those that rule both organic and 
inorganic creation: "Now free will of oyster, one can fancy to 
be direct effect of organization. . .  . If so free will is to mind, 
what chance is to matter./M. le Comte/." Darwin worries 
anxiously over these deductions: "Put it so.—Probably some 
error in argument, should be grateful if it were pointed out." 
Such scientific determinism, muses Darwin, bears a strong re­
semblance to Calvinism, with one very significant difference: 
"The above views would make a man a predestinarian of a new 
kind, because he would tend to be an atheist."1 
Darwin's notes on "Mind, Man, and Materialism" were re­
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cently published by Howard Gruber and Paul Barrett. Dar­
win's response to Comte provides a case in support of their the­
sis that the thinking in these early notebooks was to a large 
degree suppressed in Darwin's published work; not because 
Darwin doubted the truth of his conclusions, but because he 
simply wished to avoid the "headache" of an extremely contro­
versial subject.2 
Charles Darwin, of course, was only one of many Victorians 
who wrestled with the painful consequences of materialism. I 
turn to another case of mental anguish that is much closer to 
this particular Victorian circle: James Anthony Froude's con­
troversial autobiographical novel, The Nemesis of Faith 
(1849). "The book after all had been but a cry of pain," Froude 
later apologized, after his youthful skepticism had given way 
to self-satisfied orthodoxy; "It might have been better to bear 
pain silently, but even with a bad toothache an occasional 
groan may be forgiven."8 Aside from a rather chaotic and ram­
bling plot, in which the hero of the novel, Markham Suther­
land, an Anglican priest of Tractarian persuasion, loses his 
faith, has an affair with a married woman (whose child meets 
with a retributive drowning), attempts suicide, and is con­
verted (ambiguously) to Catholicism—all in two hundred 
pages!—the novel is primarily an excuse for Froude's own 
musings on the subjects of faith and fate. 
George Eliot read the Nemesis in the spring of 1849, and, in 
a letter to Sara Sophia Hennell, compared her response to 
Froude to that of Keats on first looking into Chapman's Ho­
mer.4 She wrote an ecstatic review for Charles Bray's Coventry 
Herald in praise of "a spirit who is transfusing himself into 
our souls and so vitalizing them by his superior energy, that 
life, both outward and inward, presents itself to us in higher 
relief, in colours brightened and deepened. . . . The books 
which carry this magic in them are products of genius."5 A 
warm correspondence between Froude and "the translator of 
Strauss" ensued, and Froude soon came to Coventry, to meet 
Marian Evans at Charles Bray's home. Tentative plans were 
even made for Froude to travel to Europe with George Eliot 
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and the Brays after Robert Evans's death; "Was there a faint 
hope of a match between these two fallen angels?" speculates 
Gordon Haight.fi 
Turning to the Nemesis, we find a powerful strain of scien­
tific determinism in the darker musings of Markham Suther­
land: "But, uniformly, given a particular condition of a man's 
nature . . . his action is as necessarily determined . .  . as a 
bar of steel suspended between two magnets is determined to­
wards the most powerful." Froude later returns with even 
greater emphasis to his magnetic metaphor: 
I use magnetic illustrations, not because I think the mind mag­
netic, but because magnetic comparisons are the nearest we have, 
and the laws are exactly parallel. Minds vary in sensitiveness and 
in self-power, as bodies do in susceptibility of attraction and re­
pulsion. When, when shall we learn that they are governed by laws 
as inexorable as physical laws, and that a man can as easily refuse 
to obey what has power over him as a steel atom can resist the mag­
net? 
Like Darwin, Froude also seizes upon the theological aspects 
of this necessitarianism. If man has no choice but to act as he 
is determined, does this not obviate his moral responsibility? 
"Sin, therefore, as commonly understood, is a chimera," he 
concludes.7 
Only two years later, Froude's youthful rebellion was spent. 
Strong proof of this is provided by placing the Nemesis of 
Faith side-by-side with his April 1851 essay in Fraser's, "Ma­
terialism: Miss Martineau and Mr. Atkinson," on the subject 
of their Letters on the Laws of Man's Nature and Development 
(hereafter cited as Letters). The landscape of the Nemesis, with 
its colors "bright and deep," has given way to the nightmare 
topography of Froude's vision of the Letters: "We have trav­
elled along a grim, strange road, beset with ghastly figures; 
and we are coming now towards the sullen land, where no sun 
shines, and there is no sound of prayer, or any glad song of 
Thanksgiving, where hope sickens and faith dies, and neces­
sity, with its cold arms, folds us round, and freezes up our 
veins." Here Froude, like Darwin, sees universal causality as 
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the direct road to atheism: "Effects following causes and law 
being as distinctly traceable in moral as in physical phenom­
ena," according to Froude, leads to the deadly conclusion that 
"matter is all—matter and its functions. There is no God, no 
Father." But how do Atkinson and Martineau respond to this 
pestiferous materialism?: "They bid us come to them, orphans 
as we are, and shake off our terror and be happy in our new 
freedom."8 
And indeed, it is only in Froude's eyes that Martineau's ne­
cessitarian landscape is a "sullen land, where no sun shines." 
In her Autobiography Harriet Martineau chronicles her grad­
ual conversion to the doctrine of necessity, her "repose upon 
eternal and irreversible laws, working in every department of 
the universe, without any intervention from any random will, 
human or divine." And, in apparent defiance of all logic, Har­
riet Martineau is "happy in her new freedom": "With the last 
link of [her] chain snapped," she finds herself "a free rover on 
the broad, bright, breezy common of the universe."9 
If Harriet Martineau calls into question Darwin's and 
Froude's prognosis for the health of the human will under a 
sentence of necessity, Charles Bray, author of The Philosophy 
of Necessity (1841), casts equal doubts upon the necessary con­
junction of determinism and atheism: "I am no Agnostic; to 
me God is not an unknown God. . .  . In the flower, in the 
insect, in the bird, I say here—this is God—His immediate 
work and presence." In a characteristic passage in his autobi­
ography, Phases of Opinion and Experience During a Long 
Life, Bray stops in his garden to look at a poppy, with the 
pantheistic eye of the poet-scientist: "It was white, its fringed 
edges tipped with scarlet, the other part of the flower was beau­
tifully and symmetrically striped. . .  . I could not but think, 
with wonder, who made this, and who made it so beautiful to 
me? . . . Professor Tyndall tells us that it takes 477 millions 
of vibratory waves to produce the sensation of the colour we 
call red."10 Bray concludes this discussion with the words of his 
friend George Eliot, speaking in Adam Bede of "an unfath­
omable ocean of love and beauty": "Our emotion in its keenest 
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moment passes from expression into silence—our love at its 
highest flood rushes beyond its object and loses itself in the 
sense of Divine mystery."11 
Darwin deals with the conflict between new scientific theo­
ries and conventional religion by ignoring it (at least in his 
published work). Froude retreats from youthful heresy into 
complacent middle-aged orthodoxy. But Charles Bray and 
Harriet Martineau take the via media characteristic of their cir­
cle, seeking reconciliation of polarities within a monistic cos­
mology. If George Combe and Robert Chambers are the scien­
tists of this Victorian circle (albeit with a philosophical 
intent), Bray and Martineau are its theologians (their creed 
founded on scientific theory). They preach the gospel of neces­
sity; based upon a positivistic methodology similar to Mill's 
and Comte's, and buttressed by an enthusiastic advocacy of 
phrenology. Their union of mesmerism with phrenology com­
pletes the synthesis of matter and spirit. Yet Darwin and 
Froude may seem more logically consistent in their anxious 
and doubtful conclusions than do Bray and Martineau in their 
sunny optimism. 
In order to understand this cheerful necessitarian gospel, we 
will have to come to terms with two central paradoxes: (1) how 
can determinism be reconciled with the necessitarian's claim 
of freedom and (2) how can religious faith be made congruent 
with a scientifically determined cosmos? The painful torment 
that beset Darwin, Froude, and so many other Victorians was 
simply not present for the Victorians in this circle. I offer Bray 
and Martineau as two cases in point of the ways in which these 
Victorians were able to reconcile the ethical values inherited 
from a Christian tradition with the moral implications of a 
cosmos ruled by universal causation. 
Before attempting to answer these questions, it will be useful 
to explore the common intellectual heritage of Unitarianism 
shared by Bray and Martineau, and to look briefly to Joseph 
Priestley, the eighteenth-century precursor and prototype of 
their philosophy of necessity. 
Young Harriet Martineau has been called "the Unitarian 
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prophetess."12 Before she abandoned herself to the philosophy 
of necessity and the repudiation of all orthodox religious 
creeds, Martineau was well-known for essays on subjects Uni­
tarian for the Monthly Repository. Her beloved brother 
James—who broke with Harriet over his vituperative review of 
her Letters—was to remain one of the most prominent and 
prolific Unitarian clergymen of the nineteenth century. And 
the Unitarian background is important to other members of 
this circle as well. Charles Bray was rescued from a youthful 
Evangelical phase by a debate with a Unitarian minister; he 
later wed and wooed his wife Cara away from her family's 
strong Unitarianism. But her brother, Charles Christian Hen­
nell, remained within the sect. In 1838 Hennell published his 
Inquiry into the Origins of Christianity, a critique of Biblical 
literalism that bore striking resemblance to the "higher criti­
cism" of German scholars (with whom Hennell was at that 
time unacquainted). George Eliot's reading of Hennell's In­
quiry has been well-documented as the event that precipitated 
her conversion from Evangelical piety to freethinking ration­
alism.IS 
The "new" Biblical criticism coming from Germany failed 
to startle the Unitarians, who had always believed in the ap­
plication of reason to the study of the Scriptures; it was Uni­
tarian divines who were largely responsible for the introduc­
tion of Biblical criticism from England to the continent. 
George Eliot, of course, went from Hennell to her translations 
of David Friedrich Strauss's Das Leben Jesu in 1846, and of 
Ludwig Feuerbach's Essence of Christianity in 1854. 
Much attention has been paid to the Higher Criticism and 
its profound effect on the Victorian consciousness (and con­
science). But here I wish to emphasize the other half of the Un­
itarian legacy to the Victorians: physiological psychology. 
These two interests are not, in fact, as disparate as they might 
at first seem. "Let us then study the Scriptures, Ecclesiastical 
History, and the Theory of the Human Mind in conjunction; 
being satisfied, that from the nature of things, they must, in 
time, throw a great and new light upon each other," Joseph 
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Priestley wrote in The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Il­
lustrated (1777).14 From its inception Unitarianism allied itself 
with the "theory of the human mind" as well as with Biblical 
studies. The conjunction of Biblical criticism and psychology 
provides another example of the monistic Weltanschauung 
characteristic of this frame of mind. The two fields share not 
content, but form: a common method. 
In an 1831 essay on the German critics, "The State of Prot­
estantism in Germany," Dr. R. H. Brabant, friend of the Brays 
and early mentor of George Eliot, defined Biblical rationalism 
in terms that make clear its affinities with the positivistic cos­
mos of Mill or Comte: "The fundamental principles of Ration­
alism we take to be these:—that human reason . .  . is the sole 
arbiter as to what is to be received as truth . . . that facts rec­
ognized by sense or consciousness form the materials on which 
the reasoning faculty is to be exercised . . . that the phenom­
ena of nature are so linked to each other, that the whole 
. . . constitutes a series invariably uniform."15 Over thirty 
years later, George Eliot reviewed W. E. H. Lecky's History of 
Rationalism for the Fortnightly Review, and broadened her 
definition of the term rationalism beyond "the original appli­
cation of the word to a particular phase of Biblical interpreta­
tion," to include scientific as well as religious pursuits; claim­
ing that "The great conception of universal regular sequence, 
without partiality and without caprice—the conception of 
which is the most potent force at work in the modification of 
our faith . . . could only grow out of that patient watching of 
external fact, and that silencing of preconceived notions, 
which are urged upon the mind by the problems of physical 
science."16 
Eliot's expanded definition has its roots in the eighteenth 
century. Its prototype is to be found in the philosophy of Jo­
seph Priestley. Priestley (1733-1804) was not the literal founder 
of Unitarianism, but his intellectual respectability as a scien­
tist lent the authority of leadership to his theological ventures. 
Although Priestley's influence was less important to nine­
teenth-century American circles of transcendentalist Unitari­
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ans, the theologian-scientist was an ideal inspiration to this 
particular group of scientifically-minded Victorian intellec­
tuals. A chemist of international reputation, Priestley is prob­
ably best known for the discovery of oxygen, and for his exper­
iments with electricity. He also gave a major impetus to 
association psychology by publishing an abridged version of 
David Hartley's Observations on Man, under the title Hartley's 
Theory of the Human Mind on the Principle of the Associa­
tion of Ideas (1775) (a book that Harriet Martineau claimed to 
have "studied with a fervour and perseverance which made it 
perhaps the most important book in the world to [her] except 
the Bible"17). 
But Priestley considered himself foremost a philosopher and 
a theologian. Of his works in these fields, those most relevant 
here are his Disquisitions Relating to Matter and Spirit and 
The- Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Illustrated (both 
1777). Although it was a liaison that agnostic Leslie Shephen 
considered an "unnatural alliance," Priestley himself found 
his two careers entirely compatible.18 "Hereafter, I hope that 
materialism . . . will be the favourite tenet of rational Chris­
tians," Priestley somewhat surprisingly prefaces his second 
edition of the Disquisitions Relating to Matter and Spirit. 
Priestley's scientific researches led him to conclude that "what 
we call mind . .  . is not a substance distinct from the body, 
but the result of corporeal organization." It is easy to see how 
Priestley's Unitarian tradition would prepare the Victorians 
for phrenology: "The seat of the sentient Principle in Man, is 
the material substance of the Brain." Mind is subject to the 
same laws as matter; Priestley's scientific beliefs thus entail a 
philosophy of necessity: "The doctrine of necessity . .  . is the 
immediate result of the doctrine of the materiality of man; for 
mechanism is the undoubted consequence of materialism," he 
asserts. Priestley employs the same magnetic metaphor to pic­
ture this necessity that Froude does: our reasoning with respect 
to the result of "our sensation from organization is exactly sim­
ilar to our reasoning concerning the attraction of iron by mag­
netism."19 
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The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Illustrated was 
written as an "appendix" to Matter and Spirit: it is in this book 
that Priestley attempts to sort out some of the thornier ideolog­
ical implications of the materialism of the previous work, in 
the form of arguments used later by Charles Bray and Harriet 
Martineau. Let me begin my discussion of Priestley's doctrine 
of necessity with the first paradox of this philosophy: its fun­
damental optimism. How could these necessitarians proclaim 
themselves "free rovers" on the "sullen landscape" of neces­
sity? It is here that Priestley, as an eighteenth-century ana­
logue, becomes particularly useful. 
In order to understand the optimism of this philosophy of 
necessity, one must first understand its relationship to a very 
different form of necessitarianism, Calvinism. For the dark 
strand of the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination is woven 
into the background of all these dissenting Victorian thinkers, 
as it was for their Unitarian precursor Priestley. In her Auto­
biography Harriet Martineau goes to the trouble of pointing 
out that the first English Martineaus were expatriated Hu­
guenots, Calvinists who passed from the "pseudo-Christian­
ity" of Arianism to the truer faith of Unitarianism.20 J. D. Y. 
Peel dubs Spencer, along with Bray, Combe, and Martineau, 
"neo-Calvinis[ts]."21 Charles Bray's contemporaries considered 
him the exemplar of the "Calvinist branch of the science," and 
Bray himself acknowledges Jonathan Edwards's "Inquiry into 
the Freedom of the Will" as a major inspiration for The Phi­
losophy of Necessity.22 But "neo-Calvinism" is a misleading 
term unless one emphasizes the way in which these thinkers 
made careful distinctions between what they accepted and 
what they emphatically rejected of Calvinistic doctrines. 
George Eliot wrote in 1842: "Although I cannot rank among 
my principles of action a fear of vengeance eternal, gratitude 
for predestined salvation, or a revelation of future glories as a 
reward, I fully participate in the belief that the only heaven 
here or hereafter is to be found in conformity with the will of 
the Supreme."21* Calvinism preached a fatalistic predestina­
tion: man was born already saved or damned. This might be a 
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heartening doctrine for those who believed themselves among 
the former category of the elect, but the conscience-ridden who 
numbered themselves among the latter were less satisfied. 
Young George Combe was one of such poor souls: "The more 
I believed the more unhappy I became . . . the consequences 
were appalling! Some persons were elected to everlasting en­
joyment in heaven; many more passed over by God's decree, 
before they were born, to everlasting torments in hell. I in­
cluded myself at once in this category . .  . So severely did 
these ideas oppress me, that I envied the cattle that had no 
souls, and ardently wished that I had been as fortunate as 
they."24 One has only to open The Constitution of Man to rec­
ognize the distance George Combe travelled to arrive at his gos­
pel of phrenology, and the immense liberation of its progres­
sive optimism. 
All these Victorian necessitarians retained a Calvinistic pre­
disposition to determinism; but it was their particular modifi­
cation of Calvinistic doctrines that accounted for the shared 
sense of relief and optimism that permeates their philosophies. 
In his Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity, Priestley takes care 
to devote a section to "The Calvinistic doctrine of PREDES­
TINATION compared to the philosophic doctrine of NECES­
SITY." Calvinism, Priestley argues, fails to promote virtue 
(witness George Combe's depressive inertia), because it claims 
that man can do nothing to alter his predestined fate ("I do not 
see what motive a Calvinist can have to give any attention to 
his moral conduct"). Priestley's necessity, on the other hand, 
emphasizes the power of man's reason, in this rational world 
of universal cause and effect, to understand the forces that de­
termine his behavior: "In fact, the system of necessity makes 
every man the maker of his own fortune."2* 
How can this be? The will, argues Priestley, is "a perfectly 
mechanical thing," it is "a particular case of the general doc­
trine of the association of ideas," whereby we will that which 
we associate with pleasure, reject that which we associate with 
pain. But such a mechanically predictable will can thus be 
modified by the understanding; by educating it, altering its 
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motives: "The doctrine of the necessary influence of motives 
upon the mind of man makes him the proper subject of disci­
pline, reward and punishment, praise and blame." This doc­
trine of necessity, unlike its fatalistic Calvinistic sibling, thus 
promotes an optimistic notion of human development and 
progress; furthermore, unlike its judgmental Calvinistic coun­
terpart, it encourages a broadly-based sympathy: "absolute evil 
wholly disappears," since no man is innately damned, but 
only miseducated: "I cease to blame men for their vices," writes 
Priestley; "my system cannot help viewing them with a ten­
derness and compassion."2" 
This brief discussion of Priestley's philosophy of necessity, 
as distinguished from its Calvinistic precursor, helps to ex­
plain the essential optimism of this Victorian circle, freed from 
the gloomy burden of sin and damnation—"the thorough­
going Calvinism that holds that the majority of mankind were 
created simply that the 'smoke of their torment' might serve as 
a condiment to give piquancy to the bliss of the elect," as 
George Eliot so colorfully put it!27 But my second paradox re­
mains unanswered: how is such a system congruent with belief 
in God: Priestley offers no satisfactory solution here; one is in­
clined to agree, on this point, with Leslie Stephen's judgment 
that Priestley's is an unsuccessful "compromise between 
things incompatible." Priestley never disclaims the orthodox 
Christian God as First Cause of the universe, and this results 
in some rather serious inconsistencies in his argument: "The 
full persuasion that nothing can come to pass without the 
knowledge and express appointment of the greatest and best of 
beings, must tend to diffuse a joyful serenity over the mind, 
producing a conviction that . . . whatever is, is right."28 This 
cannot but remind the reader of that optimistic eighteenth-
century Deity that George Combe failed to unify with the im­
plications of phrenology in The Constitution of Man. Priest-
ley's "joyful serenity" here may be deceptive: is it not logically 
the flip-side of gloomy predestination? God's omnipotence 
seems in direct conflict with his notion of man's self-determi­
nation. 
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It remained for Charles Bray and Harriet Martineau to offer 
alternative solutions to the problem of God in a non-Calvin­
istic necessitarian universe. Both Martineau and Bray ulti­
mately jettisoned Unitarianism as a means of reconciling reli­
gion and science.29 Like Joseph Priestley, they sought to retain 
some form of religious belief within a scientific cosmos; but 
their solutions to the problem are far less orthodox than his. 
Bray's God becomes a non-Christian pantheistic "force"; Mar­
tineau goes one radical step beyond Bray, to a "force" that ap­
parently eschews God altogether. But I would emphasize that 
both retain a strong sense of the spiritual, the intuitive. Like 
Priestley, they are fascinated with the interrelationship of mat­
ter and spirit, emphatically rejecting Froude's insinuation that 
"matter is all." 
II. THE RATIONAL ROMANTIC—CHARLES BRAY: THE PHILOSOPHY 
OF NECESSITY; OR, THE LAW OF CONSEQUENCES; AS APPLICABLE 
TO MENTAL, MORAL, AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (1841) 
On 29 August 1851 George Combe and his wife were met at 
the Coventry train station by Charles Bray. They traveled to 
Rosehill, where they were introduced by Bray to his wife Cara, 
sister-in-law Sara Sophia Hennell, and one "Miss Evans, the 
daughter of a farmer." At the outset of his friendship with 
Bray, Combe recognized a kindred spirt: "A ribbon manufac­
turer about 40; a Phrenologist and a convert to the natural 
Laws, with an . .  . excellent coronal region, but great 
Comb[atitiveness] and Destruc[tiveness] and very deficient 
Concentrativeness. He is proprietor of the Coventry Herald, 
which he uses as the organ of the new philosophy and its ap­
plications."80 As we have seen above, Combe was even more 
favorably impressed with Marian Evans. It is not remarkable 
that George Combe should have found George Eliot at Rose-
hill; for during the preceding decade, since meeting the Brays 
in 1841, "Mr. and Mrs. Bray and Miss Hennell, with their 
friends, were her world," as she told friend Mary Sibree.31 The 
friendship continued long after George Eliot left the provinces 
for London; "a beautiful and consistent friendship, running 
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like a thread through the woof of the coming thirty-eight 
years," according to George Eliot's husband and biographer 
John Walter Cross.32 
In his autobiography, Bray nostalgically paints a lovely por­
trait of Rosehill in its freethinking prime: 
There was a free-and-easy mental atmosphere, harmonizing with 
the absence of all pretension and conventionality, which I believe 
gave a peculiar charm to this modest residence. "When the bear­
skin is under the acacia," our friends used to write, "then we will 
come to you," and the spot is still associated with the flow of talk 
unrestrained, and the interchange of ideas, varied and peculiar ac­
cording to the character and mood of the talkers and thinkers as­
sembled there.M 
Mary Sibree remembers telling George Eliot, "as we closed the 
garden door" at Rosehill, "that we seemed to be entering a Par­
adise." George Eliot concurred: "I do indeed feel that I shut the 
world out when I shut that door."31 
After she settled in London in the early 1850s, George Eliot 
was still to return to that Edenic spot, to share the blessings of 
its seclusion and intellectual stimulation with the weary cos­
mopolites who now entered her life. During the time of her 
infatuation with and rumored engagement to Herbert Spencer, 
she intrigued with Bray to organize his invitations to these new 
friends to suit her liking: "He [Spencer] will prefer waiting for 
the pleasure of a visit to you until I am with you—if you will 
have him then. Entre nous, if Mr. Lewes should not accept 
your invitation now, pray don't ask him when I am with 
you."35 Long after George Eliot's more desired companion had 
become George Henry Lewes, Herbert Spencer's friendship 
with Charles Bray continued autonomously over three de­
cades, as Spencer paid solitary visits to Rosehill: "I hope you 
are likely to survive the heavy dose of theories you have had," 
Eliot joked to Cara after one such visit.36 
The emotional bonds between George Eliot and Charles 
Bray were intense: "You are the dearest, oldest, stupidest, tire­
somest, delightful lest, and never-to-be-forgottenest of friends 
to me," Eliot vowed in 1853; "As a daughter she was the most 
124 NEW FAITHS: BRAY AND MARTINEAU 
devoted I ever knew," Bray claimed to George Combe in 1854." 
And the intellectual bonds were equally profound. "I may 
claim to have laid down the base of that philosophy which she 
afterwards retained," Bray asserted somewhat hubristically in 
his autobiography.38 But his voice is unmistakable when 
George Eliot writes John Chapman in 1852: "I [believe] 
. . . that the thought which is to mould the Future has for its 
root a belief in necessity." "In the fundamental doctrine of 
your book," the Philosophy of Necessity, Eliot writes Bray in 
1857, "that mind presents itself under the same condition of 
invariableness of antecedent and consequent as all other phe­
nomena . .  . I think you know that I agree."39 
The deepest communion between Bray and Eliot espoused 
the common ground of emotion and intellect. Far more than 
rational necessity, the "invariableness of antecedent and con­
sequent," the unity of head and heart in Charles Bray's philos­
ophy provided a strong foundation for Eliot's compatibility 
with the sage of Rosehill. The first published letter from 
George Eliot to Charles Bray (dated 1848) suggests this funda­
mental affinity: "I heartily say amen to your dictum about the 
cheerfulness of 'large moral regions.' Where thought and love 
are active, thought the formative power, love the vitalizing, 
there can be no sadness. They are in themselves a more intense 
and extended participation of a divine Existence."40 Thought 
is "formative," love "vitalizing"; intellect and emotion work 
in tandem. George Eliot moves easily from the language of 
phrenology—"large moral regions"—to that of faith—"a di­
vine Existence." It also should be emphasized how remote Bray 
and Eliot are here from the stereotype of the atheistic free­
thinker. Although neither remains an orthodox Christian, 
faith in some very important form still clearly occupies a cen­
tral position in their cosmos. 
The essential statement of Charles Bray's philosophy in 
these early years can be found in The Philosophy of Necessity; 
or, The Law of Consequences; as Applicable to Mental, Moral, 
and Social Science (1841). I offer a reading of this book with 
two objectives in mind: first, to examine it in light of the fun­
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damental paradoxes of necessitarianism that were established 
in the preceding section; and second, to show how Bray's phi­
losophy fits squarely within the intellectual contexts defined 
in previous chapters of this study: the methodology of Mill and 
Comte, and the applied science of Combe and Chambers. 
Charles Bray, like so many of the Victorian intellectuals with 
whom this study deals, is a magpie thinker; he borrows una­
bashedly and quotes liberally from a host of sources. What is 
original and striking in the Philosophy of Necessity is not to 
be found in the parts, but in the whole: in Bray's juxtaposition 
of his sources. Chapter one began with the meeting of Utilitar­
ianism and Romanticism in John Stuart Mill's essays on Ben­
tham and Coleridge: his vision of polar opposites as allies, 
joined in a single progressive force. Written only a year after 
Mill's essay on Coleridge, the Philosophy of Necessity embod­
ies a similar synthesis of two traditions, as Bray moves with 
ease from Locke and Bentham to Shelley and Carlyle. 
In his introduction Bray acknowledges Bentham as a central 
source of inspiration. The utilitarian echoes throughout are 
unmistakable: "Pain and Pleasure [are] . . . the ultimate 
springs of all our actions"; "Virtue, to the Necessitarian, 
means that line of conduct which, all things considered, shall 
be productive of the greatest happiness to all."41 But Bray 
makes the transition from utilitarianism to romanticism with 
remarkable ease: "The happiness of the individual must be 
subservient to that of the human race, and the human race is 
again only a part of the great whole of animated existence, and 
man's situation and position on this earth must have reference 
to the whole of God's plan for the happiness of all." He then 
proceeds to quote from that definitive romantic pantheist, 
Shelley, in "Queen Mab's" celebration of nature's unity: 
Those viewless beings,

Whose mansion is the smallest particle

Of the impassive atmosphere,

Think, feel, and live, like man.

Bray sees no conflict between heart and head: "Such, though a 
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poetical, is yet a logical deduction from the doctrine of neces­
sity," he concludes.42 
Of all his sources, Bray returns most frequently and at great­
est length to fellow-Victorian Carlyle's Sartor Resartus (1833­
34). In Carlyle, Bray finds the solution to Priestley's dilemma 
of God's role in a universe ruled by inexorable cause and effect. 
He is not a First Cause, but a pantheistic Force, says Bray, "the 
all-prevading influence which maintains the connexion be­
tween all antecedents and consequents."1' Bray quotes Car­
lyle's rhapsodic musings in Sartor, which give perfect voice to 
this idealist faith: "This fair universe . .  . is in every deed the 
star-domed City of God; . . . through every star, through 
every grass-blade, and most through every living soul, the 
glory of a present God still beams."44 This mystical power is 
clearly not the Calvinistic Predestinator, nor is it an orthodox 
Christian God. Bray, the scientist and logician of necessity, ad­
mits to the unknowable; his God is an ineluctable force that 
unifies all: "And thus, in a mode mysterious and incompre­
hensible to Man, may the Creative Spirit of the Universe form 
a part of all Nature."45 But Bray the pantheist also remains 
Bray the scientist. The Philosophy of Necessity contains the 
seeds of a philosophy that would mediate between the scientif­
ically demonstrable and the transcendent. By On Force, in 
1866, Bray finds in the concept of "force" a fully scientific em­
bodiment of this pantheistic power. 
For now, I wish to descend from these empyrean heights; to 
return to Charles Bray the Utilitarian empiricist; and to ex­
amine his philosophy of necessity as a product of the scientific 
cosmology shared by Mill and Comte, Combe and Chambers. 
Bray's philosophy of necessity is the logical corollary of uni­
versal causality. 
Mill's Logic and The Philosophy of Necessity appeared 
within two years of one another, and the parallels between 
their views of necessity are striking. In chapter 2 of part 6, "On 
the Logic of the Social Sciences," John Stuart Mill turns to the 
subject "Of Liberty and Necessity," in a discussion he himself 
considered "the best chapter in the two volumes."46 "Are hu~ 
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man actions subject to the law of causality?" Mill opens his 
chapter; "the question, whether the law of causality applies in 
the same strict sense to human actions as to other phenomena 
is the celebrated question concerning the freedom of the 
will."47 Similarly, Bray writes in his "Introduction": "I would 
show that the mind of man is not an exception to nature's 
other works; that like everything else it has received a determi­
nate character; that all our knowledge of it is precisely the same 
as that of material things, and consists in the observation of its 
order of action, or the relation of cause and effect."48 
Because human behavior conforms to the logic of cause and 
effect, man is scientifically predictable: "If we knew the person 
thoroughly, and knew all the inducements which are acting 
upon him, we could fortell his conduct with as much certainty 
as we can predict any physical event," claims Mill.49 Again, 
compare Bray on the same point: "The character of man is the 
result of the organization he received at birth, and all the var­
ious circumstances acted upon it since, and these, if that were 
possible, being given, a mental philosopher would predict the 
line of conduct that will be invariably pursued by each individ­
ual; as readily as a chemist can predict the exact result of the 
mixture of any chemical substance." It is thus that there can 
be, as Mill claims, a "logic of the social sciences"; "The science 
of Morality is as certain as that of Physiology," asserts Bray.50 
Like Priestley, Mill and Bray insist that necessitarianism 
does not doom man to a predestined fate. Mill makes a clear 
distinction between what he calls "fatalism" and "necessitar­
ianism," a distinction very similar to that made by Priestley 
between Calvinism and Necessitarianism. Although our ac­
tions and characters "follow from our organization, our edu­
cation, and our circumstances," nonetheless man "has, to a 
certain extent, power to alter his character," says Mill.51 Neces­
sity, argues Bray, does not "annihilate the free agency in 
man." Although man's behavior is determined by his "mental 
constitution" and his "circumstances," he can reasonably ed­
ucate himself to understand, and thus potentially to alter, his 
behavior. It is thus the very logic of inexorable cause and effect 
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that is the key to man's liberation: "If necessity did not regulate 
[the world of mind as of matter] . . . man's reasoning power, 
which depends for its exercise upon the uniformity of events in 
both, would be of no use," says Bray.52 Similarly, Mill claims 
that moral reason comes from self-understanding: we are "able 
to modify our own character if we wish"; "A person feels mor­
ally free who feels that his habits or his temptations are not his 
masters."53 
Once the positivist millennium arrives, scientifically en­
lightened men will be able to experience just such freedom. 
Significantly, Comte's Cours de philosophic positive preaches 
the same necessitarianism—and the same optimism—as Bray 
and Mill. Though Comte states emphatically that "true liberty 
is nothing else than a rational submission to the preponder­
ance of the laws of nature," he also asserts that "man . . . can 
modify for his own good . . . the system of phenomena of 
which he forms a part . . . directed by an accurate knowledge 
of natural laws."54 Unlike Mill, Bray had not encountered 
Comte as early as 1841. But in his autobiography, he acknowl­
edges the essential compatibility of his philosophy of necessity 
and positivism, quoting positivist Dr. Bridges: "The first and 
last object of Comte's life was to instill that sense of steady firm 
conviction which scientific truth establishes in the regions of 
man's emotions and conduct." Bray replies: "It is this 'new 
thing' that I have been preaching for the last forty years, but I 
was not aware that I had so strong an ally in Positivism."55 
Despite the striking similarity of their arguments, Bray and 
Mill wrote independently of one another. Both based their Vic­
torian world view on a common tradition of British empiri­
cism. "The importance of the principle of Association cannot 
be overestimated," Bray avows.56 John Locke's Essay Concern­
ing Human Understanding claimed, "The liberty Men have 
. . . [is] that they can suspend their desires, and stop them 
from determining their will to any action, till they have duly 
and fairly examin'd the good and evil of it."57 Bray quotes a 
similar passage from Locke in The Philosophy of Necessity; 
he returns to Locke's Essay throughout the book.58 John Locke 
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was the "idol of the dissenters," and his work would have come 
to Bray through the Unitarian heritage; as it did to John Stuart 
Mill in the empiricist patrimony of Jeremy Bentham and his 
father James Mill.59 
However, Bray moves beyond Locke and Mill in two signif­
icant ways: first, like Combe and Chambers, he goes beyond 
mere theory about a science of mind, to claim that in phrenol­
ogy he has found the scientific embodiment of psychology. 
Second, the discoveries phrenology yields about the human 
mind take Bray beyond the boundaries of empiricism. Or 
rather, they expand the boundaries of traditional empiricism. 
For Bray does not leave behind the principles of association 
psychology, but combines them with phrenology to yield a 
new intuitionism, with significant implications for the fledg­
ling science of evolutionary biology. This newborn hybrid of 
the empirical and the intuitive is consistent with the intellec­
tual temperament of a man who quotes Shelley and Carlyle 
side-by-side with Locke and Bentham. It points the way to the 
more lucidly and explicitly stated organicism of George Henry 
Lewes and the evolutionary psychology of Herbert Spencer. I 
will spend the remainder of my discussion of Charles Bray ex­
ploring the evidence for the above assertions. 
Although Locke laid the foundations for a scientific psy­
chology in the Essay on Human Understanding, he had 
stopped short of what he called "physical considerations."60 
The science of the day, he argued, was not yet capable of such 
activities. A century and a half later, Bray believed that he 
could fill in the Lockean lacunae, establish the "first princi­
ples" of a science of psychology on the basis of a "clear chart 
of the mental faculties," "by a method strictly inductive": 
"Such a chart, the necessity for which Locke so clearly ex­
pressed his conviction . . . seems to have been furnished by 
the new philosophy of Phrenology."61 As we have seen, Bray 
was an early disciple of George Combe, and a sizable portion 
of The Philosophy of Necessity is devoted to a straight expo­
sition of the tenets of phrenology. Bray acknowledges that he 
takes his phrenological charts directly from The Constitution 
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of Man; when discussing the physical, organic, and moral laws 
(in a section allusively titled "Man Considered in Relation to 
External Objects"), he is able to abbreviate his discussion: 
"The whole of this subject has been so clearly illustrated in Mr. 
Combe's well-known work . . . that it is unnecessary to pur­
sue it here to any length."62 
Taken in conjunction with the philosophy of necessity, 
phrenology provides the bridge from Bray's empiricism to his 
intuitionism. John Stuart Mill stated in Auguste Comte that 
"the phrenological study of Mind thus supposes as its neces­
sary preparation the whole of the Association psychology."63 
We have already seen that Bray continues to assert the impor­
tance of associationism in The Philosophy of Necessity. But 
significantly, Bray writes in his autobiography that he ini­
tially thought phrenology and association psychology to be 
less than compatible: "Now I had at that time a most supreme 
contempt for Phrenology. . .  . I thought I knew how our 
Feelings had been gradually formed by Association, and that 
they did not therefore exist as primitive instincts as the Phre­
nologists asserted."64 The fundamental optimism of this neces­
sitarianism—the belief that man can modify his desires, alter 
his character—depends upon the principles of associationism: 
man changes himself by forming new associations, new pat­
terns of cause and effect. Yet Bray is outspokenly a phrenolo­
gist in The Philosophy of Necessity. How did he reconcile the 
old philosophy with the new science? 
I believe that Bray found a satisfying method of reconciling 
the two within phrenology itself; a way in which he could 
claim both that feelings are "gradually formed by association" 
and that they "exist as primitive instincts." This method con­
tained within it the germ of an evolutionary biology, which 
would come to full fruition in the thought of Herbert Spencer. 
It is not only an ingenious stratagem to reconcile antitheses, 
but a major contribution to the history of ideas in the nine­
teenth century. On the simplest level, phrenology would seem 
unequivocally to substantiate the notion of innate mental 
characteristics ("primitive instincts"): if each man is born with 
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a certain brain, is not his character thus predetermined at 
birth? Accordingly, George Henry Lewes writes in the Bio­
graphical History that "Gall may be said to have definitively 
settled the dispute between the partisans of innate ideas and the 
partisans of Sensationalism, by establishing the connate ten­
dencies both affective and intellectual, which belong to the or­
ganic structure of man."65 Yet this position, logically pursued, 
would lead to a sort of secular Calvinistic predestination (as 
Darwin, for example, realized), entailing the fatalism that 
these necessitarians so clearly rejected. 
Their solution to this dilemma is an ingenious one: associ­
ation can modify brain structure; this new brain structure de­
scends to the next generation, which is thus born with "in­
nate" tendencies that are, nonetheless, acquired by "expe­
rience." "Associations do not always originate with the indi­
vidual," writes Bray, "but . . . the state of the brain, on 
which they depend, is transmissable to offspring."66 Innate 
mental capacities are thus formed by ancestral "experience," 
and this experience is passed on from parent to child. On one 
level Bray departs radically from the empiricism of Locke and 
his followers: " 'Nihil est in intellectum quod non prius fuerit 
in sensu' is not true," he states; "the Phrenologists have dis­
covered the connexion between the primitive faculties of the 
mind and certain parts of the brain. . . . The indications that 
such faculties give us . .  . must be received as first truths, 
upon which all reasoning is founded." But he nonetheless is 
able to remain true to the fundamental utilitarian principles of 
association psychology by claiming that these innate "first 
truths" are products of sense experience: "All moral rules are 
derived from utility, but the pleasures and pains . .  . on 
which they are based are transmitted to offspring and thus be­
come intuitions."67 
Thus Charles Bray bridges the romantic and the rational, 
the intuitive and the empirical: "Kant's categories are his mode 
of arriving by Reflection or consciousness at the list of Intellec­
tual Faculties or modes of thought which Gall and his follow­
ers have arrived at by observation," he writes in On Force.™ It 
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was Herbert Spencer who was to make explicit the extraordi­
nary evolutionary implications of this new psychology, impli­
cations that should be tantalizingly apparent in what I have 
said above. But I would argue that what has been considered 
Spencer's most original contribution to scientific psychology, 
the concept of racial heredity as the source of innate ideas that 
Spencer formulated in The Principles of Psychology in 1855, 
was already present, less systematically, in earlier phrenologi­
cal theory. 
Phrenology provided Charles Bray with both a solution to 
the dilemma of determinism and a scientific basis upon which 
to reconcile empiricism with intuition. But Bray himself was 
ultimately less interested in scientific theory than he was in 
spiritual truths. In good Victorian fashion, Bray would evolve 
beyond phrenology to the even more radical tenets of mesmer­
ism and "force." 
III. MIND OVER MATTER: "FORCE" AND THE MESMERIC MANIA 
Like Robert Chambers, Charles Bray turned emphatically to 
the metaphysical in the latter portion of his career. The process 
culminated in 1866 with the publication of his book On Force, 
Its Mental and Moral Correlates; and On That Which is Sup­
posed to Underlie All Phenomena; with Speculations on Spir­
itualism, and Other Abnormal Conditions of Mind. Bray's 
concept of force is a logical next step from his philosophy of 
necessity, an epitome of the monistic impulse that animates all 
of these Victorians. 
If Bray's Philosophy of Necessity contains many parallels to 
Joseph Priestley's Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity, On 
Force can be read as the successor to Priestley's Disquisitions 
on Matter and Spirit. But with a revealing difference: Priestley 
begins with Matter and Spirit, whose "principal object is to 
prove the uniform composition of man, or that what we call 
mind . .  . is not a substance distinct from the body"; he fol­
lows this with what he calls an "appendix" volume on philo­
sophical necessity: "The doctrine of necessity . .  . is the im­
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mediate result of the doctrine of the materiality of man."69 Here 
again, the familiar idea: if mind is matter, it is thus subject to 
the necessity of physical laws. But Charles Bray reverses Priest-
ley's order, following his study of necessity with On Force. 
Herein lies the clue to his radical divergence from this eigh­
teenth-century predecessor. Bray begins his career as an advo­
cate of phrenology; like Priestley, he emphasizes the material­
ity of mind—and the attendant philosophy of necessity. But in 
On Force, Bray completes a circle: "Thus physical force creates 
the mind and the mind creates the world."70 Though the thesis 
of On Force may at first appear similar to Priestley's claim that 
spirit is really matter, in fact, Bray reverses Priestley, to argue 
that all matter is ultimately spirit. 
Before demonstrating this claim, let me begin by insisting 
that Bray's interests were not simply from the lunatic fringe, 
notwithstanding George Henry Lewes's scathing condemna­
tion of his later work as unworthy of serious attention. In fact, 
some highly respectable Victorian scientists were fascinated 
with the concept of force. For example, Bray writes that he was 
inspired by W. R. Grove's Correlation of the Physical Forces 
(1846). Grove was "the first to give complete and systematic 
expression to the new views"; but by 1865 his work could be 
collected in an omnibus on The Correlation and Conservation 
of Forces: A Series of Expositions, containing works on the 
subject by such outstanding scientific names as Helmholtz, 
Mayer, Faraday, Liebig, and Carpenter.71 At least two of our 
Victorians other than Bray were familiar with Grove's work. 
An 1855 edition of the Correlation in George Henry Lewes's 
library is covered with his marginalia and markings.72 In her 
Journal for 3 May 1870, George Eliot writes: "I began Grove 
on the 'Correlation of the Physical Forces'—needing to read it 
again—with new interest, after the lapse of years."73 
The controversial aspect of Bray's work lies in his extension 
of the concept of force from physics to metaphysics. In his Cor­
relation Grove announced that he had "purposely avoided" 
claiming that the concept of force "might be applied to the or­
ganic as well as the inorganic world."74 It is just this larger cor­
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relation that Bray will claim: "I could not see why correlation 
should stop at the physical forces, and why it should not be 
extended to mental force."75 Bray, however, was not alone in 
this notion; a leading physiological psychologist had under­
taken a similar path. Scientist W. B. Carpenter (who was, in­
terestingly, the son of a Unitarian minister) wrote in 1865: 
In a memoir of my own, "On the Mutual Relations of the Vital 
and Physical Forces" [1850] . . . I aimed to show that the general 
doctrine of the "Correlation of the Physical Forces" proposed by 
Mr. Grove, was equally applicable to those vital forces which must 
be assumed as the moving powers in the production of purely 
physiological phenomena. . . . This memoir attracted but little 
attention at the time, being regarded, I believe, as too speculative; 
but I have since had abundant evidence that the minds of thought­
ful Physiologists as well as Physicists, are moving in the same di­
rection.7H 
For Bray, as for Grove and Carpenter, the concept of force 
originates in the physical sciences: "Light, Heat, Electricity, 
Galvanism, Chemical Affinity, Attraction and Repulsion."77 
Since like Carpenter, Bray continues to believe in a science of 
mind, he can logically extend this concept from physical sci­
ence to mental science. Thus, Bray opens On Force with the 
claim that "Life and Mind" are forces analogous to, or rather, 
identical with, electricity or chemical affinity: "There is but 
One simple, primordial, absolute Force." 
"Matter and Spirit the same in Essence,*' proclaims Bray in 
Priestleyan tones. But one would be gravely mistaken if he con­
cluded from this that Bray was a materialist. "Force and 
mind . . . are . . . really identical, and the material order 
probably exists, as the Idealists say, only as mental." Bray of­
fers what seems a startling pronouncement, coming from a 
physiological psychologist: "The two apparently diverse 
classes of phenomena may be only one, and . . . the material 
order may exist only as mental." In On Force Bray is even more 
conversant with what might loosely be called German idealist 
philosophies than he was in The Philosophy of Necessity. 
"Force," he writes, is "the true doctrine of 'Absolute Identity,' 
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taught in another form by Schelling, Hegel and Cousin." He 
goes on to quote Fichte and Spinoza: "There is but one infinite 
Substance, and that is God." He even draws on the Hindu and 
Buddhist philosophies. In On Force Bray reiterates the panthe­
ism of The Philosophy of Necessity: "All we see is but the ves­
ture of God, and what we call laws of Nature are attributes of 
Deity."78 
But again, it should be emphasized that Bray in no way con­
siders this belief incompatible with a scientific world view: 
"Science, then, proves the Unity of Force."79 In fact, the very 
appeal of the concept of force for Bray is its origin in the realm 
of the physical sciences. Electricity offered the prototype of 
force (note Priestley's fame as an electrical experimenter); elec­
trical force was both invisible and measurable, spiritual and 
yet material. One cannot, finally—despite his assertion that 
"mind is all"—simply type Bray as an idealist or a metaphysi­
cian. The concept of force incarnates a dynamic unification of 
the polarities of matter and spirit, physiological science and 
the pantheistic oversoul. "A new class of beings or entities was 
thus made known, which seem to exist between the opposite 
confines of matter and spirit, and to partake in a degree of the 
nature of both," wrote J. C. Prichard in 1829, in his Review of 
the Doctrine of the Vital Principle™ Like the Comtean hier­
archy of the sciences, or the development hypothesis, force is 
one more formulation of a monistic cosmology. 
Appropriately, Samuel Taylor Coleridge was an early be­
liever in force, writing in his "Essays on Method" that "the 
masses act by a force, which cannot be conceived to result from 
the component parts. . . . In the phenomena of magnetism, 
electricity, galvanism, and in chemistry generally, the mind is 
led . .  . to regard the working powers as conducted, transmit­
ted, or accumulated by the sensible bodies, and not as inher­
ent." He continues: "This Fact has, at all times, been the 
stronghold alike of the materialists and the spiritualists, 
equally solvable by the two contrary hypotheses, and fairly 
solved by neither." Coleridge, like Bray, asserts that both hy­
potheses must cooperate for the full truth to emerge: "Religion 
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therefore is the ultimate aim of philosophy, in consequence of 
which philosophy itself becomes the supplement of the sci­
ences . .  . as supplying the copula, which modified in each 
in the comprehension of its parts to one whole . .  . as inte­
gral parts of one system."81 My reader will remember that Cole-
ridge's Theory of Life provided a major inspiration for On 
Force, via its explication in James Hinton's essay on "Phys­
iological Riddles" in the Cornhill in 1860. 
"Why should not gravity afford the conditions requisite for 
an organic relation of the masses of which the universe con­
sists?" queries Hinton. And does not this force of gravity, he 
continues, constitute "a true analogue to the vital force?" 
Force, like the development hypothesis, predicates the vital 
unity of man and the natural world. Hinton rhapsodizes: 
To feel the subtle links that tie together the diverse forms of Na­
ture's energy, and recognize, in the sportive youth or vigorous ma­
turity of bird or beast, tokens of the same powers that make firm 
the earth beneath their tread, give fluence to the waves, and cun­
ningest chemistry to the all-embracing, all-purifying air, opens to 
the lover of the animated tribes a new delight. . . . Each thrilling 
wave of life flows warm and fresh, from fountains which the sun­
beams feed, which roll through every fibre of the solid globe, and 
spring up glowing from the central fires.82 
Where the Vestiges avowed the unity of the created cosmos, 
from the nebular hypothesis to the mind of man, the pantheis­
tic priests of force embraced an even grander monistic faith: 
"This wondrous dynamic chain [of force] binds into living 
unity the realms of matter and mind, through the measureless 
amplitudes of space and time."83 
Where, one might gasp, does one go from here? Let me shift 
from the macrocosm to the microcosm, to the specific manifes­
tation of force that most interested this Victorian circle: "Brain 
force, the result of cerebration, also exists in excess in some 
nervous constitutions; it then forms a sphere or atmosphere 
around individuals by which one brain is brought into direct 
communication with others and mind becomes a unity. Indi­
vidual will-power can act through this medium beyond the 
range of individual body. In this way may be explained 
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. . . the Phenomena of Mesmerism, and the Curative Power 
of individuals."84 This statement comes from Charles Bray's 
autobiography, part of his summary of On Force. Henry 
George Atkinson's and Harriet Martineau's Letters on the 
Laws of Man's Nature and Development is predicated on the 
same theory: "What is mind but an evolved condition or form 
of the powers of nature, like light, heat, magnetism?—a form 
of the phenomena of the fundamental power which is acting 
throughout nature, and may, perhaps, be said to constitute na­
ture."85 The laws of mental force might be fully analogous to 
the laws of gravitation, but they had yet to find a satisfying 
scientific exposition: "We have discovered the law of gravita­
tion, and we now want a Newton in the department of mind," 
exhorts Bray in On Force; "mesmerism, clairvoyance, and the 
'modern spiritual manifestations,' . . . are now pressing for 
explanation and reduction to law, and when that is accom­
plished . . . the power of mind will be as greatly and rapidly 
increased as physical power has been by recent discoveries in 
steam and electricity."86 
Franz Anton Mesmer first propagated his theories of "an­
imal magnetism" in pre-Revolutionary France. In his study of 
" 'The Mesmeric Mania': the Early Victorians and Animal 
Magnetism," Fred Kaplan summarizes Mesmer's twenty-seven 
key propositions from the Memoire sur La Decouverte Du 
Magnetism Animal (1779): 
1. Mechanical laws working in an alternate ebb and flow control 
"a mutual influence between the Heavenly bodies, the Earth, and 
Animate Bodies which exist as a universally distributed and con­
tinuous fluid . . . of an incomparably rarefied nature." 
2. Since all "the properties of matter and the organic body depend 
upon this operation" whose influence or force may be communi­
cated to animate and inanimate bodies, it is possible to create a 
new theory about the nature of influence and power relationships 
between people, and between people and the objects in their en­
vironment.87 
In "'The Mesmeric Mania,'" Kaplan divides Victorian re­
spondents to mesmerism into three camps: its spiritual defend­
ers, its scientific defenders, and its opponents. Characteristi­
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cally, the advocates of mesmerism in this Victorian circle 
belong in both of the first two categories. In his study of Dick­
ens and Mesmerism, Kaplan astutely observes that mesmerism 
was a child of the Enlightenment that flourished in revolution­
ary times, a genealogy that produced a peculiar hybrid: a ro­
mantic heritage of "intuition, spontaneity, man as God, the 
role of mystery and magic in the cosmos" in conjunction with 
the eighteenth-century values of "order, social norms, central­
ized reform, progress and science."88 And so, in mesmerism, 
"Coleridge" and "Bentham" meet again. Mesmerism was ide­
ally suited to a Victorian temperament seeking the bridge be­
tween spirit and science. 
Charles Bray dates his introduction to mesmerism from 
1841, the same year he met George Eliot.89 By 1866 he remained 
a strong believer: "My own opinion is that there is an emana­
tion from all brains, the result of both conscious and uncon­
scious cerebration, forming, not spirits, but a mental or spiri­
tual atmosphere, by means of which peculiar constitutions— 
mediums and others, are put en rapport with other brains or 
minds, and become conscious of whatever is going on there."90 
In 1844, shortly after her journey to London with Bray for a 
phrenological reading, young Marian Evans ("M. A.") 
was mesmerized at a dinner party she attended with the Brays: 
"He nearly succeeded in mesmerising M. A. to the degree that 
she could not open her eyes, and begged him most piteously to 
do it for her, which he did immediately by passes," wrote 
Bray's wife, Cara.91 
The vocabulary of mesmerism, like that of phrenology, 
colors George Eliot's metaphors during the 1840s: "It is like a 
diffusion or expansion of one's own life to be assured that its 
vibrations are repeated in another, and words are the media of 
those vibrations"; the atmosphere of Geneva has "the effect of 
mesmerism or chloroform."92 In her first published fiction, 
"The Notebook of an Eccentric," in Charles Bray's Coventry 
Herald (1846-47), Eliot's hero suffers from "alleged states of 
mesmeric lucidity, in which the patient obtains an unenviable 
cognizance of irregularities, happily imperceptible to us in the 
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ordinary state of our consciousness." Eliot describes her early 
hero in the terms of electrobiology: "Any who were capable of 
a more discriminating estimate and refined analysis of his 
character, must have had a foreboding that it contained ele­
ments which would too probably operate as non-conductors, 
interposed between his highly-charged mind and the nega­
tively electrified souls around him."9S 
As with phrenology George Eliot became more rigorously 
critical but no less interested in mesmerism once she left the 
provinces for the Westminster and George Henry Lewes. 
"Thank you very much for the facts about Dr. Gregory's pa­
tient," she writes to George Combe in 1852; "we get impatient 
of phenomena which do not link on to our previous knowl­
edge. . . . This and the great mass of loose statement and cre­
dulity which surround the whole subject of mesmerism repel 
many minds from it. . .  . But indications of claire-voyance 
witnessed by a competent observer are of thrilling interest and 
give me a restless desire to get more extensive and satisfactory 
evidence."91 Eliot had little patience with faddish spiritualistic 
mediums: "Better be occupied exclusively with the intestinal 
worms of tortoises than with that!" (i.e., better be a pure ma­
terialist) she scornfully announced.95 Lewes's skepticism 
would have guaranteed Eliot's intellectual rigor on the subject. 
He was eager to expose "A Mesmeric Quack" in the Saturday 
Review in 1856: "Throughout this pretentious volume, we 
have seen no acquaintance with physiology—hence the su­
preme confidence of its dogmatism," he wrote in review of 
William Neilson's Mesmerism in its Relation to Health and 
Disease.96 
Mesmer himself was no charlatan, and many of his earliest 
advocates in Victorian England were reputable medical prac­
titioners (at least until they began to advocate mesmerism). But 
as the vogue for mesmerism grew during the 1840s, mesmerism 
became a fad as well as a science. In the midst of what contem­
poraries called the "mesmeric mania of 1851," an anonymous 
essayist in the Westminster turned to the subject of "Electro-
Biology" (the name scientists often gave to mesmerism or ani­
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mal magnetism), and painted an amusing portrait of Victorian 
society entranced with its new plaything: 
In a fashionable assembly, experiments on the mental functions 
take the place of quadrilles. Ladies of sensitive and "susceptible" 
organization, gratify a drawingroom with the exhibition of "in­
voluntary emotions," instead of a fantasia on the piano-forte. Stu­
dents at Universities excite them in each other till they find them­
selves incapacitated for attendance upon their classes; and boys at 
school forsake marbles to play tickles with the nervous system of 
their companions; for which the most serious consequences have 
sometimes ensued.97 
However, mesmerism, like phrenology, was subject to seri­
ous scientific investigation as well as party games. In his "Sci­
ence" column for the Westminster Review in January 1854, 
T. H. Huxley bemoaned the "New Demonology" of mesmerism 
and its related occult sciences: "What . .  . is our educated En­
glishman to do?" Huxley recommended as an antidote to this 
"Witch's Sabbat" a thorough study of "the chapters on the Phys­
iology of the Mind in Dr. Carpenter's excellent 'Human Phys­
iology.' " Yet Carpenter himself had proposed "the correlation 
of the physical and vital forces" in 1850. Not coincidentally, Dr. 
Carpenter took a strong scientific interest in "Electro-biology 
and Mesmerism," publishing an essay by that title in the Quar­
terly Review in 1853. There, he attempts to being the phenom­
ena of mesmerism into accord with scientific truth, by exam­
ining mesmerism as a biological phenomenon in light of such 
theories as unconscious cerebral function." George Eliot and 
George Henry Lewes responded with enthusiasm to such a 
genuinely scientific approach: "You should read the article in 
the Quarterly on Electro-Biology," Eliot writes to Bray in Oc­
tober 1853; "It is by Dr. Carpenter—a 'naked neddy' in your 
esteem, but still the first physiologist in England."100 
It should be noted that scientific mesmerists were often likely 
to be phrenologists as well. After 1838 phrenology wed animal 
magnetism, and its offspring was the new science of phreno­
magnetism, or phrenomesmerism.101 In 1843 George Combe 
added a chapter on "mesmeric phrenology" to his textbook, 
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The System of Phrenology; and two years earlier, Charles Bray 
had noted his mesmeric interests amidst the phrenological phi­
losophy of The Philosophy of Necessity.*02 "Every mesmerizer 
should understand phrenology and phreno-magnetism," write 
Atkinson and Martineau in their Letters on the Laws of Man's 
Nature and Development.10* 
Why was this so? On the crudest popular level, mesmerism 
was used to substantiate the claims of phrenology, as subjects 
in a mesmeric trance enacted the appropriate behavior in cor­
respondence to the touch on a given "organ" of their brain. In 
a broader sense, it is easy to see the compatibility of these two 
ostensibly materialist ideologies, both of which claimed that 
psychology was a physical science. But finally, and most im­
portant, mesmerism provided a temperamentally necessary 
complement to phrenology. Mesmerism is "the mind of phre­
nology," write Atkinson and Martineau.104 They might more 
appropriately have called it the heart of phrenology. Mesmer­
ism provided a spiritual complement to phrenology that tran­
scended the materiality of the brain, yet still claimed to remain 
scientifically quantifiable. 
Contemporary critics of mesmerism were quick to note the 
apparent paradox of this spiritual materialism. W. R. Grove 
himself wrote skeptically on mesmerism for Blackwood's in 
1845, and called it a "transcendental philosophy."105 Asking 
"What Is Mesmerism?" in the same journal six years later, 
John Eagles drew attention to what he called a "wonderful in­
consistency in some advocates of mesmerism, who . . . deny 
that there is any such thing as spirit at all, showing at the same 
time phenomena that cannot belong to matter."106 But such 
"wonderful inconsistency" is the stuff of this Victorian frame 
of mind. Within that context it becomes a fully logical and nec­
essary synthesis of polar antitheses. 
IV. MATERIALISM AND SPIRITUALISM—HARRIET MARTINEAU

AND HENRY GEORGE ATKINSON: LETTERS ON THE LAWS OF

MAN'S NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT (1851)

The Letters on the Laws of Man's Nature and Development 
differs from the other texts selected for this study. It adds no 
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new elements to the Victorian frame of mind shared by this 
circle. Martineau is perhaps the least intellectually gifted 
thinker among them; her Letters often seem close to the lunatic 
fringe, light-years away from the logical rigors of John Stuart 
Mill, or even the respectable Victorian system-making of Her­
bert Spencer. But if I had to select, from among the kindred 
minds that this study depicts, a prototypical expression of their 
Victorian world-view, it would be Martineau's. The Letters on 
the Laws of Man's Nature and Development has been relegated 
to dusty obscurity, unread and seemingly unreadable in the 
twentieth century. But a survey of Victorian periodicals reveals 
that it aroused remarkable furor upon its publication, and 
merited considerable attention from highly-respected journals 
and critics. Why? 
The context of the preceding chapters of my study should 
make this forgotten Victorian essay on man more accessible, 
and help to account for the amazing amount of controversy it 
engendered in its own time. The Letters contains a synthesis of 
every interrelated Victorian ideology I have discussed: univer­
sal causality, positivism, phrenology, the development hy­
pothesis, the philosophy of necessity, force. It epitomizes the 
Victorian monist's conception of the universe, the union of 
head and heart, empiricism and intuition. The issues this book 
raises were central to the Victorian age. Letters on the Laws of 
Man's Nature and Development is thus a fascinating case study 
of the way in which lesser Victorian minds seized upon sem­
inal ideas of the period. It provides a fine example of the sym­
biotic interrelationships among the Victorian ideologies 
shared by this circle of thinkers. 
Like her book, Harriet Martineau's fame in her own day was 
far more considerable than her subsequent reputation. Until 
recently, if she was remembered at all, it was often as Carlyle's 
"too happy and too noisy distinguished female," a probable 
model for Dickens's Mrs. Jellaby and Mrs. Pardiggle; an ap­
pallingly energetic spinster with an ear-trumpet, who was ca­
pable of producing, in one two-and-a-half year period alone, 
three series of tales on political economy, taxation, and the 
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poor laws—a total of some thirty-four volumes!—for earnest 
Victorian readers. Even at age three, lisping out "Never ky for 
tyfles!" and "Dooty fust and pleasure afterwards!"—the child 
was the mother of the woman.107 
Martineau, as I have already noted, began her productive ca­
reer as the "Unitarian prophetess." But by the late 1830s, this 
famous woman of letters experienced something of a mid-life 
crisis. On 16 March 1840, at the peak of her fame, she was 
stricken with a mysterious ailment, a malaise as much spiri­
tual as it was physical: "Here closed the anxious period during 
which my reputation, and my industry, and my social inter-
courses were at their height of prosperity; but which was so 
charged with troubles that when I lay down on my couch of 
pain in my Tynemouth lodging, for a confinement of nearly 
six years, I felt myself comparatively happy in my release from 
responsibility, anxiety and suspense." It might justly be said 
that Harriet Martineau took to her bed a doubting Unitarian, 
and rose up a believing atheist: "A large portion of the transi­
tion from religious inconsistency and irrationality to free­
thinking strength and liberty was gone over during that pe­
riod."108 Here is yet another Victorian paradox: Martineau 
found a necessary emotional fulfillment in the passionate ra­
tionality of mesmerism and the philosophy of necessity that 
she could not find in the too-reasonable dogma of Unitarian 
faith. 
The agent of Martineau's salvation, her miraculous cure by 
the powers of mesmerism, was young Henry George Atkinson, 
an intellectual gadfly and amateur mesmerist of considerable 
seductive charms (apparently of a Platonic nature) for older 
women.109 Though the voluminous letters Atkinson left be­
hind (and Martineau herself sent him over 1000) have con­
demned him to posterity as "a bore of the first quality," many 
of Atkinson's contemporaries were charmed: "The noblest 
man I have ever known," pronounced Dr. Samuel Brown; 
"Powerful and sagacious," concurred Margaret Fuller.110 
Closer to this Victorian circle, Atkinson claimed a long 
friendship with Charles Bray: "For more than twenty years I 
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corresponded with Mr. H. G. Atkinson. . . . He was very 
fond of writing, I suppose, as I generally received two or three 
letters a month," Bray comments.1" Lest we think that Bray 
did not take this deluge of correspondence seriously, I point 
out that he quotes extensively from these letters in his auto­
biography, and prints a great many of them in full in a lengthy 
appendix devoted entirely to that purpose in On Force. 
"The firm of Atkinson and Martineau" (as Eliot dubbed 
them) came to call on George Eliot in March 1852, a year after 
the publication of the Letters: "I can't help liking him," Eliot 
confessed of Atkinson on June 5; again, two months later: 
"pleasant and intelligent and one can't help liking him." 
George Eliot claims Atkinson an "agreeable addition" to her 
visit at Martineau's Ambleside home in October 1852; "I am 
quite straight with good, clear-eyed Mr. Atkinson," she avows 
in July 1853. "2 
But Unitarian brother Reverend James Martineau was less 
favorably impressed: "Harriet's exceptional submission to an 
inferior was mortifying to me. It seemed a kind of fascina­
tion—part of the contemporaneous disturbance of judgment 
which . . . was conspicuous in her reports of mesmeric phe­
nomena.""3 For Atkinson had raised Harriet Martineau from 
her Unitarian bed of pain by the powers of mesmerism. Pre­
liminary reports in a series of "Letters on Mesmerism" from 
Martineau to the Athenaeum in November and December of 
1844 prepared the way for the public outrage that would greet 
the more extensive Letters on the Laws of Man's Nature and 
Development in 1851. "The explicit announcement, by the 
most influential woman-writer of her day, that she had aban­
doned the whole religious system in which she had been edu­
cated . . . was a portentous thing in English life," writes J. M. 
Robertson in the History of Freethought in the Nineteenth 
Century."* 
Harriet Martineau abandoned Unitarianism to make way 
for a new faith. She wrote ecstatically to the Athenaeum: "If I 
had been a very pious and very ignorant catholic, I could not 
have escaped the persuasion that I had seen heavenly visions. 
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Every glorified object before my open eyes would have been a 
revelation; and my Mesmerist, with the white halo round her 
head . . . would have been a saint or angel." But Martineau's 
emotional response deifies Reason, not God: "Such a state of 
repose, of calm, translucent intellectuality, I had never con­
ceived of." Or to put it another way: Martineau was converted 
to Reason by the powers of Intuition: "It is a deep philosophic 
truth . . . that simple faith is as necessary to the perception of 
truth as sound reason.""5 
Many of Martineau's previous admirers were aghast; the ed­
itor of the Athenaeum himself offered "A Few Words by Way 
of Comment on Miss Martineau's Statement" on 28 December 
1844, repudiating what he called "the prevailing humbug of 
the hour," lest any of his readers think his journal supported 
all that it printed."6 But other Victorians were intrigued: Mar­
tineau writes that Robert Chambers, for example, came to call 
on her at Tynemouth to investigate her mesmeric recovery."7 
And just four months after the infamous letters were published 
in the Athenaeum, the Brays and George Eliot first met the 
new convert at a dinner party: "M. A. [Marian] and I both felt 
that we admire Miss M[artineau] much more for having seen 
her. C[harles] was disappointed with her small ordinary-look­
ing woman's head. . . . Her conversation is delightful. . . . 
She talked much with me about her brother James . . . and of 
course very much about mesmerism," Cara Bray wrote to Sara 
Sophia Hennell."8 George Eliot described the same party to 
Martha Jackson: "She is a charming person—quite one of 
those great people whom one does not venerate the less for hav­
ing seen. Full of mesmerism and its marvels, you may sup­
pose.""9 
There is no record of any further acquaintance between Mar­
tineau and George Eliot for the next six years. Significantly, 
the "considerable intimacy" that John Walter Cross claims be­
tween the two women did not begin until Martineau again 
came to Eliot's attention, as the author of the notorious Letters 
on the Laws of Man's Nature and Development.l20 As fledgling 
assistant to John Chapman, editor of the Westminster Review, 
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Eliot naturally took an interest in his other publishing ven­
tures: "Miss Martineau's book is come out, but there was not 
so great a sale the first day as was anticipated," she writes to 
the Brays on 28 January 1851.121 Conservative Henry Crab Rob­
inson reported in his journal of March 1851 that Eliot "spoke 
of Harriet Martineau's and Atkinson's letters as studiously of­
fensive. It seems as if this book is absolutely atheistic!"122 But 
that August the more freethinking George Combe was to begin 
his friendship with George Eliot on the note of her "instinctive 
soundness of judgment" on the phrenology of the Letters.12* 
And Eliot recognized the favorable audience the book would 
receive at Rosehill, asking Chapman to send Charles Bray a 
copy in October 1851 and recommending it for his review in 
the Coventry Herald.m 
The following spring George Eliot's friendship with Harriet 
Martineau blossomed, and if Eliot did have reservations about 
the Letters, she must also have been in fundamental sympathy 
with Martineau's cause, at a time when so many of the mes­
meric advocate's old friends were closing their doors. The ad­
miration was mutual. Martineau entrusted Eliot with her fund 
for Comte's publication. Eliot writes: "She is a trump—the only 
English woman that possesses thoroughly the art of writing."125 
The next fall George Eliot made an extended visit to the 
north to spend time with both the Combes at Edinburgh and 
Martineau at Ambleside. Martineau's "simple, energetic life" 
proved a "tonic" to the urban fatigue of the Westminster's as­
sistant editor. She described her arrival at the Lake Country 
retreat in glowing terms: "The coach brought me to Miss Mar­
tineau's gate at lA past six yesterday evening and she was there 
with a beaming face to welcome me. . . . Miss M. is quite 
charming in her own home—quite handsome from her ani­
mation and intelligence. She came behind me, put her hands 
round me and kissed me in the prettiest way this evening."126 
This fond sisterhood ceased abruptly when Eliot eloped to 
Germany with Lewes in 1854. Harriet Martineau, like many of 
Eliot's acquaintances, was overwhelmed with moral indigna­
tion, and not above some rather vicious rumor-mongering at 
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Eliot's expense.127 Clearly, Martineau's heterodoxy did not ex­
tend beyond the intellectual realm; nor was she willing to re­
pay Eliot's tolerance in kind. Nonetheless, George Eliot writes 
to John Chapman in 1856 with what she realizes as an "odd 
request" (in light of their publicly broken friendship) that 
upon Martineau's death—which Harriet herself was incor­
rectly advertising as imminent at that time—"I should like to 
write an article upon her. I need hardly say that mine would 
be an admiring appreciation of her."128 
There were many, after 1851, whose response to Harriet 
Martineau was a far cry from admiring appreciation. Marti­
neau's heretical intellectual crimes were as shocking to proper 
Victorians as George Eliot's sexual transgressions would prove 
to be. Martineau was prepared for the worst when she pub­
lished the jointly-authored Letters: "I anticipated excommun­
ication from the world of literature, if not from society." How­
ever divergent their mores, one can see clearly the basis for 
George Eliot's admiration of this fellow strong-minded wom­
an: "This book is, I believe, the greatest effort of courage, I ever 
made," Martineau wrote in her Autobiography.l29 This was 
not hyperbole. 
George Henry Lewes opened his "Literature" column in the 
Leader of 22 February 1851 with the announcement of his in­
tention to review this controversial book in the next issue: 
"Perhaps of all the new books we hear seriously discussed, just 
now, the Letters . .  . is the most prominent. People seem un­
easy—when they are not alarmed—at it; and this is explica­
ble." Lewes admitted that he himself was made uneasy by the 
book's "atheism," but applauded Martineau's bold expression 
of her convictions: "What has reputation to do with truth?" 
"We hope next week to treat it with the gravity it deserves," he 
concludes, before going on to his review of Herbert Spencer's 
Social Statics in that same issue.1'01 wish to reserve my discus­
sion of Lewes's subsequent review until the next chapter, for 
the light I believe it sheds on Lewes himself six months prior 
to his first meeting with George Eliot. But let me touch here 
upon other contemporary response, to substantiate the serious 
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and uneasy manner in which the Letters was read. 
Although the conflict between Judeo-Christian orthodoxy 
and the new science is incipient in Combe or Bray, Harriet 
Martineau was the first member of this Victorian circle bra­
zenly and unequivocally to assert that God was dead: "Un­
informed and misdirected, we personify, humanize, material­
ize, the object of this sense [of infinite and abstract power]."1" 
"After the publication of the 'Atkinson letters,'" Martineau 
writes somewhat acerbically, "anonymous notes came in ele­
gant clerical handwriting, informing me that prayers would be 
offered up throughout the kingdom, for my rescue from my 
awful condition."132 Martineau's friend Charlotte Bronte's re­
sponse was typical: "It is the first exposition of avowed athe­
ism and materialism I have ever read; the first unequivocal dec­
laration of disbelief in the existence of a God . . . 
I have ever seen. . . . The strangest thing is, that we are called 
on to rejoice over this helpless blank . .  . to welcome this un­
utterable desolation as a state of pleasant freedom."133 Review­
ers in the popular press could be considerably more hostile. 
John Eagles fumed in Blackwood's: 
Miss Martineau's atheistical publication has passed through my 
hands. It professes to be a joint work by herself and a Mr. Atkin­
son, one of the clique of infidel phrenological mesmerizers; but it 
is manifestly the doing of Miss Martineau herself. . . . The fe­
male atheist ("and here the female atheist talks you dead") must 
have manufactured and cooked most of his philosophy. . .  . A 
work more thoroughly degrading to character, whether moral or 
intellectual, has never come from the press.1*1 
Even the Westminster Review had difficulty in living up to its 
usual freethinking standards, as W. R. Hickson, in a lengthy 
essay entitled "Life and Immortality," struggled painfully at 
the upper limits of his liberal sensibility: "Mr. Atkinson be­
longs to a class of writers of whom we wish to speak with re­
spect, from the moral courage they evince in giving expression 
to an opinion which they know exposes them to obloquy. We 
differ with them, but would rather be supposed to hold the 
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same views, than join in an outcry against any form of ultra 
skepticism.""5 
Charles Bray's enthusiastic response to the Letters is strik­
ing, because it differs markedly from others, in its emphasis on 
the psychological rather than the theological aspects of the 
book: "I consider this work the most valuable contribution to­
wards Psychology based on Physiology which we have had 
since Gall and Spurzheim's works on Cerebral Physiology, or 
Phrenology," he writes in On Force (going on to quote liber­
ally from the Letters throughout that book).1*6 Bray found in 
Martineau an ardent fellow-convert to phrenology; indeed, she 
was among the first of the phrenological faithful. As early as 
1832, she records talks with the Combes about phrenology and 
education. She had phrenological casts of her head taken in 
1833 and 1853, and bequeathed her skull and brain "to the 
ablest phrenologist I know of."137 In her Autobiography Mar­
tineau recounts at amusing length the comedy of errors she ex­
perienced during an anonymous head-reading by two eminent 
professionals: one concluded that her problem was "constant 
failure through timidity"; the other "pronounced my genius 
to be for millinery"! But Martineau, like other phrenological 
intellectuals, drew a careful distinction between popular prac­
tice and scientific theory: "The proceedings of the fortune-tell­
ing oracles, are no more like those of true and philosophical 
students of the brain than the shows of itinerant chemical lec­
turers . . . are like the achievements of a Davy or a Fara­
day."1™ 
Interestingly (and somewhat inconsistently, due to their ob­
vious interrelationship), reviewers of the Letters took less um­
brage at the book's physiological psychology than they did at 
its religious heterodoxy. The anonymous author of a lengthy 
review article in the Westminster, after condemning the "ab­
solute predestination" of the authors' philosophy of necessity, 
went on to praise its chapters on the brain: "Since the discov­
eries of Gall, physiologists have for the most part abused and 
misrepresented phrenology; but they have been compelled to 
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admit its truth, at least so far as the broad principle that differ­
ent parts of the brain have different functions to fulfill."199 
Even such an unsympathetic reader as James Anthony Froude 
praised the discussion of phreno-mesmerism as "the really im­
portant part of the book."110 
As with other Victorians in this circle, phrenology was but 
one thread in a matrix of interrelated beliefs. The book begins 
with Martineau's claim that she is a true Baconian in her ap­
plication of scientific method to psychology: "My wonder is,— 
not that there are few so-called Mental philosophers who use 
or even advocate any experimental method of inquiry into the 
science of mind; but that there seem to me to be none."111 The 
tenets of Mill's universal causality are quite at home in Atkin­
son and Martineau. "The whole aim of science is a search 
into . . . those general laws which link the phenomenon to­
gether in the eternal and universal chain of existence and the 
uniform rule," Atkinson wrote to Charles Bray.112 A passage 
from the Logic is presented between quotations from Bacon 
and Newton: "I do not believe that there is now one object or 
event in all our experience of nature . . . which has not . . . 
been ascertained by direct observation to follow laws of its 
own."113 These general laws are operative in all branches of 
knowledge. Independently of Comte, Atkinson and Martineau 
argue for the interconnectedness of the sciences and their hier­
archical structure: "Chemistry, Geology, Astronomy, Optics 
&c, are now freed from superstition, and have become true sci­
ences. It remains for philosophers to place Physiology and 
Mental and Moral Philosophy in the same position as positive 
science reached by induction."111 The grounds for Martineau's 
later rapturous discovery of the Cours are readily apparent in 
her Letters. 
A direct link can be traced between universal causality, 
phrenological tenets, and the seeds of an evolutionary biology: 
Man has his place in natural history . . . his nature does not dif­
fer essentially from that of the lower animals . .  . he is but a 
fuller development and varied condition of the same fundamental 
nature or cause. . . . Mind is the consequence or product of the 
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material man, its existence depending on the action of the brain. 
Mental Philosophy is, therefore, the physiology of the brain, as 
Gall termed it. Spurzheim called it Phrenology.Mr> 
Man's place in the natural world makes him part of a contin­
ually evolving cosmos: "Nature never rests; but all is action, 
change and growth." The phrenologist does not limit himself 
to pure physiology; mind is shaped by the external world. Both 
environment and heredity determine the development of the 
individual: 
The true physiologist studies the laws of matter, and the whole 
process of development, disentangling himself from all spiritual 
and metaphysical dogma, and will take into consideration all the 
circumstances which influence the man from childhood to the 
grave. He will observe the conditions of the parents before the 
child is born, or even conceived; and back through many genera­
tions, noting these conditions which more particularly descend, 
and are impressed on the constitution. . . . After the child is 
born, he will watch the treatment of the infant, and the gradual 
development of its instincts and powers. . . . He will note how 
the child is trained to good or evil how its passions are stimulated 
and directed.Mfi 
What are the moral implications of this disentanglement 
from spiritual and metaphysical dogma, the psychologist as 
natural historian? Initially, Atkinson's and Martineau's liber­
ated view of moral man seems to substantiate their critics' 
worst fears: "As a part of Nature, as a creature of necessity, as 
governed by law, Man is . .  . neither good nor evil . . . but 
simply nature, and what is possible to nature, and could not 
be otherwise."117 They have two solutions to this potentially 
enervating fatalism: one borrows from a heritage of eigh­
teenth-century rationalism; the other is distinctly nineteenth 
century. First, this pair offer the familiar argument that it is 
paradoxically because of universal causality in the realm of 
mind that man can improve his fatalistic lot. He has the intel­
lectual power to reason his way to an altered future: "Without 
determining laws there could be no hope, and no regenerating 
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principle; and all teaching, preaching, and training would be 
useless."148 
But Atkinson and Martineau were more than mere necessi­
tarians; they appeared to many to be full-fledged materialists. 
In an essay on Joseph Priestley, T. H. Huxley drew a witty 
distinction between the epithet "necessitarian" and the far 
graver calumny, "materialist": 
A man may be a necessarian without incurring graver reproach 
than that in being called a gloomy fanatic, necessarianism, 
though very shocking, having a note of Calvinistic orthodoxy; 
but, if a man is a materialist; or, if good authorities say he 
is . .  . respectable folks look upon him as an unsafe neighbour 
of a cashbox, as an actual or potential sensualist, the more vir­
tuous in outward seeming, the more certainly loaded with secret 
"grave personal sins."H9 
James Anthony Froude unequivocally entitled his condemna­
tory essay "Materialism: Miss Martineau and Mr. Atkinson." 
Other reviewers concurred in a literal-minded application of 
the concept. The Westminster reviewer writes: "Here we have 
two clever, well-informed people, persuading themselves that 
they experience extraordinary raptures mingled with the most 
exquisite philosophic calm, from believing that unconscious 
matter is the cause of conscious thought, that the truest human 
affection is nothing worthier than the love of a spoonful of ni­
tric acid for a copper penny. . . . From such views both the 
intellect and the heart of man recoil with well-founded dis­
gust."150 Even Charles Bray, recounting his friendship with At­
kinson, takes care to differentiate himself (as a mere "ne­
cessarian") from the more dreaded denomination: "We had 
some fundamental agreements, as he was a Phrenologist and 
Mesmerist, and so was I, but I leaned towards Idealism, and he 
decidedly towards Materialism."151 
A careful reading of the Letters, however, reveals that At­
kinson and Martineau themselves emphatically deny these 
charges. "Men's minds are so beset with 'gross materialism,' 
with their concrete and mechanical notions, that they shrink 
from the obscure, imponderable agents, and the study of vital 
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action, and the real powers of nature."152 Mesmerism, not ra­
tionalism, is ultimately the key to Atkinson's and Martineau's 
optimism, the primary source of their cheerful liberation from 
the darker moral implications of materialism. 
To give them their due, even the unsympathetic critics rec­
ognized in Atkinson and Martineau something beyond the re­
ductionistic tenets of atheistic "materialism." "In spite of all 
that we have said," confesses Froude, "there is a tone in Mr. 
Atkinson's thoughts far above those of most of us who live in 
slavery to daily experience. The world is awful to him—truth 
is sacred."15* W. R. Hickson quotes a lengthy passage of Atkin­
son's autobiographical reminiscence from the Letters, in 
which Atkinson sits "on the marble rocks of Devonshire," 
looking out upon the landscape and imagining his own in­
evitable transformation into the earth: "Nature is one, and all 
things varieties of the same material."154 Yet Hickson recog­
nizes that this "material" is in some very important way not 
equivalent to "materialism": "These reflections . . . carry us 
far beyond the bounded views implied in the proposition with 
which he sets out, of mind being a product of the brain. We 
now learn, that the brain is but one of the forms or manifesta­
tions of an infinite being,—a being,—the essence of all sub­
stance,—working throughout nature by general laws."155 
Truth is to be found neither (or rather, not entirely) in ide­
alist imaginings nor in materialist experiments: "Mind was 
fashioned into fanciful forms by the metaphysicians, while the 
physiologists were, on the other hand, slicing up the brain as 
they would a turnip"156 Atkinson and Martineau do deny that 
the spiritual is opposed to or separable from the material. But 
if there is no spirit apart from matter, there is, equally, no mat­
ter apart from spirit. Like Charles Bray, Atkinson and Marti­
neau found in the combination of phrenology with mesmer­
ism what they considered the perfect synthesis: a science that is 
also a religion; an empirical explanation for the realm of in­
tuitive truths; the union of positivist law with phenomena be­
yond the ordinary powers of the senses. 
The scientific inadequacies of this solution must not blind 
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us to its ideological significance for a Victorian frame of mind. 
"Christ, the prophets, the oracles, all exhibit features of the 
same great fact,—the existence of faculties in Man beyond 
sense, experience, and reason," assert Atkinson and Marti­
neau. And they mean "faculties" in the most literal phrenol­
ogical sense: "Beneath the central organ of Comparison, lying 
under Benevolence, is what has been termed by a somnambule 
the Eye of the Mind. This seems to be power of judgment:—we 
might call it the Intuitive faculty; for it is this which is chiefly 
concerned in clairvoyance." Clairvoyance is that state of myst­
ical insight reached in a mesmeric trance: "All time seems to 
be as one duration; space seems as nothing; all passions and 
desires become hushed; truth becomes an insight, or through 
sight; and life a law." The mesmerist transcends traditional 
definitions of empiricism: "Rejecting the dogmas of metaphy­
sicians, and disbelieving that Ideas are the relics of Sensa­
tions"; yet his insight comes through the "energy of the sen­
ses" in the form of a "higher sense,—of divination." Only in 
the mesmeric state, believes Harriet Martineau, can man ex­
perience a direct apprehension of that monistic, cosmic force 
that is hidden from the eye of sense: "Nothing in the experi­
ence of my life can at all compare with that of seeing the melt­
ing away of forms, aspects and arrangements under which we 
ordinarily view nature, and its fusion into the system of forces 
which is presented to the intellect in the magnetic state."157 It 
is not necessary to belabor the point that what Martineau is 
describing seems to be a religious experience. I will simply rei­
terate that mesmerism, for Atkinson and Martineau, was in­
tended to be a fully scientific phenomenon. Not only is intui­
tion, or instinct, a phrenological organ, it is also the product 
of evolutionary biology. Atkinson queries Bray: "What we call 
inspiration, or intuition, or genius . . . are all to be reduced 
to a general and uniform law. It is clear that many of the lower 
animals . . . are so guided, as we may be, by instinct. . .  . is 
it hard to suppose that more highly-developed man should un­
der all circumstances be wholly free from such so-called in­
stinct?"158 
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This visionary "fusion" experienced during the mesmeric 
trance becomes a perfect metaphor for that monistic concep­
tion of the universe after which all of these Victorians strive: 
"Thus we draw the circle of facts closer and closer to the centre, 
which is Unity," conclude Atkinson and Martineau. This pair 
become fully representative not only in their striving for that 
visionary moment of Unity—or even in their achievement of 
that moment—but also in their refusal to take that achieve­
ment as an end in itself. They continue: "While we dilate the 
sight in the sense of the unity of Nature, and the relations of 
the sciences, we must not forget to contract the sight to every 
particular and circumstance; that nothing may be omitted, and 
Nature may be searched for truth."159 Man must look outward 
as well as inward, to the particular as well as to the general; the 
key to the cosmos lies in the smallest scientific detail as well as 
in the visionary religious synthesis. 
In mesmerism Bray and Martineau both found satisfying 
personal solutions to their need for a faith consistent with a 
scientific world view. Although mesmerism had much to offer 
as a new religion, it was unfortunately less successful in cor­
rectly accounting for scientific detail. It was in another guise 
altogether that this circle would most accurately find the one 
in the many: the development hypothesis. We have seen how 
the groundwork for an evolutionary cosmology was laid by 
Robert Chambers. George Henry Lewes and Herbert Spencer 
would give it a substantive incarnation, with particular signif­
icance for the history of psychology. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Synthetic Philosophy: George Henry Lewes 
and Herbert Spencer 
Those who have handled sciences have been either men of ex­
periment or men of dogmas. The men of experiment are like 
the ant: they only collect and use; the reasoners resemble spi­
ders, who make cobwebs out of their own substance. But the 
bee takes a middle course; it gathers its material from the flow­
ers of the garden and of the field, but transforms and digests it 
by a power of its own. Not unlike this is the true business of 
philosophy; for it neither relies solely or chiefly on the powers 
of the mind, nor does it take the matter which it gathers up 
from natural history and mechanical experiments and lay it 
up in the memory whole, as it finds it; but lays it up in the 
understanding altered and digested.—Francis Bacon, Novum 
Organum 
I. THE HEART AND THE BRAIN—GEORGE HENRY LEWES:

"SPINOZA'S LIFE AND WORKS" (1843)

It has been said of George Henry Lewes that he "represented 
perhaps the more effervescent, more eccentric, and yet also the 
more truly philosophical aspects of the mid-Victorian mind."1 
A single chapter cannot do full justice to the breadth of Lewes's 
thought: he was a literary critic, a novelist, a playwright, an 
editor, a physiologist, a psychologist, a philosopher, an histo­
rian of ideas; a true Victorian polymath. What little attention 
has been paid to Lewes by previous scholars has tended to cen­
ter on his relationship with George Eliot, or on his role as lit­
erary critic and man of letters. But Lewes viewed himself 
preeminently as a philosopher of science. My focus here will 
be on Lewes's earlier philosophical work, particularly in the 
field of psychology; those aspects of his intellectual biography 
that link him most closely with this Victorian circle. 
Lewes called his final and most ambitious project, Prob­
lems of Life and Mind (5 vol., 1874-79), his "key to all Psy­
chologies."2 Therein, he attempted to resolve "the long debates 
respecting the true position of Psychology among the sci­
ences," within a continuum of ideas from the 1840s and 1850s, 
freely acknowledging his debts to Comte, Mill, and Spencer as 
the thinkers with whom he was "most in agreement."3 As we 
have seen, Lewes was an early disciple of Mill and Comte; but 
Herbert Spencer was his friend and intellectual equal. This 
chapter will establish some of the early sources of Lewes's and 
Spencer's ideas, and chronicle the path of their mutual intel­
lectual development during the decade of the 1850s, their lively 
and reciprocal interplay of ideas. As with so many in this cir­
cle, it is often difficult to determine the exact origin of an idea. 
Spencer's greater philosophical fame has tended to obscure 
Lewes's own important contributions to nineteenth-century 
intellectual history—and to Herbert Spencer's intellectual his­
tory. 
Lewes's debts to Mill and Comte notwithstanding, Johann 
Wolfgang von Goethe was his most-admired mentor. In his 
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1852 essay on "Goethe as a Man of Science" (the germ of 
Lewes's classic biography of Goethe), Lewes quotes Goethe 
speaking of a life "passed in creating and observing, in synthe­
sis and analysis: the systole and diastole of human thought 
were to me like a second breathing process—never separated, 
ever pulsating."4 The dual strands of philosophy and biology, 
synthesis and analysis, general and particular, span the de­
cades of Lewes's intellectual development. Twenty-four years 
later, in an essay entitled "Materialism and Spiritualism," 
which summarizes his work-in-progress on Problems of Life 
and Mind, Lewes would remember Goethe's words: "Analysis 
and synthesis are the systole and diastole of science. "5 It was 
Lewes's lifelong ambition to effect the perfect fusion of part 
and whole, that individuation in which each part is uniquely 
particular and yet fully subsumed within a greater unity. Like 
Herbert Spencer, Lewes would find the key that would unlock 
the apparent paradox of the many in the one, the one in the 
many, in evolutionary biology. 
But in his search for this delicate balance, it has been Lewes's 
fate to be both oversimplified and misinterpreted. For exam­
ple, Rosemary Ashton has difficulty reconciling Lewes's early 
enthusiasm for Hegel's aesthetics with his later embrace of 
Comte's positivism. She resorts to a simple dichotomy: "From 
1843 on, Lewes ranged himself on the side of analysis, not syn­
thesis in criticism, just as he stood for empiricism rather than 
a priorism in philosophy."6 Similarly, Robert M. Young is in­
correct in his interpretation of Spencer's debt to Lewes: "Just 
as the reading of Lyell's refutation of Lamarck turned Spencer 
towards belief in inheritance of acquired characteristics, the 
reading of Lewes's positivist polemics seemed to have turned 
him towards metaphysics."7 In fact, Lewes was not an idealist 
turned empiricist; nor was he a positivistic polemicist who 
drove his friend to metaphysics. 
To be fair, Lewes himself is partially responsible for the con­
fusion: in the Biographical History of Philosophy, he argued 
emphatically for the death of metaphysics at the hand of posi­
tivistic natural science. But it should be clear from my discus­
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sion of Comte in chapter 1 that positivism is not simply to be 
allied with science in opposition to metaphysics. It occupies a 
middle ground between the two. Other critics have more cor­
rectly perceived the similar mediating tendencies in Lewes's 
work, but have incorrectly located their philosophical counter­
parts. In his essay on "The Empirical Metaphysics of George 
Henry Lewes," Jack Kaminsky divides nineteenth-century Eng­
lish philosophy into the "opposing tendencies" of "empir­
ical positivism" (Mill and Spencer) and its "philosophic reac­
tion" (exemplified in "Carlyle's transcendentalism, Newman's 
Catholicism, and Green's idealism"). Kaminsky correctly ar­
gues that Lewes sought to "heal the bifurcation in philosophy, 
[urging] that the study of metaphysical problems might be 
pursued with an empirical rather than a transcendental 
method." But Mill and Spencer themselves share many funda­
mental similarities with Lewes. Kaminsky considers Lewes 
"one renegade positivist," crying alone in a wilderness of skep­
tics and Roman catholics, biologists and German idealists. In 
reality Lewes was far from solitary in his pursuit of a middle 
ground. Kaminsky ruefully concludes that "the full import of 
Lewes's views on metaphysics was completely lost to nine­
teenth-century philosophers."8 Although it may be true that 
his ideas were not influential within the academy, the inter­
connections between Lewes and an important circle of Victo­
rian minds were rich and pervasive. 
One might expect that George Henry Lewes would have 
given a favorable review to Atkinson's and Martineau's Letters 
on the Laws of Man's Nature and Development in his three 
"Literature" columns in the Leader devoted to that subject in 
February and March 1851. Although Lewes did claim the Let­
ters worthy of "serious discussion" and acknowledge them the 
"result of honest, independent thinking," he was otherwise 
highly critical. One immediate source of Lewes's disapproba­
tion is suggested by his intolerance of phrenological faddism, 
mesmeric quacks, and pseudo-scientific notions of force—and 
indeed, "the mesmeric and clairvoyant revelations" of the pair 
do "excite [his] ridicule." But unexpectedly, Lewes is more 
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critical of what could loosely be termed the theological aspects 
of the book than he is of its dubious scientific underpinnings: 
"We are among those who must unequivocally dissent from 
the opinions it ushers in": "the open avowal of Atheism and 
denial of Immortality." Lewes here sides with Froude and 
those critics who were offended by what they considered a dan­
gerous materialism: "Reason is daylight; by it we see all that 
can be seen in daylight; but there are realities the perception of 
which daylight destroys, and among these are the stars."9 
These are hardly the words one might expect from a clear-eyed 
empiricist. 
George Henry Lewes and Harriet Martineau have more in 
common than Lewes grants (as chapter 3 demonstrates). Al­
though he misreads Martineau as a simple atheist, this mis­
reading is highly illuminating of Lewes himself: "The soul is 
larger than logic," he argues; "there is . .  . a logic of emo­
tions, and a logic of instincts as well as a logic of ideas." 
George Henry Lewes, amateur scientist and positivist, five 
years after condemning metaphysics in the Biographical His­
tory and on the eve of his study of Comte, speaks in strikingly 
idealist terms: "We are not Kantists, but detect in his system 
the indistinct expression of that consciousness of a transcen­
dental faculty we feel within ourselves."10 
Although Lewes was never an orthodox religious believer, 
this transcendental streak was strong in him from the start. In 
his 1876 essay on "Spiritualism and Materialism," Lewes in­
dulges in a rare moment of autobiographical reminiscence: 
There was one brief period when I was very near a conversion. The 
idea of a noumenal Mind, as something distinct from mental phe­
nomena—a something diffused through the Organism giving uni­
ty to Consciousness, very different from the unity of a machine, 
flashed upon me one morning with a sudden and novel force, 
quite unlike the shadowy vagueness with which it had heretofore 
been conceived. For some minutes I was motionless in a rapt state 
of thrilled surprise. I seemed standing at the entrance of a new 
path, leading to new issues with a vast horizon. The convictions 
of a life seemed tottering. A tremulous eagerness, suffused with the 
keen light of discovery, yet mingled with cross-lights and hesita­
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tions, stirred me; and from that moment I have understood some­
thing of sudden conversions. There was, as I afterwards re­
membered, no feeling of distress at this prospect of parting with 
old beliefs. Indeed it is doubtful whether sudden conversions are 
accomplished by pain, the excitement is too great, the new ideas 
too absorbing. The rapture of truth overcomes the false shame of 
having been in error. The one desire is for more light." 
Lewes's self-portrait here has much in common with Marti­
neau's own rhapsodic account of her conversion to mesmer­
ism, with its strong overtones of religious experience mingled 
with scientific conviction. Characteristically, Lewes asks for 
the "light" of intellectual illumination in the midst of this 
most emotional moment. 
A brief scientific essay, "The Heart and the Brain," which 
Lewes wrote for the Fortnightly Review in 1865, provides a 
theoretical analogue to his personal account of the interwork­
ings of heart and brain. It is important to remember that for 
Lewes, as for Atkinson and Martineau, "transcendental facul­
ties" were also biological phenomena. Much of "The Heart 
and the Brain" is, quite literally, a biological discussion of 
those two organs. "Heart and Brain are the two lords of Life," 
Lewes opens. But he immediately suggests that this statement 
may also be read figuratively: "In the metaphors of ordinary 
speech and in the stricter language of science, we use these 
terms to indicate two central powers, from which all motives 
radiate, to which all influences converge."12 
The phrenologists had claimed that the brain was the organ 
of the mind, and were branded godless materialists. Lewes 
seems at first to disagree with phrenology, condemning as un­
scientific "the modern doctrine respecting the brain . .  . as 
the exclusive organ of sensation." Lewes has come full circle 
within physiological psychology, "toappreciate the truth . . . 
in the ancient doctrine respecting the heart as the great emo­
tional organ." But instead of repudiating the materialism of 
the phrenologists, Lewes actually enlarges their claims. The 
heart is physiologically the "great emotional center": "As the 
central organ of the circulation [it] is so indissolubly connected 
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with every manifestation of Sensibility, and is so delicately sus­
ceptible to all emotional agitations." Heart does not replace 
brain as center; both are simply parts of a greater whole, "the 
vital activities of the whole organism."13 Read figuratively (as 
Lewes invites), the "two lords of life," each equal in power yet 
interdependent, are the emotions and the intellect. Lewes in­
sists that metaphor and fact, poetry and science, mirror one an­
other. The transcendent logic of emotions has its correspond­
ent physiology. 
In this context I turn back to the 1840s, when Lewes was in­
troduced to the study of philosophy by the work of Benedict 
Spinoza, a seventeenth-century Dutch philosopher who mech­
anized human passions in the form of geometrical proposi­
tions, and argued for the unification of mind and matter as 
manifestations of a single substance. In the philosophy of Spi­
noza, Lewes was to find both a solution and a dilemma: the 
prototype of his ideal philosophic temperament, and what he 
saw as the greatest obstacle to any philosophical endeavor. 
Whether by fortunate coincidence or careful design, George 
Henry Lewes was asked to contribute to the "S" volume of the 
Penny Cyclopaedia in 1842; his task: to define the terms "Sub­
ject, Subjective," "Substance," and "Spinoza." His trip to 
Germany in 1838 had fueled Lewes's early fascination with 
German idealist philosophies; but even in these short entries, 
among his earliest published writing, we can see the character­
istic bias of Lewes's mind. Lewes's definition of "subject" is 
inseparable from its polar antithesis: "The very subject itself 
(the mind) can become an object by being psychologically con­
sidered."11 In his definition of "substance," Lewes similarly 
insists on a two-sided vision, the equivalence of subject and 
object: "The stronghold of Idealism is consciousness. In Con­
sciousness there is nothing but transformations of itself—no 
substance, no external world is given. . . . But consciousness 
is equally the stronghold of Realism; for we are as conscious 
that what we call substance, or the world, is not ourselves, and 
does not depend on us, and is a distinct existence."15 
Spinoza is identified with both subject and substance, 
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closely linked with the idealist school: "All the German phi­
losophers, from Kant downwards, owns [sic] him as its mas­
ter."16 Lewes confessed elsewhere that he considered Spinoza's 
"the grandest and most religious of philosophies."17 The con­
tinuity of Lewes's interest in Spinoza is evident in his return to 
the philosopher in 1843 and again in 1866. In an autobio­
graphical moment in the 1866 Fortnightly Review essay, 
Lewes travels to a small tavern in Red Lion Square in the mid­
1830s, "where the vexed questions of philosophy were dis­
cussed with earnestness, if not insight," by young George, 
not yet twenty, and a mixed group of speculatively-minded 
friends. Supreme among them was a German Jew, a watch­
maker named Cohn: "He remains in my memory as a type of 
philosophic dignity"; "I venerated his great calm intellect. He 
was the only man I did not contradict in the impatience of ar­
gument," Lewes recalls. It was Cohn who tutored the group 
weekly in Spinoza. Lewes's intense feelings for Spinoza were 
inextricably mixed with those for his mentor, Cohn: "I habit­
ually think of him in connexion with Spinoza, almost as much 
on account of his personal characteristics, as because to him I 
owe my first acquaintance with the Hebrew thinker. My ad­
miration for him was of that enthusiastic temper which in 
youth we feel for our intellectual leaders."18 Lewes's essay on 
"Spinoza's Life and Works" in the Westminster Review (1843) 
came at a time when Spinoza was not translated into English, 
and was generally acknowledged as a ground-breaking attempt 
to bring this difficult philosopher to the attention of the En­
glish reading public.191 consider this essay the cornerstone of 
Lewes's early thought; it epitomizes both his characteristic 
frame of mind and his central intellectual dilemma at the time, 
to be resolved through his friendship with Herbert Spencer in 
the early 1850s. 
Lewes's attraction to Spinoza is fraught with a most interest­
ing tension: Lewes venerates Spinoza as a religious philoso­
pher, and writes essays on the man at both ends of his career. 
Yet Lewes's early insistence in the Biographical History on the 
objective, psychological view, in contradistinction to the sub­
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jective, philosophical one, his assertion that consciousness is 
not all—this seems in conflict with Spinoza, by Lewes's own 
definition the forefather of Kantian idealism. Ashton argued 
that Lewes's early flirtation with German romanticism and a 
priori idealism gave way to the later empiricism of the Bio­
graphical History. And indeed that book does seem to support 
a reading of Lewes as an a posteriori empiricist. Lewes's fun­
damental disagreement with Spinoza in 1843 becomes the 
germ of his central argument throughout the 800-page history. 
The "fundamental error of Spinozism," Lewes writes, will be 
rectified by the objectivity of the new positivist psychology: 
It is our firm conviction that no believer in Ontology, as a possible 
science, can escape the all-embracing dialectic of Spinoza. To him 
who believes that the human mind can know noumena, as well as 
phenomena—who accepts the verdict of the mind as not merely 
the relative truth, but also the perfect, absolute truth—we see 
nothing, humanly speaking, but Spinozism as a philosophical 
refuge. . .  . If you do not believe that your knowledge is abso­
lute, and not simply relative, you have no sort of ground for belief 
in the possibility of ontology. 
Lewes takes the latter position. In the Biographical History, 
the error of the ontologist becomes for scientific psychologist 
Lewes the fundamental error of all philosophers: the notion 
that the mind can intuitively, clearly and distinctly, know 
Truth, that Ideas exist independent of experience. "Spinozism 
or Skepticism?" Lewes demands; "choose between them, for 
you have no other choice."21 But if Lewes was not a Spinozist, 
was he a Skeptic? I will look to both Lewes's 1843 essay and 
Spinoza's Ethics, and suggest two possible solutions to this di­
lemma: first, in the dialectic that Lewes sets up in that essay 
between the idealist, subjective Spinoza and the man Lewes 
considers his realist, objective polar antithesis, Francis Bacon; 
second, and more intriguing, in the philosophy of Spinoza it­
self, which in many ways attempts to reconcile antitheses in 
ways directly relevant to this Victorian circle. 
"Spinoza's Life and Works" provides ample documentation 
of Lewes's continued attraction to the great philosopher since 
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his student days in Red Lion Square. But Lewes's essay adopts 
a peculiar stratagem, given its ostensibly admiring stance to­
wards Spinoza. Once Lewes has outlined Spinoza's life, he 
shifts unexpectedly to Francis Bacon, as a counterpoint to Spi­
noza: "From Bacon [comes] the whole school of scientific men, 
the materialists, Scotch physiologists, and political econo­
mists," in contradistinction to the "Cartesian" school, in 
which Lewes includes Spinoza, Kant, and Hegel. After Lewes's 
denunciation of the fundamental error of Spinozism, Bacon 
arises as the hero of a new, empirical psychology, which 
claims to escape the subjective boundaries of the reflective con­
sciousness: "We might have gone on baffled, yet persisting, 
seeking the unknowable, and building palaces on air 
. . . had not Bacon arisen to point out that the method men 
were pursuing was not the path of transit to the truth, but led 
only to a land of chimeras." Bacon heralds the new spirit of 
Positive Science, and it is this nineteenth-century Baconian­
ism, in opposition to the "arachnae philosophers of Ger­
many," that Lewes praises throughout the Biographical His­
tory of Philosophy.2'2 
Yet to suggest that he simply abandoned Spinoza at this 
point belies the intensity of Lewes's fascination with the Dutch 
philosopher. Lewes not only returned to the subject of Spinoza 
in 1866, he also encouraged the earliest efforts to translate Spi­
noza into English. In January 1843 George Eliot had borrowed 
Spinoza's works from R. H. Brabant (who had been introduced 
to Spinoza by no less than Samuel Taylor Coleridge himself, 
in 1815-1623), and began a translation for her friend Charles 
Bray—probably the Tractatus, but also possibly "De Deo," the 
opening of the Ethics.24 In February 1847 Eliot returned Bra­
bant's copy of the philosopher's Latin works and borrowed 
publisher John Chapman's.25 Cara Bray wrote to Sara Sophia 
Hennell in the spring of 1849 of Eliot's "great desire to under­
take Spinoza." It was to her translation of the Tractatus that 
Eliot turned while nursing her father through his final illness: 
"It is such a rest to her mind," Cara wrote.26 But in the grief 
and aimlessness of those months following Robert Evans's 
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death in May 1849, Eliot and Spinoza were "divorced"; though 
she agreed grudgingly to uphold her bargain with Chapman 
for a translation of the Tractatus Theologico- Politicus, to be 
published in conjunction with an American translation of the 
Ethics: "If you are anxious to publish the translation in ques­
tion I could, after a few months, finish the Tractatus Theolo­
gico-Politicus to keep it company—but I confess to you, that I 
think you would do better to abstain from printing a transla­
tion." Grief may have dampened Eliot's energies, but her dis­
couragement with the translation also took a more complex 
form: "What is wanted in English is not a translation of Spi­
noza's works, but a true estimate of his life and system. After 
one has rendered his Latin faithfully into English, one feels 
that there is another yet more difficult process of translation 
for the reader to effect, and that the only mode of making Spi­
noza accessible to a larger number is to study his books, then 
shut them and give his analysis."27 
Spinoza was surely not the least of that community of intel­
lectual interests that Eliot and Lewes found when they met and 
fell in love between 1851 and 1854; when they eloped to Ger­
many in 1854, Eliot began a translation of the Ethics while 
Lewes labored on his Life of Goethe, and they returned to Eng­
land to see both books through publication.28 In October 1855 
an announcement in Lewes's Goethe proclaimed that "Spi­
noza will ere long appear in English, edited by the writer of 
these lines," as a joint product of George Eliot and George 
Henry Lewes. Such was not to be: Lewes's agreement with 
publisher Bohn for his edition of Eliot's translation ended in 
acrimonious financial squabbles between Lewes and Bohn 
during the early weeks of June 1856.29 
George Eliot's interest in the Tractatus was clearly of a piece 
with her translation of the German rationalist critics Strauss 
and Feuerbach. Spinoza is "Vater der Speculation unserer Zeit; 
er ist auch Vater der biblischen Kritik," Strauss himself 
wrote.M It was Lewes who turned Eliot to work on the Ethics, 
a book more directly relevant to my discussion here. For in the 
Ethics itself, we find many clear reasons for Spinoza's strong 
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appeal to the frame of mind shared by this Victorian circle. 
A brief outline of the basic argument of the Ethics is useful 
at this point.31 Descartes introduced dualism into Western phi­
losophy: mind and body are partners, in a reciprocal, causal 
relationship (and Spinoza was a Cartesian, albeit a critical one, 
for half of his philosophic life). But Spinoza perplexingly de­
fies either category, monist or dualist. His theory of the rela­
tion between mind and body is a dualism of sorts: mind and 
body coexist amicably; yet unlike Descartes, Spinoza posits no 
causal relationship between them. There is a material event for 
every body event, but body does not cause mind, nor mind, 
body; nor do they interact, as in Descartes. Mind and body are 
two aspects of the identical substance, which informs the entire 
universe: "Substance thinking and substance extended are one 
and the same substance."1*2 This substance, Spinoza calls God. 
This God bears a superficial resemblance to the Judeo-Chris­
tian God: He is eternal, infinite, omnipotent. But just as Spi­
noza resists the dualism of mind and body, he denies the dual­
ity of God and His creation, the world. Spinoza's God did not 
make the world; the world is God, one substance, immutable. 
God's infinity necessitates his unity with the cosmos. 
Furthermore, His perfection results in a deterministic uni­
verse; everything functions according to universal and neces­
sary laws: "Nothing in the universe is contingent, but all 
things are conditioned to exist and operate in a particular 
manner by the necessity of the divine nature." If things could 
be other than they are, then God would not be perfect: "God's 
will cannot be different from God's perfection." Spinoza re­
jects any notion of divine teleology, argument from design, 
God's "purposes" in the world: "Nature has no particular 
goal in view . . . final causes are mere human figments. "M 
Spinoza's method in the Ethics follows closely upon his 
metaphysics. The entire treatise is written in the form of a se­
ries of geometrical propositions: "These effects follow as nec­
essarily from the said emotion, as it follows the nature of the 
triangle, that the three angles are equal to two right angles." 
Minds are subject to the same laws as bodies: "The laws of na­
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ture have regard to nature's general order, whereof man is but 
a part. I mention this, in passing, lest any should think that I 
have wished to set forth the faults and irrational deeds of men 
rather than the nature and properties of things. For . .  . I re­
gard human emotions and their properties as on the same foot­
ing with other natural phenomena."34 
Herein the link between Spinoza's metaphysics and his eth­
ics: the mind, consciousness, can be studied in the same man­
ner as the body, since it is part of the same substance, subject 
to the same necessary laws. It would seem that the logical result 
of this would be a pure form of psychological determinism. 
How can it make sense to talk of ethics, if all mental behavior 
is necessitated by invariable laws? Yet just as Spinoza wishes to 
argue for the coexistence of mind and body, his philosophy 
encompasses freedom as well as necessity. 
In the Ethics Spinoza presents a three-tiered theory of knowl­
edge. The first level at which man arrives is that of confused 
ideas. Man "knows" in a purely mechanical, passive, fragmen­
tary way. He is at the mercy of both external events or sensory 
impressions and his own unregulated emotions: "We are in 
many ways driven about by external causes, and . . . like 
waves of the sea driven by contrary winds we toss to and fro 
unwitting of the issue of our fate." This Spinoza calls "bond­
age." At the second level, man arrives at adequate ideas, 
exercising his powers of reasoning in order to understand the 
causal relationships among things. In the first stage, he sees 
only particulars; now he is capable of generalizations. This is 
as far as most of us, unendowed with the philosopher's intel­
lect, can get. Understanding brings man a kind of moral lib­
erty: "The more we endeavour to be guided by reason, the less 
do we depend on hope; we endeavour to free ourselves from 
fear, and, so far as we can, to dominate fortune, directing our 
actions by the sure counsel of wisdom." 
But there is a third, highest stage: "scientia intuitiva," in­
tuitive knowledge. It is a mystical state, where man arrives at 
the true "love of God." But what is God in Spinoza's uni­
verse?—simply the Unity of all that is particular, individual: 
 177 THE HEART AND THE BRAIN
"The more we understand particular things, the more do we 
understand God." At this third stage of knowledge man fully 
understands each particular thing in the order of its general 
relation to the cosmos; he apprehends the full harmony of the 
universe in a simultaneous transcendentalism and descenden­
talism. In this state man does not rise above human passions, 
but rather incorporates them with a visionary reason; intellect 
and emotion are at one. "This love or blessedness is in the Bi­
ble called Glory, and not undeservedly. For whether this love 
be referred to God or to the mind, it may rightly be called ac­
quiescence of spirit."85 Little wonder that Spinoza would at­
tract the philosopher who sought to "reduce all knowledge 
into harmony," and that his earliest champion in England was 
Samuel Taylor Coleridge. 
The above summary, although it hardly does justice to the 
complexities of a profound and difficult philosophy, should 
serve to illuminate some of the sources of Spinoza's powerful 
attraction for the Victorian intellectual. Spinoza clearly makes 
way for a scientific psychology, in accordance with the laws of 
nature. The psychology of Hartley and Priestley has been 
called "a kind of bargain-basement Spinozism."36 I draw 
attention to the little-known and fascinating fact that the first 
published translator of Spinoza into English was Dr. Robert 
Willis, a practicing phrenologist!37 Spinoza's single "sub­
stance," and the pantheism that is its product, suggest many 
parallels with Charles Bray's and Harriet Martineau's "force," 
which similarly partakes of the nature of both mind and body. 
The necessitarian implications of Spinoza's universal causa­
tion and his faith in the qualified liberty that reason can effect 
resonate clearly with the discussion of necessitarianism in 
chapter 3. And Spinoza's "scientia intuitiva" is remarkably 
similar to the systole and diastole of analysis and synthesis 
with which this chapter began, that desire to see the many in 
the one, the one in the many, which is the common ground 
of all these Victorian thinkers. 
Leslie Stephen, writing on Spinoza in 1880, summarizes the 
preceding decades of English response when he suggests that 
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Spinoza "has been defended as he has been attacked from the 
most opposite points of view. The materialist and the idealist; 
the dogmatist and the sceptic; the mystic and the man of sci­
ence have each found in him something congenial, and with 
equal ease something antagonistic."38 Spinoza's appeal to the 
mystic who was also a man of science would be powerful; his 
balance of necessitarianism and ethical idealism, rationalist 
and visionary, intellect and emotion, irresistible to a Victorian 
sensibility. 
And yet we must not forget "the fundamental error of Spi­
nozism" that so troubled Lewes and necessitated the Baconian 
corrective. This error becomes all the more consequent in light 
of the otherwise powerful seductions of Spinoza's philosophy. 
It obviously troubled Lewes to the extent that it sparked an 
800-page disquisition on what Lewes considered the failures of 
the ontological method: "If you do not believe that your 
knowledge is absolute, and not relative, you have no sort of 
ground for belief in the possibility of ontology." But it is in 
error to conclude from this statement that George Henry Lewes 
was a relativist skeptic. It would be truer to say that Lewes in 
fact yearned for absolute knowledge; but was unable to accept 
the Absolute when it was grounded—as it was for Spinoza and 
the arachnae philosophers of Germany—purely on the subjec­
tive basis of individual consciousness. What Herbert Spencer 
was to give George Henry Lewes in The Principles of Psy­
chology was a key to all mythologies, a ground for the Abso­
lute that was based upon sense experience; the grand Spino­
zistic synthesis of mind and body, rewritten in Baconian terms 
to fit a Victorian frame of mind. 
II. THE FOUNDATIONS OF A FRIENDSHIP—HERBERT SPENCER: 
SOCIAL STATICS (1851) 
In his journal for January 1859, George Henry Lewes looked 
back upon the momentous beginning of his lifelong friend­
ship with Herbert Spencer in the spring of 1850: 
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I owe him a debt of gratitude. My acquaintance with him was the 
brightest ray in a very dreary wasted period of my life. I had given 
up all ambition whatever, lived from hand to mouth, and thought 
the evil of each day sufficient. The stimulus of his intellect, espe­
cially during our long walks, roused my energy once more, and 
revived my dormant love of science. His intense theorizing ten­
dency was contagious, and it was only the stimulus of a theory 
which could then have induced me to work.—I owe Spencer an­
other, and a deeper debt. It was through him that I learned to 
know Marian—to know her was to love her—and since then my 
life has been a new birth.19 
The late 1840s had been lean years both personally and in­
tellectually for Lewes, as his wife Agnes entered into a liaison 
with his best friend and coeditor of the Leader, Thornton 
Hunt, and Lewes turned from philosophical and scientific 
subjects to piecework literary criticism and two rather dreadful 
novels, Ranthorpe (1847) and Rose, Blanche, and Violet 
(1848)40 But the stimulus that Spencer offered Lewes was far 
more than simply a contagious penchant for theorizing. Lewes 
found in Herbert Spencer the germ of "a theory" that was to 
flourish in the rich soil of their mutual discourse on contem­
porary scientific ideas from 1850-55, bursting forth in full 
bloom in Spencer's Principles of Psychology; a resolution to 
the intellectual stalemate of the 1840s reflected in Lewes's am­
bivalence towards Spinoza. 
Herbert Spencer's first book, Social Statics, originated in a 
series of twelve letters to The Nonconformist in 1842. In the 
spring of 1850, when he was near to finishing the study, Spen­
cer met Lewes: "In the course of our walk home from a soiree, 
a conversation between us produced mutual interest." The ac­
quaintance that began on that walk was renewed a year later as 
a result of Lewes's review of Social Statics in The Leader in 
March and April 1851: "When Social Statics came out he spoke 
highly of it, both privately and in public . . . and naturally 
when we met again, a further step was taken towards intimacy. 
As we had many tastes and opinions in common, the intimacy 
grew rapidly."11 The manner in which Lewes announced his 
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upcoming review of Social Statics in the Leader suggests in no 
uncertain terms the intensity of his intellectual excitement 
over this "profound and suggestive work": "We remember no 
work on ethics since that of SPINOZA to be compared to it in 
the simplicity of its premises, and the logical rigor with which 
a complete system of scientific ethics is evolved from them. 
This is high praise; but we give it deliberately."12 
But before pursuing Social Statics in more detail, to see just 
what Lewes found in this Victorian Spinoza that so excited 
him, I should like to turn first to the "deeper debt" of mutual 
acquaintance with young Marian Evans, who arrived fresh 
from the provinces as the new assistant editor of the Westmin­
ster Review on 29 September 1851. Among the Friday guests at 
142 Strand, George Eliot writes Charles Bray on October 4 of 
that year, was "a Mr. Herbert Spencer who has just brought 
out a large work on 'Social Statics,' which Lewes pronounces 
the best book he has seen on the subject. You must see the book 
if possible."13 The previous August Eliot had been introduced 
to Spencer while on a London visit to the Crystal Palace with 
the Brays, and the friendship flourished when they met again 
soon after Eliot's permanent move to London. By April 1852 
Spencer was writing to friend Edward Lott: "the most admi­
rable woman, mentally, I ever met."11 
"We have agreed that we are not in love with each other," 
George Eliot avows that same month. It is but a "deliriously 
calm new friendship," a "delightful camaraderie" only, she 
explains, despite the fact that the world incorrectly "sets 
[them] down" as engaged, she protests to Charles Bray on 14 
June 1852.15 But three passionate love-letters, written during 
July 1852 and only recently published after their long incarcer­
ation in the British Museum, tell quite a different story, as 
George Eliot confesses her devotion to Spencer—"those who 
have known me best have always said that if I ever loved any 
one thoroughly my whole life must turn upon that feeling, 
and I find they said truly"—is spurned as a lover—"No credit 
to me for my virtues as a refrigerant"—but reconciles herself to 
an offer of friendship—"Let us, if you will, forget the past, 
 181 FOUNDATIONS OF A FRIENDSHIP
except in so far as it may have brought us to trust in and feel 
for each other. . .  . I can promise you such companionship 
as there is in me, untroubled by painful emotions."46 
And the intellectual intimacy did continue unabated; in 
mid-August Spencer was back with George Eliot at Broad-
stairs, discussing Mill's Logic and his plans for the Principles 
of Psychology. "In physique there was, perhaps, a trace of that 
masculinity characterizing her intellect," Spencer wrote in his 
Autobiography; but what Spencer considered a sexual liabil­
ity, he found an intellectual asset: "Her philosophical powers 
were remarkable. I have known but few men with whom I 
could discuss a question in philosophy with more satisfaction. 
Capacity for abstract thinking is rarely found along with capa­
city for concrete representation, even in men; among women, 
such a union of the two as existed in her has, I should think, 
never been paralleled."47 
Any sympathy we might feel for George Eliot should 
quickly be tempered by the fact that the witty and loving 
George Henry Lewes stood ready to replace Spencer in Eliot's 
affections. Unlike Spencer, Lewes considered Eliot's intellect 
worthy of love as well as admiration; and he recognized the 
sensitive human heart beneath that "masculine" brain (and 
face). The following summer it was he who was now vacation­
ing at Broadstairs with the Westminster's female editor, on 
considerably more romantic terms. By autumn Spencer was 
aware of the situation, and rather ungraciously relieved to pass 
her on to his friend. 
Romance had little adverse effect on friendship for the three. 
Eliot had met both men in the previous autumn, several 
months after Lewes's favorable review of Social Statics.4* The 
two quickly expanded their new-found friendship to include 
her. From the start it was an intellectual menage a trois, as 
Spencer and Lewes frequently stopped by Marian Evans's 
lodgings at John Chapman's, just around the corner from the 
Leader's offices. During 1853-55 Eliot zealously read proof of 
Lewes's Comte, read the manuscript of his Life of Goethe, 
took dictation of his Leader essays, and filled in with an occa­
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sional column herself.49 She unquestionably shared in the gen­
eral intellectual camaraderie between Lewes and Spencer dur­
ing these years. The close friendship among the trio continued 
into the 1870s, as Spencer often took advantage of his standing 
invitation to the Priory: "Our talk, if not very often enlivened 
by witticisms, always contained a mixture of the gay with the 
grave: good stories and a little badinage breaking our discus­
sions, which were generally quite harmonious; for there were 
but few points on which we disagreed."50 On her part George 
Eliot was always slightly amused by Spencer's furious system-
making: "I went to Kew yesterday on a scientific expedition 
with Herbert Spencer, who has all sorts of theories about 
plants—I should have said a proo/-hunting expedition. Of 
course, if the flowers didn't correspond to the theories, we said, 
'tant pis pour les fleursV"—this to Sara Sophia Hennell in 
June 1852, at the peak of her romantic infatuation with Spen­
cer.51 Yet her final words on the subject of Herbert Spencer, 
twenty-eight years later (just two and a half weeks before her 
death) were admiring: "He has so much teaching which the 
world needs."52 
It will be my task in the remainder of this chapter to suggest 
what it was in Spencer's teaching that George Eliot and 
George Henry Lewes considered to be so necessary. To that end 
I turn to Social Statics, to see what Lewes and Eliot would have 
found there for the foundation of the intellectual intimacy 
with Spencer that sprang up so quickly and so intensely for 
both of them. 
J. D. Y. Peel succinctly summarizes the diminished reputa­
tion of Herbert Spencer: "Posterity is cruellest to those who 
sum up for their contemporaries in an all-embracing synthesis 
the accumulated knowledge of their age."5S Many twentieth-
century scholars, appalled by the sheer volume of Spencer's 
repetitious and abstract tomes, have been content to suggest 
vaguely that he is a quintessential^ Victorian thinker, and 
then to turn with relief to the more readable prose of Mill or 
Carlyle or Ruskin. But Spencer was an immensely popular and 
influential writer in his own time. "Spencer's paradoxi­
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cal . . . combination of evangelical spirit and rationalist sub­
stance was peculiarly congenial to the mid-Victorians," Peel 
writes; his "achievement was virtually the answer to the plea 
which Coleridge had made years before: 'Socinianism moon­
light; Methodism a stove. O for some sun to unite heat and 
light!' "M In Social Statics George Henry Lewes found a Spi­
nozistic "sun" to unite the heat of passion with the light of 
reason. 
"I have been reading Bentham's works," Spencer notes in 
1843, "and mean to attack his principles shortly, if I can get 
any review to publish what will appear to most of them so 
presumptuous."55 Presumption was the by-word of Herbert 
Spencer's philosophizing. Spencer's immodest disagreement 
with Bentham provided the germ of Social Statics. The first 
section of the book's lengthy introductory chapter is entitled 
"The Doctrine of Expediency," and Spencer unequivocally as­
serts from the outset that such a doctrine is "futile."56 The he­
donistic calculus of "the greatest happiness of the greatest 
number" is inadequate on two interrelated counts: it fails to 
take into consideration the individual, and it overlooks the 
heart. "The standard of happiness is infinitely variable," 
Spencer objects; "To educe from the infinitely-ramified com­
plications of universal humanity, a true philosophy of na­
tional life, and to found thereon a code of rules for the obtain­
ment of 'greatest happiness,' is a task far beyond the ability of 
any finite mind."57 Furthermore, these utilitarian philoso­
phers believe that such moral calculations are matter for pure, 
logical reason. From the outset Spencer lets the reader know 
that his philosophy is to be of another sort: "Should exception 
be taken to the manifestations of feeling now and then met 
with, as out of place in a treatise having so scientific a title; it 
is replied that, in their present phase of progress, men are but 
little swayed, by purely intellectual considerations." "Faith 
not sight must be our guide," he continues.58 
The reader will recall the Utilitarian underpinnings of 
Charles Bray's Philosophy of Necessity. George Eliot recog­
nized the tension between Bray's and Spencer's ideas when she 
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provided Bray with a copy of Social Statics in March 1852: "I 
did not send you 'Social Statics' because I thought you would 
admire the book—far from it—but because you expressed a 
wish to have it."59 When she writes Bray on his Philosophy of 
Necessity in 1857, her objections to the book at that time follow 
lines similar to Spencer's attack on Utilitarianism in Social 
Statics: 
In the fundamental doctrine of your book . . . you know that I 
agree . . . but I think it is very likely that I should be unable to 
agree with much that you say in relation to the religious ideas and 
the moral tendencies. . . . you appear to consider the disregard 
of individuals a lofty frame of mind. My own experience and de­
velopment deepen every day my conviction that our moral pro­
gress may be measured by the degree in which we sympathize with 
individual suffering and individual joy.60 
The Utilitarians were closely allied with the association psy­
chology of the eighteenth century, as James Mill and Jeremy 
Bentham, writing in the tradition of Gay and Hartley, argued 
that moral feelings were the result of experience, association, 
and reasoning. Herbert Spencer's counter to their philosophy 
comes from a contrary dogma, emphasizing the innate foun­
dations of the human mind, which he loosely terms the "Shaf­
tesbury School." The second half of his introduction, in jux­
taposition to "The Doctrine of Expediency," is entitled "the 
Doctrine of the Moral Sense." Spencer was, of course, one of a 
long line of political moralists, including thinkers like Joseph 
Priestley and William Godwin, who had grounded their pre­
scriptions in a divinely-implanted moral sense. This innate 
moral sense, unlike the calculations of the Utilitarians, speaks 
directly to "the religious ideas and the moral tendencies" that 
Eliot claimed as so essential in her letter to Bray. 
George Henry Lewes's essay on "Hereditary Influence" 
(1856) clearly bears the imprint of Social Statics. Lewes pro­
vides a definition of the term "moral sense," clarifies his 
appeal to emotions over intellect, and places himself emphat­
ically on the side of the angels (and Herbert Spencer): 
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One school of thinkers has energetically denied that we are born 
with any Moral Sense; another school has energetically affirmed 
that we are born with it. And of the two we think the latter are 
nearest the truth. It is certain that we are so organized as to be pow­
erfully affected by actions which appeal to this "Moral sense," in 
a very different way from mere appeals to the intellect—the dem­
onstration of abstract right or wrong; were it otherwise, the keen­
est intellects would also be the kindest and the justest. 
Furthermore, continues Lewes, this moral sense is innate, not 
acquired: "This aptitude . . . varies not according to 
. . . intellect but according to . .  . native tendencies in that 
direction."61 
However, Herbert Spencer adds a distinctively Victorian 
twist to this eighteenth-century doctrine: for Spencer, the 
moral sense is not simply a philosophical abstraction, it is a 
phrenological organ.62 Spencer's argument in Social Statics is 
based on a philosophy in harmony with the phrenological 
view of man. Let me return to George Eliot's 1857 letter to 
Charles Bray, to emphasize that if there were grounds of dis­
parity between Bray and Spencer, there was also important 
agreement on what Eliot called "fundamental doctrines": 
"that mind presents itself under the same condition of invari­
ableness of antecedent and consequent."68 Both Bray and Spen­
cer found in phrenology a would-be science of mind in accor­
dance with the doctrine of universal causality, and believed 
that a scientific morality should be the product of a 
scientific phychology. "As with the physical, so with the ethi­
cal," writes Spencer in Social Statics; "A belief . .  . is begin­
ning to spread among men, that there is an indissoluble bond 
between cause and consequence, an inexorable destiny, a 'law 
that altereth not.' " What Spencer calls "beneficent necessity" 
rules in mind as well as matter, according to the principles of 
universal causation: mental laws "are like the laws of the uni­
verse—safe, inflexible, ever active, and having no excep­
tions."64 Spencer's lifework was dedicated to this notion of a 
fully scientific morality. So Herbert Spencer, like Charles 
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Bray, must make space for moral growth within the "inexo­
rable destiny" of cause and effect. 
The concept of a divinely-implanted moral sense is clearly 
one answer to this dilemma; but it makes an uneasy ideological 
bedfellow with inflexible universal law, however attractive it 
may seem as an antidote to Utilitarianism. And in fact Spencer 
is also critical of the Shaftesbury school for reasons antithetical 
to his attack on the Benthamites: "Confounding the functions 
of feeling and reason, they required a sentiment to do that, 
which should have been left to the intellect. . . . They were 
not right in assuming . . . instinct to be capable of intui­
tively solving every ethical problem submitted to it. To sup­
pose this, was to suppose that moral sense could supply the 
place of logic."65 Ultimately, the similarities between Bray and 
Spencer override their differences, as Spencer, like Bray, at­
tempts to mediate between a science of mind and a system of 
ethics. If the Utilitarians eliminate emotion, the moral sense 
school attempts to do without reason. Spencer wants both: 
"Whilst the decisions of this moral sense . . . are inaccurate 
and often contradictory, it may still be capable of generating a 
true fundamental intuition, which can be logically unfolded 
into a scientific morality."™ First articulated in Social Statics, 
this goal will be fully realized in The Principles of Psychol­
ogy. There, Spencer argues for what he believes to be a truly 
scientific basis for intuitive truths, as the product of an evolu­
tionary psychology. 
In essence Social Statics is nothing less than Spencer's at­
tempt to synthesize two opposing schools of social theory: 
Shaftesbury's moral sense with Bentham's greatest happiness 
for the greatest number. At this stage in his career, Spencer 
frames the problem in terms of political economy; once his 
friendship with Lewes begins, the same questions will be re­
formulated in the language of developmental biology. The 
fundamental issues remain the same, however; issues that 
should be familiar from Charles Bray and Harriet Martineau: 
how can we reconcile the uniqueness of the individual with the 
inexorable logic of scientific causality? How can we accom­
 187 FOUNDATIONS OF A FRIENDSHIP
modate within a single perspective the subjective, introspec­
tive vision with the objective, empirical view? The synthetic 
whole with the analytic part? 
In Social Statics Herbert Spencer finds his answer in a sin­
gle, quintessentially Victorian word: "progress." "Progress, 
therefore, is not an accident but a necessity."67 For Spencer 
progress is the necessity that engenders the ultimate freedom; 
or rather, that renders freedom and necessity in perfect har­
mony. Social Statics is a misleading title, because "social stat­
ics" will be reached only once society has progressed to the 
ideal state, the millennium (not unlike Comte's positivistic 
nirvana). "Social dynamics" is the real subject of Spencer's 
book.68 
"All evil results from the non-adaptation of constitution to 
conditions. This is true of every thing that lives," writes Spen­
cer. But according to Spencer's law of Progress, "constitution" 
will gradually adapt itself to "conditions"; man's "latent ca­
pabilities" will blossom under "favorable circumstances."69 
Once this progressive adaptation has perfected itself, Spencer 
believes, there will no longer be any tension between constitu­
tion and conditions. The individual will be harmoniously at 
one with his environment; the part will be perfectly assimi­
lated into the whole. 
It is here that Samuel Taylor Coleridge's law of individua­
tion, as discussed in the "Prelude" of this study, enters Spen­
cer's system: 
Paradoxical though the assertion looks, the progress is at 
once toward complete separateness and complete union. . . . 
Civilization is evolving a state of things . .  . in which two 
apparently conflicting requirements are reconciled. To achieve the 
creative purpose—the greatest sum of happiness, . . . the ex­
tremest mutual dependence [is necessary]: while on the other hand, 
each individual must have the opportunity to do whatever his 
desires prompt. 
In other words, concludes Spencer, human progress is toward 
both "greater mutual dependence" and "greater individua­
tion." Spencer believes that "this ultimate identity of personal 
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and social interests" (the perfect adaptation of constitution to 
conditions) will effect the reconciliation of utility and the 
moral sense. In this ideal society, the "greatest sum of happi­
ness" for the whole will thus be in full accord with the pro­
gressively-perfected "innate desires" of each individual part: 
Thus the production of the greatest happiness, though inappli­
cable as an immediate guide for men, is nevertheless the true end 
of morality, regarded from the Divine point of view; and as such, 
forms part of the present system. The moral-sense principle, also, 
whilst misapplied by its propounders, is still based on fact; and, 
as was shown, harmonizes when rightly interpreted, with what 
seemed conflicting beliefs, and unites them to produce a complete 
whole.70 
Social Statics is fundamentally a work of social science and 
political economy. But significantly, as early as 1851, Spencer 
frames his Utopian social vision in biological metaphor: "A 
physiological view of social actions was taken, the aggregation 
of citizens forming a nation was compared with the aggrega­
tion of cells forming a living body; the progress from a whole 
made up of like parts which have little mutual dependence, to 
a whole made up of unlike parts which are mutually depen­
dent to a high degree, was shown to be a progress common to 
individual organisms and social organisms."71 In this future 
state of social statics, society will be an harmonious living or­
ganism, just as the human body is an organic whole 
"compounded of innumerable microscopic organisms," each 
of which nonetheless possesses "a kind of independent vital­
ity."72 The concept of evolution lurks just behind Spencer's 
"progress." Spencer is already intrigued by "social" develop­
ment as a model for "individual" development. 
I have had little to say about George Henry Lewes's review 
of Social Statics. Much of it consists of large chunks of direct 
quotation from Spencer. But Lewes singles out for particular 
praise Spencer's Law of Progress, the progressive adaptation 
of organization to circumstances. One passage is of particular 
importance: "The universal law of physical modification is 
the law of mental modification also."73 Of course, this argu­
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ment follows logically upon Spencer's belief, nurtured in 
phrenology, that mind is subject to the same laws as body. But 
here, in this simple statement, can be found the germ of Her­
bert Spencer's great contribution to nineteenth-century intel­
lectual history: an evolutionary psychology. 
It is in this notion of "mental modification" that we find the 
inception of what would ultimately constitute a far profound­
er reconciliation of two philosphical traditions than the me­
diating social theory of Social Statics. In his first book, Spencer 
attempts to reconcile two conflicting schools of social philos­
ophy; in The Principles of Psychology, he moves a step fur­
ther, to reconcile the divergent assumptions about the nature 
of the human mind that underpin these two schools. John 
Stuart Mill considered Spencer an "anti-Utilitarian." In a let­
ter to psychologist Alexander Bain, Spencer denied the title; in 
fact, he both drew upon Utilitarian principles for his evolu­
tionary psychology and modified them significantly: "I believe 
that the experiences of utility, organized and consolidated 
through all past generations of the human race, have been pro­
ducing corresponding nervous modifications, which, by con­
tinued transmission and accumulation, have become in us cer­
tain faculties of moral intuition—certain emotions responding 
to right and wrong conduct—which have no apparent basis in 
the individual experiences of utility."71 This passage speaks of 
Spencer's achievement in The Principles of Psychology (of 
which I will have more to say below), the reconciliation of in­
tuition and experience through a theory of racial heredity. But 
it also draws attention to the origins of that reconciliation in 
the synthetic approach to Bentham and Shaftesbury, "ex­
periences of utility" and "moral intuition," begun in Social 
Statics. 
Herbert Spencer was George Henry Lewes's Victorian Spi­
noza for many reasons: the sheer audacity of an all-embracing 
system; the highly abstract, reasoned deification of passionate 
emotion; the belief in a scientific psychology that would treat 
mind and body as one substance. But for Lewes, Spinoza fi­
nally remains a transcendental philosopher, the ground of his 
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philosophy fenced within the subjective realm of conscious­
ness. As the Victorian Spinoza, Spencer would combine 
"German" philosophy with "Baconian" science by way of ev­
olutionary biology, providing a ground for the Absolute that 
transcended the limitations of the individual mind. 
III. STATICS AND DYNAMICS—TRANSCENDENTAL ANATOMY AND 
THE DEVELOPMENT HYPOTHESIS—SPENCER AND LEWES: ESSAYS, 
1851-1857. 
All discovery must be the discovery either of a fact or of a re­
lation. . . . The discovery of a fact may be a consequence of 
pre-eminent faculties in the discoverer, but it is not necessarily 
so. The discovery of a relation, on the contrary, is strictly and 
exclusively the consequence of pre-eminent faculties, or power 
of origination.—George Eliot to George Combe, 22 April 1852 
As Herbert Spencer recalled, the subject of his first conver­
sation with George Henry Lewes in the spring of 1850 was not 
social statics, but the development hypothesis.75 Thereafter, it 
was not backward to social theories inherited from the eigh­
teenth century, but forward, to the exciting scientific develop­
ments of their own times, to which the new friends turned dur­
ing the "long Sunday-rambles," beginning in the summer of 
1851, which gradually grew into more wide-ranging excur­
sions about the English countryside. One four-day journey up 
the valley of the Thames was especially significant: "It was to 
the impulse he received from the conversations during these 
four days that Lewes more particularly ascribed that awakened 
interest in scientific theories," writes Spencer. "And in me," 
he continues, "observation on the forms of leaves set going a 
train of thought which ended in my writing an essay on 'The 
Laws of Organic Form'; an extended exposition of which oc­
cupies some space in The Principles of Biology'1 (1864).76 
In that essay, published in the British and Foreign Medico-
Chirugical Review in 1859, Spencer reminisces about the same 
ramble, mentioning Lewes by name as his companion. He re­
members picking a buttercup, gazing upon its form, and 
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reflecting on the effects of soil and climate on structure. 
Spencer's interest is equally divided between the questions of 
environmental influence and the inherent structural princi­
ples within the plant itself. "The conditions are manifestly the 
antecedent, and the form the consequent," he concludes; "it 
may be fairly presumed that like relationship holds through­
out the animal kingdom." Spencer is also impressed with the 
"universal harmony" of morphological forms, "the unity 
which pervades the organic creation."77 
These were the same terms to which Spencer and Lewes 
would return again and again in their essays of the early 1850s: 
the unity of composition and the multiplicity of adaptation; in 
man, the animal kingdom, organic creation, and, in a grand 
progressive synthesis, the cosmos itself. Within the next year 
after that theory-hunting expedition, both Lewes and Spencer 
made public their adherence to the controversial "development 
hypothesis": Lewes first, the autumn after those summer ram­
bles, in "Lyell and Owen on Development" (Leader, 18 Octo­
ber 1851); Spencer in the same journal in March 1852, on "The 
Development Hypothesis." 
In his essay Lewes articulates his disagreement with partic­
ular scientific details in Lyell, Owen, and Robert Chambers. 
Yet he also argues for the larger ideological correctness of evo­
lutionary theory: "The differences are reconcilable between all 
forms of the development hypothesis directly we substitute for 
it the more abstract and comprehensive formula of the law of 
Progressive Adaptation."78 Although Spencer acknowledges 
that the theory of evolution is not yet "adequately supported 
by the facts" (many of which Darwin would provide), he also 
asserts unequivocally that "any existing species immediately 
begins to undergo certain changes of structure fitting it for new 
conditions." These changes follow the same pattern of pro­
gressive development that Spencer traced in Social Statics: 
"Complex organic forms have arisen by successive modifica­
tions out of simple ones."79 
It is often remarked that during the decade before Charles 
Darwin's Origin of Species, evolution was "in the air." Chap­
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ter 2 demonstrated that Chambers's Vestiges of Creation was 
an important source of Lewes's and Spencer's early notions 
about evolution. Both men were also well-acquainted with the 
many other scientific guises in which precursors of Darwin ap­
peared during the nineteenth century in the work of men such 
as Lyell, Owen, Lamarck. But it is important to remember that 
for both Lewes and Spencer, the faith preceded the facts. I have 
chosen Chambers as my prototypical Victorian evolutionist, 
precisely because he was, as Lewes said, the most "metaphys­
ical" of these scientific theorists. For Lewes and Spencer began 
with certain beliefs about the order of things; when they read 
contemporary scientists, they sought the facts to fit those be­
liefs ("tant pis pour les fleurs").*0 
In the discussion of Lewes's and Spencer's evolutionary be­
liefs that follows, I make no claim to do full justice to the com­
plex matrix of contemporary scientific developments that in­
fluenced these two Victorian thinkers. Rather, I will isolate the 
concepts I believe were central to their evolutionary cosmolo­
gies as they developed in the early 1850s, and suggest some of 
the sources for these concepts. They are: the unity of composi­
tion (from Goethe and St. Hilaire); the organism and the me­
dium (from Comte); and the development from homogeneity 
to heterogeneity (from von Baer). The interrelation of these 
three concepts (and they were inseparable for Lewes and Spen­
cer) reveals the thesis / antithesis / synthesis structure so char­
acteristic of these Victorians: the static morphology of the 
unity of composition; the dynamic evolution of the develop­
mental process; and what Lewes calls "the Staticodynamical 
view," in which the inherent "transcendent" structure of the 
individual organism is counterbalanced against the ever-
changing forces of the medium as a whole.81 
Unity of Composition 
Lewes's choice of Goethe as the subject for a full-length bi­
ography (the first ever written on the German) was motivated 
by a subject who was scientific and philosophical, as well as 
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literary. Lewes clearly saw Goethe as a model for his own 
yearning to fuse science and humanism. Appropriately, 
Goethe was deeply involved in the rediscovery of Spinoza by 
the German romantics, praising Spinoza as one "who had 
wrought so powerfully on me, and who was destined to affect 
so deeply, my entire mode of thinking."82 Goethe, like Herbert 
Spencer, was another genius in the Spinozist mold, the man of 
passionate emotions and far-reaching abstractions. In his Life 
of Goethe, Lewes singles out Goethe's ability to "[unite] the 
mastery of Will and Intellect to the profoundest sensibility of 
Emotion."83 In an extended passage from that book, Lewes 
compares Goethe's "poetical Pantheism" to Spinoza's, with 
evolutionary overtones: "In it the whole universe was con­
ceived as divine . .  . as the living manifestation of divine en­
ergy . .  . St. Paul tells us that God lives in everything and 
everything in God. Science tells us that the world is always be­
coming . . . the primal energies of Life are . . . issuing 
forth under new forms, through metamorphoses higher and 
higher."84 
When Herbert Spencer writes in his Autobiography that 
"the inability of a man of science to take the poetic view simply 
shows his mental limitation; as the mental limitation of a poet 
is shown by his inability to take the scientific view. The 
broader mind can take both. Those who allege this antagonism 
forget that Goethe, predominantly a poet, was also a scientific 
inquirer," he unmistakably takes his cue from Lewes.85 Goethe 
is not just a scientist who is also a poet; he is a poetical scien­
tist. Head and heart, reason and imagination are fully inte­
grated in him. As such Goethe epitomizes the intellectual tem­
perament of both Lewes and Spencer themselves: "Do not 
mistake him for a metaphysician. He was a positive thinker on 
the a priori Method."86 
Lewes's interest in Goethe germinated in the essay "Goethe 
as a Man of Science," published in the Westminster under 
Eliot's editorship in 1852, which reappeared as chapter 9, book 
5 in the Life, retitled "The Poet as a Man of Science." The 
seeds of Lewes's interest in Goethe were scientific, not literary. 
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Lewes was the first to discuss seriously Goethe's work as a sci­
entist on the metamorphosis of plants, the vertebral structure 
of the skull, and the discovery of the intermaxillary bone com­
mon to both man and animals. Lewes begins his essay by cat­
egorizing scientists as "analytical" or "synthetical" (those fa­
vorite Spencerian terms), as epitomized by Cuvier and St. 
Hilaire: "The former starts from Individuals in order to arrive 
at a Whole. . . . The latter carries within himself the image 
of this Whole, and lives in the persuasion that little by little 
the Individuals will be deduced from it."87 He goes on to trace 
the similarities between the work of St. Hilaire and Goethe, 
arguing that Goethe, like St. Hilaire, is a "synthetical" scien­
tist. 
Lewes credits St. Hilaire with the grand concept of "Unity 
of composition," a notion not only of service to zoological 
studies, but of philosophical significance as well.88 He would 
return to this same idea at length in an essay on the "Life and 
Doctrine of Geoffrey St. Hilaire," again in the Westminster, in 
1854: "What is his Doctrine? . . . That throughout the infi­
nite variety of organic forms there runs one principle of com­
position: that there is one type underlying all diversities. This 
is . .  . the greatest idea contributed by zoology to philoso­
phy." St. Hilaire's "anatomy was philosophic, or transcen­
dent, because transcending the vision of the eye, it had the vi­
sion of the mind"; it is "this addition of Reason to Observation 
which characterizes philosophic anatomy."89 Herbert Spencer 
announced in his own essay on "Transcendental Physiology" 
in 1857 that he too was a "transcendental anatomist" who 
sought "general principles of structure common to vast and 
varied groups of organisms—the unity of plan discernible 
throughout multitudinous species."90 
But Goethe was not merely "synthetical." He was also 
"eminently a positive thinker . . . the attitude of his mind, 
the organic tendency of his nature, was eminently scientific."91 
Revealingly, Lewes compares Goethe with Bacon as one 
"penetrated by the spirit of positive philosophy." In systole 
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and diastole, Goethe descends from the philosophical gener­
alization to the scientific fact, "and thus brings the whole di­
versity of forms within the unity of Life."92 Lewes notes that 
Goethe himself was an early believer in the development hy­
pothesis. Like Spencer, Goethe looks not just at static struc­
ture, but also to progressive development. In the Life Lewes 
quotes Goethe on the "law of Individuation," in language that 
bears an unmistakable similarity to Spencer's in Social Statics: 
"The more imperfect a being is, the more do its individual 
parts resemble each other, and the more do these parts resemble 
the whole. The more perfect the being, the more dissimilar are 
the parts. . . . The more the parts resemble each other, the 
less subordination is there of one to the other. Subordination 
of parts indicates high grade of organization."93 
Lewes believes that Unity of Composition is a profound truth. 
Unity of Composition is the necessary starting point for an evo­
lutionary biology; but taken by itself, it places too much em­
phasis on the static inherent order of the individual organism. 
It is not adequate to explain the changing nature of the uni­
verse. "It is only by connecting this theory with another, view­
ing it as the Statical Law of which the Development is the Dy­
namical Law, that, in our opinion, it can be accepted," Lewes 
concludes.94 Lewes and Spencer found the key to progressive 
adaptation in the dynamic interrelationship of organism and 
medium. 
Organism and Medium 
Writing on "The Natural History of German Life" in 1856, 
George Eliot made clear that she had thoroughly assimilated 
Herbert Spencer's movement from a biological to a social 
model in Social Statics: "The external conditions which soci­
ety has inherited from the past are but the manifestation of in­
herited internal conditions in the human beings who compose 
it; the internal conditions and the external are related to each 
other as the organism and the medium; and development can 
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take place only by the gradual constantaneous development of 
both."95 
When Lewes investigated "Mr. Darwin's Hypothesis" in 
1868, he credited French scientist Jean-Baptiste Lamarck 
(1744-1829) with the "law of Adaptation" that Charles Darwin 
enlarged into "natural selection," praising "the singular im­
portance of Lamarck's hypothesis in calling attention to mod­
ifiability of structure through modifications of adaptation." 
Although Lamarck erred in placing too much emphasis on the 
medium at the expense of the organism, he provided a neces­
sary corrective to the static viewpoint of transcendental anat­
omy. "Naturalists before his time had been wont to consider 
the Organism apart from the Medium in which it existed; [La­
marck] clearly saw that vital phenomena depended on the re­
lation of the two."96 
Auguste Comte's emphasis on the relationship of organism 
and medium developed the same idea.97 Lewes found the most 
explicit statement of the concept in Comte's definition of life 
in the Cours de philosophic positive: "The idea of Life sup­
poses the mutual relation of two indispensible elements—an 
organism and a suitable medium or environment."98 Lewes re­
turns to the concept repeatedly throughout his book on Comte: 
"So far from organic bodies being independent of external cir­
cumstances they become more and more dependent on them as 
their organization becomes higher, so that organism and a me­
dium are the two correlative ideas of life."99 
This same notion of mutual interdependence lies directly be­
hind Herbert Spencer's famous definition of life in The Prin­
ciples of Psychology: "the continuous adjustment of internal 
relations to external relations."100 Lewes's own emphasis on 
the relationship between organism and medium as the corner­
stone of his evolutionary philosophy never wavered. His final 
book, Problems of Life and Mind, echoes the ideas of twenty-
five years earlier: "Every vital phenomena is the product of two 
factors, the Organism and the Medium1'; "Life may be defined 
as the mode of existence of an organism in relation to its me­
dium."101 
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Homogeneity and Heterogeneity. 
But taken by themselves, Unity of Composition and the in­
terdependence of Organism and Medium do not necessitate a 
belief in progressive evolutionary development. The final 
seeds of Lewes's and Spencer's evolutionary theory were 
planted when Spencer reviewed W. B. Carpenter's Principles 
of Physiology in the autumn of 1851. In reading Carpenter 
writes Spencer, "I became acquainted with von Baer's state­
ment that the development of every organism is a change from 
homogeneity to heterogeneity. The substance of the thought 
was not new to me, though its form was." The substance of 
von Baer's theory is anticipated in Social Statics as "an un­
shaped belief in the development of living things; including, 
in a vague way, social development."102 Spencer's sociological 
notions of "individuation," in which each part becomes pro­
gressively more individualized and complex, yet simultane­
ously more interdependent with the whole, are given explicit 
scientific foundation by the German zoologist and embryolo­
gist Karl Ernst von Baer (1792-1876). Carpenter writes in the 
summary of von Baer that Spencer read: "The lower we de­
scend in the scale of being, whether in Animal or in Vegetable 
series, the nearer approach do we make to that homogeneous­
ness which is the typical attribute of organic bodies, wherein 
every particle has all the characters of individuality . .  . as we 
ascend in the scale of being, we find the fabric—whether of the 
Plant or the Animal—becoming more and more heteroge­
neous."108 
Reviewing Carpenter's book in 1855, T. H. Huxley claimed 
that von Baer's laws "are to Biology what Kepler's great gen­
eralizations were to Astronomy."104 Spencer's application of 
von Baer gave the proof to Huxley's analogy. His researches in 
embryology led von Baer to conclude that development pro­
ceeds from the general to the more highly specialized. Not sur­
prisingly, Herbert Spencer titled the 1857 essay that took von 
Baer's "homogeneity" and "heterogeneity" as its passwords 
"Progress: Its Law and Cause." Just as Spencer moved analo­
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gously from sociology to biology in Social Statics, so he made 
the even greater leap, in "Progress," from von Baer's embryol­
ogy to a full-blown Victorian cosmology: 
The series of changes gone through during the development of a 
seed into a tree, or an ovum into an animal, constitute an advance 
from homogeneity of structure to heterogeneity of structure. 
. . . This is the history of all organisms whatever. . . . 
Now, we propose in the first place to show, that this law of or­
ganic progress is the law of all progress. Whether it be in the de­
velopment of the Earth, in the development of Life upon its sur­
face, in the development of Society, of Government, of 
Manufactures, of Commerce, of Language, Literature, Science, 
Art, this same evolution of the simple into the complex through 
successive differentiations, holds throughout.101"' 
Spencer's intellectual kinship with Robert Chambers is most 
apparent in this essay. Chambers gathers the universe into 
"one majestic Whole," from the nebular hypothesis and the 
formation of the solar system to the mind of man, under the 
universal law of development.106 In "Progress: Its Law and 
Cause," Spencer follows the same structural model as the Ves­
tiges, tracing the "law of progress" (the development from 
homogeneity to heterogeneity) through the solar system, the 
formation of the earth, plants and animals, man, society, lan­
guage, religion, and art. 
George Henry Lewes and George Eliot were also much taken 
with von Baer. In June 1853 Lewes devoted an essay in the 
Leader to "Von Baer on the Development Hypothesis," stress­
ing "the law of organic modification in adaptation to circum­
stances."107 Lewes also quotes the German scientist in his Life 
of Goethe in 1855: "The history of Development is the true 
torchbearer in every inquiry into organic bodies." Lewes con­
tinues in his own words, in terms that make clear that the no­
tion of a broader, nonbiological application of von Baer's bi­
ological principles did not originate with Herbert Spencer in 
1857: "In Geology, in Physiology, in History, and in Art, we 
are now all bent on tracing the phases of development. To un­
derstand the grown we try to follow the growth."*0* In that 
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same year, Lewes notes that he and George Eliot are reading 
Carpenter's Principles of Physiology again—along with 
Gall's Anatomie et physiologie du cerveau.109 
Of George Eliot's interest in von Baer, we have only a small 
but intriguing clue, to be found in the first of those three pas­
sionate love letters to Spencer in July 1852. The lovesick intel­
lectual depicts herself filled with "a loathing for books," re­
gressing on the scale of mental evolution: "You see I am 
sinking fast towards 'homogeneity,' and my brain will soon be 
a mere pulp unless you come to arrest the downward pro­
cess."110 Gordon Haight footnotes Spencer's essay on the 
"Development Hypothesis" of 20 March 1852 as the source of 
Eliot's "homogeneity"; but in fact "homogeneity" and 
"heterogeneity" do not make their first entrance in print until 
Spencer's essay on "The Philosophy of Style," in October 
1852—and are not explicitly related to Spencer's evolutionary 
beliefs until "Progress," in 1857.'" Spencer discovered von 
Baer's law while reading Carpenter in the autumn of 1851, and 
George Eliot offers a small but unmistakable clue that she was 
present at the creation. Eliot, like Herbert Spencer, was nur­
tured in the progressive cosmology of the phrenological world 
view; like Lewes, she met Spencer with an intellectual dispo­
sition ready to resonate with his. This was the woman who had 
opened her first essay for the Westminster Review in January 
1851 "with a profound belief in the progressive character of 
human development.""2 
After 1859 Eliot, Lewes, and Spencer all accepted Darwin's 
evolutionary thesis—although each did so with qualifications. 
In the late 1860s, a congenial scientific correspondence be­
tween Charles Darwin and George Henry Lewes ensued, re­
cently published in volume 8 of The George Eliot Letters. 
Lewes produced a series of lengthy essays on "Mr. Darwin's 
Hypothesis" in the Fortnightly in 1868 with the evolutionist's 
blessing: "The articles strike me as quite excellent, and I hope 
they will be republished; but I fear they will be too deep for 
many readers," Darwin writes Lewes.1" 
Although much that he says about Darwin in 1868 is beyond 
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the scope of this study, it is appropriate to note here that Lewes 
did not see Darwin's ideas as radically different from evolu­
tionary predecessors like St. Hilaire, Lamarck, and Robinet. 
Lewes did argue that Darwin's unique contribution, natural 
selection, though only another hypothesis, is "the best hy­
pothesis at present." He credits Darwin with a more explicit 
formulation of the "law of adaptation" than his predecessors, 
but he also finds reflected in Mr. Darwin's hypothesis much 
that should seem familiar to the reader of Herbert Spencer in 
the 1850s: "The evolution of Life is the evolution of the special 
from the general, the complex from the simple. An organism 
rises in power as it ramifies into variety. From a homogeneous 
organic mass a complex structure is evolved," writes Lewes— 
summarizing Darwin in very Spencerian language. Within 
Darwin's theory of natural selection, Lewes found a persuasive 
reformulation of his own dual emphasis on the dynamic inter­
relationship of "conditions" and "form," medium and organ­
ism: "Minds unconvinced [by previous theories] . . . were at 
once subdued by the principles of Natural Selection, involving 
as it did, on the one hand, the incontestible 'Struggle for Ex­
istence,' and on the other, the known laws of Adaptation and 
Hereditary Transmission.""4 But in the final analysis, the af­
finities between Herbert Spencer and Robert Chambers's Ves­
tiges are much closer than any with Charles Darwin's Origin. 
Spencer is a cosmologist rather than a practicing scientist. He 
is interested in evolution as a universal process that could be 
applied not just to individual organisms, but to the solar sys­
tem, social structures, and everything in between. 
Spencer's second book, The Principles of Psychology 
(1855), takes the general evolutionary notions that first ap­
peared in the social theory of Social Statics, and combines 
them with the scientific concepts of the early 1850s shared by 
Lewes and Spencer. The product: a model of the human mind 
that grows out of the distinctive intellectual matrix of this Vic­
torian circle. For Herbert Spencer in the 1850s, the most pro­
ductive application of the universal law of "progress" was to 
be found in the field of human psychology. This was to be 
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Spencer's most original contribution to the history of ideas. It 
was Herbert Spencer, not Charles Darwin, who first concep­
tualized an adaptive, evolutionary psychology."5 
IV. LIFE AND MIND—HERBERT SPENCER: THE PRINCIPLES OF PSY­
CHOLOGY (1855) 
Both George Eliot and George Henry Lewes were closely in­
volved with the creation of The Principles of Psychology. 
Spencer's "general interest in mental phenomena" had been 
increased by reading Lewes's Biographical History of Philos­
ophy in the autumn of 1851. He dated the inception of the 
Principles from a letter to his father in March 1852 when he 
began his reading (starting with Mill's Logic, lent him by 
Eliot) for his "Introduction to Psychology.""6 The reader will 
remember that March 1852 dates the beginning of the most in­
tense period of Eliot's and Spencer's relationship. Although 
the romance soon cooled, their continuing intellectual inti­
macy is evident in George Eliot's ecstatic letter to Sara Sophia 
Hennell in July 1854: "Herbert Spencer . . . will stand in the 
Biographical Dictionaries of 1954 as 'Spencer, Herbert, an 
original and profound philosophical writer, especially known 
by his great work XXX which gave a new impulse to psychol­
ogy and has mainly contributed to the present advanced posi­
tion of that science, compared with that which it had attained 
in the middle of the last century.' ""7 
After The Principles of Psychology was published in 1855, 
Eliot lent copies to her friends, and, reported George Henry 
Lewes, "nailed to the book by his interest in it.""8 Lewes, who 
had learned the art of adaptive survival of the fittest in the lit­
erary marketplace, wrote two quite different reviews of the 
book, one for the more conservative Saturday Review—"As the 
Saturday Review is not to be heterodox, he was necessarily 
gene," explains Eliot"9—the other, a series of three essays for 
the less orthodox Leader. Both are fascinating: the first for 
what it reveals of the impact of The Principles of Psychology 
on the general Victorian reader; the second for the clarity with 
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which it represents Spencer's theories as the culmination of 
Lewes's search for the Victorian Spinoza. 
The Principles of Psychology is grounded on the applica­
tion of the physiological method to the study of the human 
mind: "He makes Psychology one of the great divisions of Bi­
ology," Lewes writes in the Leader.120 The same readers who 
had been shocked by Combe, Chambers, and Martineau would 
respond in like manner to the Principles, as Lewes well knew 
when he wrote his "gene" essay for the Saturday Review. "This 
is an exposition of psychical phenomena which will find little 
favor except with those who advocate materialism." Spencer's 
"denial of free-will" and "identification of mind with life" 
will be particularly controversial, observes Lewes; the Princi­
ples "cannot hope for much acceptance from the English pub­
lic."121 He was correct: "It does not appear to us scientific in 
character. . . . We are opposed to Mr. Spencer's fundamental 
principles," wrote the British Quarterly Review.™1 In the Un­
itarian National Review, R. H. Hutton entitles his essay 
"Atheism": "We find philosophers like Mr. Spencer, instead 
of examining the moral realities of human life, actually dissi­
pating or distorting them, in the hope of deducing them from 
physiological assumptions."128 Such objections should by now 
sound familiar. 
But when Lewes turns to his first essay in the Leader, 
"Herbert Spencer's Psychology," the tactful mask of the com­
mon reader cast aside, the intensity of his intellectual excite­
ment is unrestrained. Lewes designates Herbert Spencer as the 
third and culminating figure in a crucial process of scientific 
discovery, which begins with St. Hilaire's zoology and contin­
ues with Schwann's cell theory. Just as "Schwann set aside the 
old methods," writes Lewes, "and proved the Unity of Com­
position which really underlies all the variety of forms, so Her­
bert Spencer sets aside" the old philosophical psychology: "We 
may pause by the way to notice the stages of the history of this 
doctrine of Unity, which succeed each other according to the 
law of development, i.e. from general to particular. First comes 
Geoffrey St. Hilaire, who proclaims the Unity of Composition 
in the animal forms; then Schwann, who proves the Unity in 
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the animal tissues; and finally, Herbert Spencer, who proves 
that Unity in the animal intelligence."124 
Forms, tissues, intelligence—from the most homogeneous 
and general to the most particular, complex, and specialized 
forms of life; all are a part of that great Whole, that single Sub­
stance that constitutes the monist's universe. "The Law rules 
the whole, one process is seen amid the endless variety," writes 
Lewes. He reminds the reader of his 1851 review of Social Stat­
ics, and feels compelled to reiterate, even more emphatically, 
the analogy he drew there: "In reviewing Herbert Spencer's 
former work, we compared him with Spinoza: a comparison 
which seemed strange and even hyperbolical to those who 
knew nothing of the old Hebrew logician; but this Principles 
of Psychology is so like Spinoza in the mental qualities it ex­
hibits, and frequently in the very doctrine it professes, that 
no one acquainted with the two can fail to perceive their 
kindred."125 
In Spencer's Principles of Psychology, the positivist millen­
nium has, in theory, arrived. Spencer has rescued British 
psychology from the airy insubstantialities of "arachnae" 
metaphysics. In editions of his Biographical History after 
1855, Lewes added footnotes to that effect.126 And thirty years 
after that first history of philosophy, he returns to the same 
subject in Problems of Life and Mind. Locke, Hobbes, Berke­
ley, and Hume "have produced essays, not systems. There has 
been no noteworthy attempt to give a conception of the World, 
of Man, and of Society, wrought out with systematic harmo­
nizing of principles. . . . Mr. Herbert Spencer is now for the 
first time deliberately making the attempt to found a Philoso­
phy."127 This is a philosophy on the positive plan. At the heart 
of the Principles lies Spencer's most original contribution: he 
takes the biological principles he shared with Lewes during 
the early 1850s—the unity of composition, the organism and 
the medium, progressive adaptation from homogeneity to het­
erogeneity—and applies them to mental development: within 
the individual, but, with more far-reaching implications, to 
the human race as a whole. 
George Henry Lewes entitled his third review essay of Spen­
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cer's Principles, "Life and Mind," twenty years before his own 
magnum opus by that title. In order to appreciate Spencer's 
theories of mind, we must first state his definition of life. This 
subject has been discussed at some length in my prelude, in the 
context of Spencer's borrowings from Samuel Taylor Cole-
ridge. Taken in conjunction with von Baer's development 
from homogeneity to heterogeneity, Spencer's "individ­
uation" becomes an evolutionary process. This process is ef­
fected by the dynamic and adaptive interaction of organism 
and medium. Thus Spencer arrives at his "broadest and most 
complete definition of life": "The continuous adjustment of 
internal relations to external relations."12* 
This definition may strike the twentieth-century reader as 
less than earth-shaking. But we must place Spencer's defini­
tion against the psychology of Locke, Hume, Berkeley, and 
prior to Darwin's biology, to perceive its genuinely radical im­
pact. In his own Principles of Psychology, William James 
paid homage to Spencer: 
At a certain stage in the development of every science a degree of 
vagueness is what best consists with fertility. On the whole, few 
recent formulas have done more real service of a rough sort in psy­
chology than the Spencerian one that the essence of mental life 
and bodily life are one, namely, "the adjustment of inner to outer 
relations." Such a formula is vagueness incarnate; but because it 
takes into account the fact that minds inhabit environments which 
act on them and on which they in turn react; because, in short, it 
takes mind in the midst of all its concrete relations, it is immensely 
more fertile than the old-fashioned "rational psychology," which 
treated the soul as a detached existent, sufficient unto itself and 
assumed to consider only its nature and properties.129 
According to Herbert Spencer, this adjustment of inner to 
outer, organism to medium, leads to "progressive adapta­
tion."130 When this adaptation is translated into psychological 
terms, Spencer arrives at his theory of mental inheritance, the 
cornerstone of The Principles of Psychology. 
The Principles of Psychology is divided into four parts: the 
general analysis, special analysis, general synthesis, and spe­
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cial synthesis. In his preface Spencer explains that "the four 
parts of which this work consists, though intimately related to 
each other as different views of the same great aggregate of phe­
nomena, are yet, in the main, severally independent and com­
plete in themselves." The analysis deals with the study of hu­
man intelligence subjectively; the synthesis, objectively.131 To 
translate this Spencerese: in his analysis, Spencer views the hu­
man mind philosophically, from the subjective, internal per­
spective, the single center of consciousness; in the synthesis, he 
views the same phenomena biologically, or objectively: each 
mind as a single part of a greater synthetic whole, the larger 
pattern of evolutionary development. The essence of The 
Principles of Psychology is to be found in the ingenious 
method by which Spencer mediates between analysis and syn­
thesis, the claims of philosophy and biology, introspection 
and observation, intuition and experience; and asserts the har­
monious coexistence and dynamic interpenetration of both. 
Although Spencer claimed to ground his psychology on bi­
ology rather than metaphysical speculation, he did not believe 
that dissecting the brain like a turnip was any more effica­
cious, taken alone, than introspective cogitation. In claiming 
the unity of composition, that life and mind are one substance, 
Spencer did not intend simple materialism; like Spinoza, it is 
inaccurate to classify him as either materialist or idealist. In 
fact, what Spencer sought was a science of mind that would 
transcend biology; to unify the polarities of introspective ideal­
ists and their innate ideas (such as the "moral sense") with the 
empirical men of science, who grounded their utilitarian beliefs 
on sense experience. The hereditary transmission of innate 
mental characteristics was Herbert Spencer's key to all mythol­
ogies, his intended reconciliation of the Shaftesbury and the 
Benthamite schools; his chief claim to a science of mind that 
would combine the truths of the metaphysicians with the dis­
coveries of the biologists. 
In my discussion of Charles Bray and Harriet Martineau, I 
suggested that the bridge between Carlyle and Bentham for 
Bray, mystical experience and materialism for Martineau, was 
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to be found in a blend of nineteenth-century romanticism with 
eighteenth-century rationalism, phrenology, and association 
psychology. In its original, "static," inception, Gall's phre­
nology argued for the unity of composition, mind as matter, 
innate mental characteristics determined in each individual at 
birth. But beginning with George Combe and Robert Cham­
bers, these optimistic Victorian necessitarians added a "dy­
namic" belief in progress, adaptive change in accordance with 
circumstance. The law of universal causation remained invar­
iable, as Mill and Comte had asserted; but the individual could 
also form new associative mental patterns, altering his innate 
constitution. And most significantly this new constitution 
could be passed on to the next generation. 
George Henry Lewes's final words on the much-maligned 
science of phrenology were ones of praise: "Gall taught men 
the futility of looking inwards, and neglecting the vast mass of 
external observation which animals and societies afforded; he 
taught them where to seek the primary organic conditions—in 
inherited structures and inherited aptitudes. The effect of this 
teaching is conspicuous in modern works."132 One of these 
modern works was The Principles of Psychology. The reader 
will recall that Spencer's introduction to psychology was phre­
nology during the decade of Charles Bray's Philosophy of Ne­
cessity and Robert Chambers's Vestiges of Creation, George 
Combe's proselytizing and Harriet Martineau's conversion. 
Robert M. Young argues persuasively that phrenology was 
also a seminal influence behind Spencer's psychological theo­
ries. m My discussion above of Combe and Chambers, Bray and 
Martineau, has suggested some of the ways in which Spencer's 
wedding of psychology to evolutionary biology was antici­
pated by other members of this Victorian circle, all of whom 
can be linked with phrenology.131 
Hints of the evolutionary possibilities of phrenology can be 
found in the Vestiges of Creation. Chambers believes mental 
characteristics are innate: "The mental characters of indi­
viduals are inherently various . . . education and circum­
stance . . . are incapable of entirely altering these 
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characters." And yet, he continues provocatively, "there is, 
nevertheless, a general adaptation of the mental constitution of 
man to the circumstances in which he lives." Might not 
environment alter heredity? And might not the development of 
the individual be parallel to that of the race?135 Not sur­
prisingly, young Charles Darwin took a strong interest in the 
evolutionary possibilities of phrenology: "One is tempted to 
believe phrenologists are right about habitual exercise of the 
mind, altering the head, & thus these qualities become heredi­
tary," he writes in his notebooks in 1838. "To avoid stating 
how far I believe, in Materialism, say only that emotions, 
instincts, degrees of talent, which are hereditary are so because 
brain of child resembles parent stock.—(& phrenologists state 
that brain alters)."136 
The phrenological cosmologies of Robert Chambers and 
George Combe, Charles Bray and Harriet Martineau, are in­
tended to be equally biological and metaphysical; but prior to 
Herbert Spencer, the metaphysics clearly outweighed the biol­
ogy. In 1855 Spencer not only had the phrenological back­
ground upon which to draw, but also the broader range of sci­
entific sources he had explored with Lewes, from "transcen­
dental anatomy" to the adaptation of the organism to the 
medium. 
As early as 1841, in the Philosophy of Necessity, Charles 
Bray had anticipated Herbert Spencer's Principles of Psychol­
ogy: "All moral rules are derived originally from Utility, but 
the pleasures and pains . .  . on which they are based are 
transmitted to offspring and thus become intuitions."1" But it 
is left to the reader of the Philosophy of Necessity to move in­
ferentially from this statement to a reconciliation of Bray's 
transcendental with his empirical tendencies; Bray himself 
makes no overt connection. By contrast, in The Principles of 
Psychology, Spencer's synthesis is systematic and explicit, as 
he claims to "furnish a solution to the controversy between the 
disciples of Locke and those of Kant," combining "the expe­
rience-hypothesis and the hypothesis of the transcendentalists: 
neither of which is tenable by itself."138 
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"Before our generation," wrote William James in 1890, 
when empirical psychologists contended that sense experience 
was the basis of mental development, "it was the experience of 
the individual only that was meant." In his "brilliant and se­
ductive" Principles of Psychology, Herbert Spencer wrought 
a seminal change: "When one nowadays says that the human 
mind owes its present shape to experience, he means the expe­
rience of ancestors as well. Mr. Spencer's statement of this is 
the earliest emphatic one."139 In Problems of Life and Mind, 
George Henry Lewes rewrites Locke's famous metaphor in 
Spencerian terms: "The sensitive subject is no tabula rasa; it is 
not a blank sheet of paper, but a palimpsest."140 
The heart of Spencer's argument for this new definition of 
an "experiential" school of psychology is to be found in chap­
ter 3 of part 4 of The Principles of Psychology, the "Special 
Synthesis," "The Growth of Intelligence." There Spencer ar­
gues that all knowledge does come from experience, but ex­
pands the definition of experience to include "the experience 
of the race organisms forming its ancestry." Like the phrenol­
ogists Spencer believes in innate mental faculties; but he incor­
porates phrenology with association psychology, to arrive at 
the notion of mental development: "The familiar doctrine of 
association here undergoes a great extension. . . . The effects 
of associations are . . . transmitted as modifications of the 
nervous system."141 Hereditary transmission is the key to this 
process by which each new mind is born, as a palimpsest, al­
ready imprinted with a rich mental heritage of so-called 
"innate" ideas: "Instinct may be regarded as a kind of orga­
nized memory."142 
Spencer saves his biggest gun for the end: "As most who have 
read thus far have perceived," this notion of mental heredity 
implies "a tacit adhesion to the development hypothesis."14* 
The racial mind of man develops over time, as its ancestral her­
itage grows ever more complex. What began as animal in­
stincts evolve into higher mental processes: "That progressive 
complication of the instincts, which . . . involves a progres­
sive dimunition of their purely automatic character, likewise 
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involves a simultaneous commencement of Memory and Rea­
son."141 Spencer's definition of life as "the continuous adjust­
ment of internal relations to external relations" is thus central 
to the Principles. In her notebooks in the early 1870s•, George 
Eliot demonstrated her familiarity with the vocabulary of the 
Principles of Psychology: "We have, as well as we can, to ar­
rive at the classification which is called the distinction between 
the Static & Dynamic—between what is an inherent quality or 
characteristic or need of the human being . .  . & what is mod­
ifiable or doomed to disappear under successive changes."145 
The year after Spencer's Principles of Psychology was pub­
lished, Lewes wrote his essay on "Hereditary Influence, Ani­
mal and Human," which abounds with echoes of Spencer. Just 
as they had shared the unity of composition, the organism and 
the medium, and the development from homogeneity to het­
erogeneity between 1851-54, this intellectual friendship con­
tinued to be the source of rich reciprocation for both men. "We 
inherit the acquired experience of our forefathers—their ten­
dencies, their aptitudes, their habits, their improvements," 
writes Lewes, commending to his readers the "original and re­
markable 'Principles of Psychology' ": "In this work Heritage, 
for the first time, is made the basis of a psychological system; 
and we especially recommend any reader interested in the pres­
ent article, to make himself acquainted with a treatise in every 
way so remarkable."146 Twenty years later, in the five-volume 
Problems of Life and Mind, the influence of Spencer's evolu­
tionary psychology continues to be strong and unmistakable: 
"Thought is an embodied process, which has its conditions in 
the history of the race no less than in that of the individual," 
writes Lewes. "We learn by individual experiences, registra­
tions of feeling, rendered possible by ancestral experience."147 
The Principles of Psychology completes the scientific ar­
gument of this study, closing a circle of thinkers that found its 
methodology in the universal causation of John Stuart Mill 
and the positivism of Auguste Comte, and its first practical ap­
plication in the phrenologists' claim that the brain is the organ 
of the mind. Herbert Spencer's original contribution to the his­
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tory of psychology grows directly out of the matrix of ideas 
shared by this Victorian circle: the Principles fuses holistic 
metaphysics with evolutionary biology in an exemplary incar­
nation of a distinctively Victorian frame of mind. But the final 
note of my history is to be sounded in a theological key: be­
cause for all these thinkers, science was ultimately the servant 
of a higher faith. Thus I conclude with what Spencer called the 
"ontological bearings" of the case.118 
V. THE KNOWABLE AND THE UNKNOWABLE—HERBERT SPENCER: 
"PROGRESS: ITS LAW AND CAUSE" (1857) 
How strange it would be if Physical Science should first reduce 
the explanation of all phenomena to a single force, and then 
Philosophy step in to reduce the logic of all explanation to a 
single formula. What a sword wherewith to open the world, 
our oyster!—Robert Lytton to George Henry Lewes, 1872 
Herbert Spencer's 1857 essay, "Progress: Its Law and Cause" 
was incorporated three years later into part 1 of First Princi­
ples, as "The Unknowable."119 As we have seen, it was in 
"Progress" that Spencer made the conceptual leap from von 
Baer's embryology to his grand Victorian cosmology on a bio­
logical model. Von Baer's development from homogeneity to 
heterogeneity had provided Spencer with a key to all mythol­
ogies, a formula that would unlock the mysteries of the uni­
verse by a plan according to which all the parts would be 
clearly connected within one stupendous whole. This evolu­
tionary process constitutes the first half of the essay, the scien­
tific "law" of Progress. In the second half, Spencer turns to its 
"cause": "The Unknowable." 
George Eliot's interest in the Unknowable antedated Spen­
cer's; she had quoted R. W. McKay in her first essay for the 
Westminster in 1851: "The known and the unknown are inti­
mately connected and correlative."150 "Progress: Its Law and 
Cause," in its original essay form and its later version in First 
Principles, was singled out by Eliot for more praise than any 
of Spencer's other work. In a letter to Sara Sophia Hennell on 
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5 June 1857, Eliot leaves no doubt that it is Herbert Spencer as 
the poet of the Unknowable with whom she resonates: 
I feel every day a greater disinclination for theories and arguments 
about the origin of things in the presence of all this mystery and 
beauty and pain and ugliness, that floods one with conflicting 
emotions. 
Didn't you like the conclusion of Herbert Spencer's article in the 
Westminster] R[eview]? There was more feeling in it than we gen­
erally get in his writing. 
Her response to First Principles is similar: "I think the first 
part ["The Unknowable"] superior to anything he has done 
before, and he says he feels the same himself: it is less barely 
intellectual—the considerations are larger." Reading proof of 
the second part, George Eliot continues to find herself 
"supremely gratified": "It is, as he says, a result of his riper 
thought." "It is the best thing he has done," she writes in De­
cember 1860; and later: "It is touching to see how his whole life 
and soul are being poured into this book."151 Eliot's first scene 
of clerical life, "Amos Barton," was published in January 
1857; that October she would begin her first full-length novel, 
Adam Bede. The germinating artist found in Spencer's "Prog­
ress" considerations larger than the merely intellectual, a 
response to the same "mystery and beauty and pain and ugli­
ness" that she would envision in the poetic eye of her fictions. 
And yet, like her friend Herbert Spencer, George Eliot the nov­
elist can hardly be said to embody a "disinclination for theo­
ries." For Eliot as for Spencer, poetry and science are insepa­
rable. 
Significantly, Herbert Spencer's first mention of the Un­
knowable comes in his most confident and visionary essay. 
The more Spencer knows, the more clearly he can define the 
boundaries of what cannot be known; or, to put this another 
way, Spencer came to know, with confident certainty, exactly 
what he could never hope to understand. The known and the 
unknown are the ultimate Victorian polarity, as Spencer him­
self realized: "A known cannot be thought of apart from an 
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unknown. . . . To carry further the metaphor before used,— 
they are the positive and negative poles of thought; of which 
neither can gain in intensity without increasing the intensity 
of the other."152 
The pivotal transition from the known to the unknowable 
takes place at the halfway point in "Progress: Its Law and 
Cause": "Does not the universality of law imply a universal 
cause? . . . To do this [fathom cause] would be to solve that 
ultimate mystery which must ever transcend human intelli­
gence." Although the optimistic Victorian believes that he can 
fully come to understand the "how?" of the physical world, its 
universal causation and evolutionary processes, this finally 
does not answer its "why?": "We are still in the dark respecting 
those mysterious properties in virtue of which the germ, when 
subjected to the fit influences, undergoes the special changes 
that begin the series of transformations."I5S When George Eliot 
read Darwin's Origin of Species in 1859, she was already an 
enthusiastic adherent of the development hypothesis; but Dar­
win's definitive intellectual breakthrough prompted her to re­
spond with a polar antithesis: "To me the Development The­
ory and all other explanations of processes by which things 
come to be, produce a feeble impression compared with the 
mystery that lies under the processes."151 
"Progress," Spencer concludes, "is not an accident, not a 
thing within human control, but a beneficent necessity."155 In 
his Autobiography Spencer writes that the essay on "Progress" 
was intended as a "repudiation of materialism."156 Like Bray 
and Martineau, Spencer did not believe that matter was all. 
Nor did he believe in an orthodox Christian God as first mover. 
But Spencer's beneficent necessity emanates from what can 
surely be called a religious sense of the universe. 
Twentieth-century critics have tended to be unsympathetic 
to Spencer's Unknowable, regarding it as at best an amusing 
and at worst a pathetic Victorian attempt at spiritual survival 
in a world without God. "His philosophy of religion is an il­
logical blend of reason and faith," writes Alfred Benn, "which, 
as such, finds its proper place among the various schemes of 
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compromise and conciliation characteristically put forward by 
English thought when the religious revolution had entered on 
its acute phase."157 In The Great Chain of Being, A. O. Lovejoy 
is even less respectful: "There is a purely metaphysical other-
worldliness which is sometimes to be found completely disso­
ciated from any corresponding theory of the nature of the 
good, and therefore from any otherworldly moral and reli­
gious temper. Perhaps the oddest example of this is to be seen 
in those half-dozen irrelevant chapters about the Unknowable 
which Herbert Spencer . . . prefixed to the Synthetic Philos­
ophy."158 
But the response of Spencer's contemporaries was quite dif­
ferent: James Hinton rejoiced that Spencer had "shown so 
many evidences of a truly religious nature."159 For these Victo­
rians the Unknowable was a happy and a necessary counterpart 
to their boundless optimism about the knowable; an intensely 
emotional counterbalance to their equally intense rationality. 
Harriet Martineau wrote in her Autobiography in 1855: 
"Wondrous beyond the comprehension of any one mind is the 
mass of glorious facts, and the series of mighty conceptions 
laid open; but the shadow of the surrounding darkness rests 
upon it all. The unknown always engrosses the greater part of 
the field of vision; and the awe of infinity sanctifies both the 
study and the dream."160 In his autobiography Bray quotes 
George Combe and Herbert Spencer in tandem: 
As George Combe says, "We cannot tell what matter is, and we are 
travelling through a world in which all that we can comprehend 
is truly relationship and nothing more. We know that the relation­
ship established between things, and between our mind and them, 
gives rise to certain impressions in us, but we can penetrate no 
deeper into the mysteries of nature." "No relation in conscious­
ness," says Herbert Spencer, "can resemble or be in any way akin 
to its source beyond consciousness.""*1 
These mysteries of nature were not daunting; they were a 
source of joy and inspiration. George Henry Lewes first found 
the Unknowable in Faust's "streben nach dem unendlichen": 
"If we at the outset content ourselves with the Knowable and 
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attainable, and give up the wild impatience of desire for the 
Unknowable and unattainable . . . knowledge can only be 
relative, never absolute."162 "What life is we know not—cannot 
know. The mystery is impenetrable. No positive philosophy 
attempts to penetrate it," he writes in Comtek Twenty years 
later he opened volume 2 of the First Series of Problems of Life 
and Mind (suggestively titled The Foundations of a Creed) in 
a similar vein: "The Universe is mystic to man, and must ever 
remain so."164 Clearly, Herbert Spencer did not originate the 
concept of the Unknowable. He is giving voice to a sensibility 
central to this Victorian frame of mind. 
When Spencer transmuted "Progress: Its Law and Cause" 
into part 1 of First Principles as "The Unknowable," he made 
explicit the implications of the earlier essay, by entitling chap­
ter 1 "Religion and Science," to replace "cause" and "law." 
Science and religion are, for Spencer, simply empiricism 
and intuitionism writ large: "This conclusion which 
. . . expresses the doctrine of the English school of philoso­
phy, recognizes also a soul of truth in the doctrine of the antag­
onist German school—this conclusion . . . brings the results 
of speculation into harmony with those of common sense; is 
also the conclusion which reconciles Religion with Science." 
We have traversed the full circumference of this Victorian cir­
cle, back to the Coleridgean polarity that found expression in 
Mill's essays on Bentham and Coleridge, when Spencer writes: 
Each side, therefore, has to recognize the claims of the other as 
standing for truths that are not to be ignored. He who contem­
plates the Universe from the religious point of view, must learn to 
see that this which we call Science is one constituent of the great 
whole. . . . While he who contemplates the Universe from the 
scientific point of view, must learn to see that this which we call 
Religion is similarly a constituent of the great whole. . .  . It be­
hooves each party to strive to understand each other, with the con­
viction that the other has something worthy to be understood; and 
with the conviction that when mutually recognized this some­
thing will be the basis of a complete reconciliation.l6!i 
What is that "something worthy to be understood" that will 
effect the "complete reconciliation" of religion and science? 
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According to Spencer it is the "largest fact to be found within 
our mental range," an "ultimate fact," that will "[unite] these 
positive and negative poles of human thought." And what is 
this "deepest, widest, and most certain of all facts," the fact 
that is common to both religion and science?: "that the Power 
which the Universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable."166 
Paradoxically the knowledge of the Unknowable is "the most 
certain of all facts." The ultimate mysteries of the universe are 
shared by both science and religion. 
Previous critics of George Eliot have made much of the in­
fluence of Feuerbach's Religion of Humanity on her intellec­
tual development. Feuerbach would reduce all religion to psy­
chology, viewing God simply as a projection of all that is 
noblest in man's own nature: "Religion is human nature re­
flected, mirrored in itself."167 Although Feuerbach did indeed 
have a great deal to teach George Eliot about the anthropo­
logical aspects of religion, I believe it is incorrect to assume 
that her translation in 1854 of Feuerbach's Essence of Christi­
anity resulted in a demystification of the Unknowable for her. 
In that same letter to Charles Bray of 15 November 1857—six 
months after the publication of "Progress"—in which she de­
fends the innate moral sense of the individual against the im­
plications of Bray's utilitarianism, George Eliot speaks of "the 
many proofs that urge upon us our own total inability to find 
in our own natures a key to the Divine Mystery. I could more 
readily turn Christian and worship Jesus again than embrace 
a Theism which professes to explain the proceedings of 
God."1*8 
But George Eliot wrote of Spencer in 1875 that "every main 
bias of [her] mind had been taken before [she] knew him.'!169 
Long before Spencer articulated it in First Principles, these 
Victorians sought in a wide variety of ways to reconcile reli­
gion and science, the emotions and the intellect, the unknow­
able and the knowable. In her first review essay for the West­
minster on R. W. McKay, published six months prior to her 
first meeting with Spencer, George Eliot "[could not] resist 
giving a long extract" from McKay's "admirable" section on 
faith: "Religion and science are inseparable. No object in na­
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ture, no subject of contemplation, is destitute of religious ten­
dency and meaning." Let me urge my readers to this essay 
itself, to the fascinating and lengthy passage from McKay that 
George Eliot quotes in full. "Faith is, to a great extent, invol­
untary; it is a law or faculty of our nature, operating silently 
and intuitively to supply the imperfections of our knowledge"; 
conversely, "the capacity of belief must be taught how to build 
securely, yet not arrogantly, on the data of experience." Ideally 
"faith and knowledge tend mutually to the confirmation and 
enlargement of each other."170 
Knowing and feeling are literally, not just metaphorically, 
linked for these Victorians. Subjective and objective truths, in­
tuitive expressions and sensory impressions, are two refrac­
tions of the same reality; transcendental visions are both a mys­
tical impulse and a localized biological phenomenon. The Un­
knowable is also a scientific fact. "We find no room for matter 
at all. . . . We find only force or power, and that not separate 
from its source, or from God.171 Bray, the reader will remem­
ber, draws upon Eastern mysticism, German idealism, and Spi­
noza for his concept of force: "There is but one infinite sub­
stance, and that is God"; but also, equally, on contemporary 
scientific theories of electricity and magnetism: "Science, then, 
proves the unity of Force."172 Force bridges the physical and 
the metaphysical, operating in accordance with laws common 
to both matter and spirit. 
Herbert Spencer's Unknowable has a great deal in common 
with Charles Bray's force: 
Though he may succeed in resolving all properties of objects into 
manifestations of force, he is not thereby enabled to conceive what 
force is; but finds, on the contrary, that the more he thinks about 
it, the more he is baffled. Similarly, though analysis of mental ac­
tions may finally bring him down to sensations as the original ma­
terials out of which all thought is woven, he is none the forwarder; 
for he cannot in the least comprehend sensation. Inward and out­
ward things he thus discovers to be alike inscrutable in their 
ultimate genesis and nature. He sees that the Materialist and 
Spiritualist controversy is a mere war of words; the disputants 
being equally absurd—each believing he understands that which 
it is impossible for any man to understand.171 
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Spencer once again rejects any simple dichotomy of material­
ism and spiritualism; any view that sees the world purely as a 
product of material forces, or conversely, entirely reducible to 
subjective sensations. According to Spencer both physical 
forces and mental sensations are manifestations of the same, 
"primordial," force: "Those modes of the Unknowable which 
we call motion, heat, light, chemical affinity, etc., are alike 
transformable into each other, and into those modes of the 
Unknowable which we distinguish as sensation, emotion, 
thought,"171 Not surprisingly, Charles Bray quotes this pas­
sage approvingly in his autobiography, also printing there a 
letter he received from Spencer in 1881 in which the synthetic 
philosopher asserts the same belief: "There is not only a cor­
relation between physical force and that which we know as 
feeling, but the one is, under the conditions specified, trans­
formed into the other. In fact, I can perceive no other possible 
interpretation of the phenomena."175 
Another of the many interests George Henry Lewes shared 
with Herbert Spencer was the concept of force. Although he 
rejected Charles Bray's mesmeric force as a simplistic and un­
scientific notion in 1866, Lewes had discussed force as early as 
1853, in an essay on "English Philosophy" in the Leader. 
"The Organic is reproductive. . .  . It thus becomes a centre 
of Force . . . that which is true of the organical . .  . is 
equally true of the Mind; it is also a centre of Force."176 In the 
1870s Lewes turned to an extended discussion of force and 
cause as "Problem V" of The Foundations of a Creed in Prob­
lems of Life and Mind. In chapter 1, "The Conception of 
Force," Lewes, always the intellectual historian, summed up 
previous definitions of Force—including Herbert Spencer's 
Unknowable and Charles Bray's imaginary entity—before of­
fering his own definition of the term: 
The word Force is a symbol which has many meanings. It varies 
in different works, and often in different passages of the same 
work. Sometimes it stands for the Unknowable, whose manifesta­
tions are the objective universe; sometimes it is the common mea­
sure by which all phenomena are rendered intelligible; sometimes 
it is an imaginary entity supposed to take up its habitation in sub­
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stances, passing freely from one to the other . . . sometimes it is 
the simple synonyme of cause, sometimes of strength, sometimes 
of motion; now confounded with, and now distinguished from, 
Energy. . . . But the physicist has his cohesive, diffusive, elastic 
forces, the chemist has his affinity, the biologist his vital forces, 
and the psychologist his moral forces,—which are not so readily 
reducible to the mathematical formula. 
If we consider what all these different meanings have in common, 
it will be found that the definition I have proposed—the Activity 
of Matter, or the Changes in the Felt—comprises them all.177 
Characteristically, Lewes the positivist would unify physics, 
chemistry, biology, and psychology under the common law of 
force. "The activity of Matter, or the changes in the Felt," are 
one and the same—simply viewed from the objective and sub­
jective sides of the circle. 
"Our world arises in Consciousness," Lewes writes in Prob­
lems of Life and Mind;i7H and much of Lewes's later thought 
has a real kinship with Charles Bray's philosophy. Bray as­
serted that "the material order may exist only as mental."179 
"Matter, the real, with which we have to deal, is saturated with 
Mind, since it is the Felt," writes Lewes in the important essay 
"Spiritualism and Materialism" (1876) that summarizes much 
of Problems.™0 Charles Bray also quotes Lewes approvingly in 
his autobiography: "All our knowledge springs from, and is 
limited by, Feeling. The universe represented in that knowl­
edge can only be a picture of a system of things as those exist 
in relation to our sensibility."181 Bray then goes on to argue 
that this limitation—"We know only our own feelings"—has 
its virtues: "We may be thankful . . . for if, as George Eliot 
says, we had a keen vision and feeling for all ordinary life, it 
would be like hearing the grass grow and the squirrel's heart 
beat; and we should die of that roar which lies on the other side 
of silence."182 This famous passage is, of course, taken from 
Middlemarch. I will turn to that novel in the chapter that 
follows; but let me emphasize here that this picture of limited 
human perceptions—the Unknowable—must be viewed in 
conjunction with the microscopic eye of the novelist's power­
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ful narrator, focusing its intense illumination on the "part­
icular web" of Middlemarch.l8S These Victorian visionaries 
never falter in their optimistic exploration of the knowable, 
despite their acute awareness of its limitations. For they all be­
lieve in what Lewes called "the invisible continuous Cosmos, 
which is conceived as an uniform Existence, all the modes of 
which are interdependent."184 Because the cosmos is continu­
ous, the web of the created world, however apparently tangled, 
must finally have a coherent pattern, a meaningful order. 
A healthy respect for the limitations of human understand­
ing must not stand in the way of legitimate distinctions be­
tween that which is truly unknowable and that which is merely 
as yet unknown. "All our knowledge springs from, and is lim­
ited by, feeling"; but Lewes—and all his Victorian compa­
triots—do not stop with the felt; but rather, seek, to translate it 
into the known: "The facts of Feeling which sensation differ­
entiates; Theory integrates. What we experience as Feeling, we 
systematize as Science. Hence the speculative effort, thor­
oughly justifiable, to reduce all phenomena to one Cause, all 
laws to one law, to see the Many in the One, and the One in 
the Many, as Plato divined."185 If I had to select a single state­
ment, from the many quoted in this study, to epitomize the 
frame of mind shared by these Victorians, it would be this one. 
John Stuart Mill's universal causation, Auguste Comte's pos­
itivism, George Combe's phrenological philosophy, Robert 
Chambers's evolutionary cosmology, Charles Bray's and Har­
riet Martineau's mesmeric force, Lewes's search through the 
annals of philosophy and science, Herbert Spencer's Law of 
Progress: each can be seen as an effort, grounded upon a belief 
in the continuous Cosmos, to "reduce all phenomena to one 
Cause, all laws to one law." "Without general conceptions," 
Lewes writes in Problems of Life and Mind, "particular ex­
periences would be like the scattered leaves of the Sibyl; unless 
each leaf be read in connection with the others, its significance 
is concealed, for in itself it has no significance."186 
But just as the known and the unknown are intimately con­
nected, so the polarities of analysis and synthesis go hand-in­
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hand, as the diastole and systole of human reason. Intuitive 
faith leads back to scientific fact. These Victorians were more 
often armchair scientists than practicing technicians, and sub­
sequent advances have relegated many of their most-cherished 
scientific beliefs to the dusty attic of historical oddities; yet 
each, in his own fashion, embraced with scientific energy and 
enthusiasm the individuality and the multiplicity of the con­
tinuous cosmos—its "heterogeneity"—as a necessary comple­
ment to the poetics of its fundamental unity. Once again, it is 
George Henry Lewes who sums this up best, in the concluding 
paragraph of The Foundations of a Creed: 
This unification of all the modes of Existence by no means oblit­
erates the distinction of modes, nor the necessity of understanding 
the special characters of each. Mind remains Mind, and is essen­
tially opposed to Matter, in spite of their identity in the Absolute; 
just as Pain is not Pleasure, nor Color either Heat or Taste, in 
spite of their identity in Feeling. The logical distinctions represent 
real differentiations, but not distinct existents. If we recognize the 
One in the Many, we do not thereby refuse to admit the Many in 
the One.187 
There has been a great deal of emphasis in this study on the 
dynamic interpenetration of polar opposites. But it should be 
stressed here that, as Samuel Taylor Coleridge and Herbert 
Spencer insisted, the highest unity—the one in the many—also 
implies the most intense individuality—the many in the one. 
Whether these Victorian cosmologies are persuasive may be 
debatable; whether the cosmos is, in fact, "continuous," is cer­
tainly still as much a question of faith as of proof for the twen­
tieth century as it was for the nineteenth. And these Victorians 
themselves, despite the radiant illumination of their appar­
ently boundless optimism, were forced to expand the bounda­
ries of the dark Unknowable on every side, even as they claimed 
new territories for the known. 
In the context of all the forward-looking energy of this Vic­
torian vision, we should not forget that many of these ideas 
depend upon intellectual foundations laid long before the 
nineteenth century. None more so than "the Many in the One, 
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the One in the Many," which, George Henry Lewes reminds 
us, was expounded by Plato in the fourth century B.C. Plato, 
for all his search after absolutes and unswerving belief in their 
existence, knew how small man stood in the midst of the con­
tinuous cosmos: "The soul is confronted with the Many by 
means of Sense, and by means of Reason it detects the One in 
the Many; i.e. the particular things perceived by Sense awaken 
the recollections of Universals or ideas. But this recollection of 
Truth is always more or less imperfect. Absolute Truth is for 
the Gods alone."188 Looking back upon these Victorians as 
they attempt to scale Mount Olympus, they must at times ap­
pear, if not foolish, at least foredoomed to failure. But surely 
their hubris is worthy not only of our sympathy, but of our 
admiration—and perhaps, of our envy. 
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FINALE 
"The Many in The One, The One in The Many": 
George Eliot's Middlemarch (1871-1872) as 
Victorian Cosmology 
This long and anxious dwelling with experience and matter 
and the fluctuations of individual things, drags down the 
mind to earth, . . . removing and withdrawing it from the 
serene tranqulity of abstract wisdom, a condition far more 
heavenly. Now to this I readily assent; and indeed this which 
they point at as so much to be preferred, is the very thing of 
all others which I am about. For I am building in the human 
understanding a true model of the world, such as it is in fact, 
not such as man's own reason would have it to be; a thing 
which cannot be done without a very diligent dissection and 
anatomy of the world.—Bacon, Novum Organum 
I. BORTHROP TRUMBULLS AUCTION

Although it has looked before and after, the focus of this his­
tory has been two decades, from the late 1830s to the late 1850s. 
George Eliot figures prominently in this Victorian circle as ed­
itor, essayist, and friend. Her most original genius was to be 
reserved for fiction; but she did not begin to write novels until 
1856, at age 36. It has often been remarked that Eliot is unique 
among Victorian novelists, in the extent to which her artistic 
career was preceded by an apprenticeship to the seminal intel­
lectual movements of her age. This study provides ample evi­
dence for that assertion. It also adds an important dimension 
to George Eliot's intellectual biography, filling in the forma­
tive associations with Charles Bray's Coventry circle and the 
London era of the Westminster Review editorship. 
Among previous biographical studies of Eliot, Gordon 
Haight's George Eliot (1968) contains a meticulous account of 
the facts of her life, but shies away from exploring the ideolog­
ical contexts of those early years. More recent biographers have 
ventured into the interpretive realm, most notably, Ruby Red­
inger in George Eliot: The Emergent Self (1975); but their bias 
has been toward the emotive side of George Eliot's develop­
ment. Much recent criticism, psychological or feminist in bias, 
is similarly slanted towards Eliot's heart rather than her head.' 
But the image of the painfully homely provincial spinster, the 
"Strauss-sick" renegade from Evangelical piety, the young 
woman editor in a man's world, the sexual heretic cast out 
from Victorian drawing rooms, must be counterbalanced by a 
clearer vision of George Eliot as a solidly established member 
of a Victorian circle of brilliant theoreticians, ambitious syn­
thesizers, and progressive optimists. Much has been made of 
George Eliot's migraine headaches and her emotional depend­
ence on George Henry Lewes; not enough has been said of her 
confident and aggressive intellectuality. A clearer understand­
ing of the formative years of Eliot's intellectual development 
can provide new ways of reading her novels. This finale, a 
reading of Middlemarch, is intended as a suggestive illustra­
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don of that claim rather than an exhaustive exploration of its 
possibilities. 
In a novel whose characters are so often seeking a vocation, 
trapped in the wrong vocation, or striving anxiously to fulfill 
the obligations and potential of the vocation they have chosen, 
Middlemarch's auctioneer Borthrop Trumbull is uniquely 
self-satisfied: "Surely among all men whose vocation requires 
them to exhibit their powers of speech, the happiest is a pros­
perous provincial auctioneer keenly alive to his own jokes and 
sensible of his encyclopaedic knowledge."2 Language is Bor­
throp Trumbull's medium, and he wields it powerfully. 
"Being an auctioneer," George Eliot wryly tells her reader, 
Trumbull "was bound to know the nature of everything" 
(229); he "would have liked to have the universe under his 
hammer, feeling that it would go at a higher figure for his rec­
ommendation" (442). George Eliot enjoys her own gentle jokes 
in depicting the Middlemarch auction in chapter 60. Trum­
bull's remarkable success lies in his endless ability imagina­
tively to alter his point of view—and thus, that of his customer: 
" 'I have in my hand . .  . an ingenious contrivance—a sort of 
practical rebus, I may call it; here, you see, it looks like an el­
egant heart-shaped box, portable—for the pocket; there, again, 
it becomes like a splendid double flower—an ornament for the 
table; and now'—Mr. Trumbull allowed the flower to fall 
alarmingly into strings of heart-shaped leaves—'a book of rid­
dles; No less than five hundred printed in a beautiful red'" 
(443). 
The sibylline and sympathetic narrator of Middlemarch 
poses the "riddles" of human nature in the "heart-shaped 
leaves" of her novel, mirroring "this mighty volume of 
events/The world, the universal map of deeds."3 On one hand 
the Victorian map of Middlemarch bears resemblance to Trum­
bull's grandly visionary description of that most Victorian of 
portrait heroes, the Duke of Wellington: "a [fine] subject—of 
the modern order, belonging to our own time and epoch." 
Trurobull, who "knows the nature of everything," knows also 
the limits of that knowledge; his picture is a subject "the un­
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derstanding of man could hardly conceive; angels might, per­
haps, but not men, sirs, not men" (443). Yet although the uni­
verse may pass under Borthrop Trumbull's hammer, it does so 
one particular piece at a time: "Now ladies," he tells his audi­
ence, "this tray contains a very recherchy lot—a collection of 
trifles for the drawing room table—and trifles make the sum 
of human things—nothing more important than trifles" (442­
43). Under the measuring observation and shaping imagina­
tion of its author, George Eliot's vision of Middlemarch, like 
Borthrop Trumbull's of Middlemarch, strives toward angelic 
understandings with an emphatic insistence on the trifles of 
which any synthetic "sum" must be made. 
Like the auctioneer George Eliot approached this subject 
"of the modern order" with "encyclopaedic knowledge." In 
the Leader in 1850, George Henry Lewes presaged his love for 
the woman he was to meet a year later when, under his gadfly 
persona "Vivian," he excoriated merely "clever women" at the 
expense of truly wise ones: "The women whose minds are 
stored with the writings of poets, moralists, and historians, 
who have thought upon the questions which affect the inner 
life of man, who have observed and analyzed the passions, 
watched society, traced the operation of moral laws . . . those 
women I find to be . .  . adored by their humble servant."4 
George Eliot was worthy of Lewes's adoration. In 1949 histo­
rian of ideas Basil Willey made the often-quoted observation 
that "probably no English writer of the time, and certainly no 
novelist, more fully epitomizes the century; her development is 
a paradigm, her intellectual biography a graph, of its most de­
cided trend."5 George Eliot's contemporaries were immedi­
ately responsive to the distinctively Victorian qualities of Mid­
dlemarch: "What she writes is so full of her time," claimed 
reviewer Sidney Colvin in the Fortnightly, 
saturated with modern ideas, and poured into a language of which 
every word bites'home with peculiar sharpness to the contempo­
rary consciousness. . . . We are afraid of exaggerating the mean­
ing such work will have for those who come after us, for the very 
reason that we feel its meaning so pregnant for ourselves. If, in­
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deed, the ideas of to-day are certain to be the ideas of to-morrow 
and the day after, if scientific thought and the positive synthesis 
are indubitably to rule the world, than any one, it should seem, 
might speak boldly enough to George Eliot's place." 
Of course, so much of the Victorian "to-day," its scientific 
thought and its positive synthesis, has been buried with the 
cast-off intellectual oddities of another age. Middlemarch has 
endured because of its timeless human truths rather than its 
dated ideological underpinnings. But I believe that an appre­
ciation of some of the ways in which it manifests a distinctively 
contemporary consciousness can both add significantly to our 
understanding of this literary masterpiece and provide a final 
epitome of the frame of mind shared by this circle of Victorian 
intellectuals. 
Scores of critical treasure-hunters have excavated the ency­
clopaedic "stratum of conglomerated fragments" this Victo­
rian genius left behind her in the form of letters, essays, and 
novels.7 Anna Kitchel's publication of Eliot's "Quarry for 
Middlemarch" in 1950 and Jerome Beaty's "Middlemarch1' 
From Notebook to Novel a decade later have more recently 
been followed by publication of the complete Middlemarch 
notebooks, transcribed and edited, providing ample evidence 
for the breadth of George Eliot's learning and the minute re­
search at the foundations of this remarkable novel.8 The pre­
vious chapters of my study document many important intellec­
tual sources upon which George Eliot could draw for the 
topography of her Victorian world. For example, the reader 
who knows something of magnetism and mesmerism will read 
passages like the following in a new way: "When Mrs. Casau­
bon was announced he started up as from an electric shock, 
and felt a tingling at his finger-ends. . . . every molecule in 
his body has passed the message of a magic touch. . . . For 
effective magic is transcendent nature; and who shall measure 
the subtlety of those touches which convey the quality of soul 
as well as body?" (285). The relation between innate disposi­
tion and external objects, the dilemmas of determinism shared 
by these Victorians, can illuminate the dialogue between those 
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two gentlemen of chapter 4's epigraph: 
1st Gent. Our deeds are fetters that we forge ourselves.

2nd Gent. Ay, truly: but I think it is the world

That brings the iron. (25)

Dr. Tertius Lydgate, searching for "certain primary webs or 
tissues, out of which the various organs—brain, heart, lungs, 
and so on—are compacted" (110) is, of course, a Spencerian 
transcendental anatomist. And so forth; such a list could be 
continued at length. Scholarly essays have been written, and 
remain to be written, on the resonant interweavings of contem­
porary ideas about determinism, or positivism, or biology, or 
evolutionary theory, in George Eliot's fiction.9 Much that I 
have said in chapters 1 through 4 should stimulate the reader 
familiar with Eliot's novels. 
But source-hunting is not my primary intention here. For 
surely the whole of this great novel is more than the sum of 
such particular parts. For each of these thinkers, the details of 
positivist logic or phrenological dissection or evolutionary 
embryology were merely the means to a much larger end: the 
foundations for a Victorian cosmology. Rather than syllo­
gisms or skulls, character and plot were to be George Eliot's 
data, the particulars in which she would embody her general­
izations. "Ideas are often poor ghosts; our sun-filled eyes can­
not discern them. . . . But sometimes they are made flesh; 
. . . they are clothed in a living human soul, with all its con­
flicts, its faith, and its love. Then their presence is a power," 
she writes in her first fiction, Scenes of Clerical Life.™ The in­
carnation is to be a literal one, as a Victorian sensibility defines 
its shape in the complex yet coherent human web of Middle-
march society. 
II. A VICTORIAN SENSIBILITY: THE POETRY OF THE REAL 
The aesthetic faculties are . . . intermediate between the pure­
ly moral and the purely intellectual faculties.—Lewes, Comte's 
Philosophy of the Sciences, 1853. 
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"Every limit is a beginning as well as an ending," George 
Eliot opens her "Finale" (607). After eighty-six chapters she 
ends her narrative with the "great beginning" of marriage; but 
remember that she also began Middlemarch with the marriages 
of her heroine Dorothea and hero Lydgate, exploding at the 
outset any conclusive linear myth of happily ever after. On the 
circumference of the Victorian circle traced by my book, end­
ings similarly return us to beginnings. At the opposite pole of 
the nineteenth century from Coleridge's Theory of Life, 
George Eliot's Middlemarch can be read as a finale that inter­
acts dynamically with Coleridge's prelude to the Victorian age. 
"Who that cares much to know the history of man, and how 
the mysterious mixture behaves under the varying experiments 
of Time, has not dwelt, as least briefly, on the life of Saint 
Theresa," the novel's "Prelude" begins (3; my emphasis). 
Thus Middlemarch opens: with mystery and experiment, the 
unknowable and the knowable, inextricably intertwined. In 
this first paragraph, the narrator's synthesizing sensibility is 
mirrored in her heroine, Saint Theresa." The glory of There­
sa's "epos," her "epic life," is exemplified by her ability to 
translate passionate emotion—"the rapturous consciousness 
of life beyond self"—into constructive action—"the reform of 
a religious order" (3). 
By contrast the second and third paragraphs of the three-par­
agraph "Prelude" present a world without order. In the second 
Eliot depicts a life spiritually inadequate, one in which mod­
ern-day Theresas lack "coherent social faith" (3). She then goes 
on, in the third, to mock the equal inadequacy of a simplisti­
cally empirical cosmos, those who believe that "the social lot 
of women might be treated with scientific certitude" (4). The 
twentieth-century reader might be tempted simply to conclude 
that Eliot's contemporary men and women, without the cen­
tering force of Saint Theresa's Catholic church, are doomed to 
disorder, "dim lights and tangled circumstances" (3); and that 
scientific certitude offers little that is really certain to replace 
the fallen idols of orthodox faith. 
But the confident tone of the narrator's opening words, the 
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ease with which she moves from the mystical to the empirical, 
cannot be overlooked. The fallible and confused modern-day 
Theresas must be juxtaposed with Eliot's omniscient narrator, 
with her much broader view of "the history of man": "With 
dim lights and tangled circumstance they tried to shape their 
thought and deed in noble agreement; but after all to common 
eyes their struggles seemed mere inconsistency and formless­
ness" (3; my emphasis). These struggles only seem formless. Is 
not a finer and fuller vision possible to the uncommon eye— 
the all-seeing "I" of the novelist? This uncommon eye is both 
intuitive and empirical; it can give clearer shape to spiritual 
inconsistency and refine simple scientific certitudes into less 
rigid forms: "Meanwhile the indefiniteness remains, and the 
limits of variation are really much wider than anyone would 
imagine" (4). The uncommon eye can contain the polarities of 
mystery and experiment; it can mediate between the chaos of 
formlessness and the reductiveness of unrefined structures. 
The final words of the "Prelude" describe the failed Saint 
Theresa of the modern age, "foundress of nothing, whose lov­
ing heart-beats and sobs after an unattained goodness . . . are 
dispersed among hindrances, instead of centering in some 
long-recognisable deed" (4). As so many critics of Middle-
march have observed, the novel overflows with failed monistic 
cosmologists, seeking the wrong Key to All Mythologies or the 
nonexistent Universal Tissue—systems no more valid than 
phrenology or mesmerism. "I have made up my mind not to 
run that risk of never attaining a failure," Will Ladislaw tells 
Dorothea Brooke (165). The unknowable lies at the boundary 
of the known; but the search for a center must continue. 
"Difficulties of thought and acceptance of what is without 
comprehension belong to every system of thinking. The ques­
tion is to find the least incomplete," George Eliot writes in 
1874.12 Both the novelist and her characters search for what Do­
rothea Brooke calls "the fullest truth, the least partial good" 
(151). The uncommon eye persists in seeking the order of the 
continuous cosmos.IS 
Source-hunting for Middlemarch's models has inspired 
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small scholarly conflagrations for a century. Where did Eliot 
get the name Casaubon? Was he a portrait of Mark Pattison? 
Dr. Brabant? George Henry Lewes? But George Eliot herself 
answered the question: "When a young friend put the question 
direct: 'But from whom, then, did you draw Casaubon?' 
George Eliot, with a humorous solemnity, which was quite in 
earnest, nevertheless, pointed to her own heart."11 No novel in 
the English language can boast a more fully-articulated cast of 
characters than Middlemarch. But the one of George Eliot's 
creative identity is refracted in the many of a diverse group of 
fictional individuals.15 
The first two chapters of the novel introduce two most dis­
similar reflections of that narrator who coupled mystery so eas­
ily with experiment. In chapter 1 Dorothea Brooke: Dorothea, 
we quickly learn, is both a religious mystic and a would-be 
social reformer: "'How very beautiful these gems are!' said 
Dorothea, under a new current of feeling, as sudden as the 
gleam. 'It is strange how colours seem to penetrate one, like 
scent. . . . They look like fragments of heaven'" (10). But a 
page later, Dorothea switches from "fragments of heaven" to 
bricks and mortar: "Here, Kitty, come and look at my plan; I 
shall think I am a great architect, if I have not got incompatible 
stairs and fireplaces" (11). 
This same theme is orchestrated in quite another way in the 
paragraph that immediately follows Dorothea's architectural 
outburst, as chapter 2 opens with an abrupt introduction to 
that "pulpy" (52) proponent of many-sidedness, Dorothea's 
uncle: 
"Sir Humphry Davy?" said Mr. Brooke, over the soup, in his easy 
smiling way, taking up Sir James Chettam's remark that he was 
studying Davy's Agricultural Chemistry. "Well, now, Sir Hum­
phry Davy: I dined with him years ago at Cartwright's, and Words-
worth was there too—the poet Wordsworth, you know. Now there 
was something singular. I was at Cambridge when Wordsworth 
was there, and I never met him—and I dined with him twenty 
years afterwards at Cartwright's. There's an oddity in things, now. 
But Davy was there: and he was a poet too. Or, as I may say, 
Wordsworth was poet one, and Davy was poet two. That was true 
in every sense, you know. [11-12] 
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It is easy to identify George Eliot with her "ardent, theoretic, 
and intellectually consequent" heroine (21); but she also shares 
much with her wise fool Brooke, who "goes into" science, the­
ology, history, and political economy with equal fer­
vor: "Pigeon-holes will not do" (14). "I should learn every­
thing then," says Dorothea (21); Brooke is George Eliot's affec­
tionate parody of the same encyclopaedic impulse, and his 
amusing ramblings always contain a germ of truth: "I have 
always been in favor of a little theory: we must have Thought" 
(13). It is significant that Brooke's first words in the novel are 
of Sir Humphry Davy and William Wordsworth, "poet one" 
and "poet two," "in every sense."16 Art and science, intuitive 
imagination and empirical observation, are not mutually ex­
clusive. Brooke is a far cry from Goethe or Spinoza!—but he 
nonetheless speaks to the ideal of the poet-scientist. 
Of course Middlemarch has both its own poet-scientist and 
scientific poet, in Tertius Lydgate and Will Ladislaw. For 
Lydgate, as for George Henry Lewes, heart and brain are the 
dual lords of life, both literally and metaphorically. Lydgate's 
search for a vocation is fulfilled by the "intellectual passion" 
of his scientific research (107). In a brilliant stroke of imagi­
nation on Eliot's part, her scientific hero "kindles" that pas­
sion by discovering a passage "on the valves of the heart" in a 
book on anatomy. It is through the medium of language, a me­
taphoric leap of the poetic imagination, that Lydgate first be­
comes a scientist: "He knew that valvae were folding doors, 
and through this crevice came a sudden light startling him 
with his first vivid notion of finely-adjusted mechanism in the 
human frame" (106-7). In The Principles of Success in Liter­
ature (1865), George Henry Lewes drew the distinction be­
tween the appeal of science to the intellect, and art to the emo­
tions. As might be expected, Lewes quickly goes on to deny any 
necessary separation of the two processes: "But having recog­
nized the broadly-marked differences, we are called upon to as­
certain the underlying resemblances. Logic and Imagination 
belong equally to both." l7 Likewise, Lydgate's research is "the 
most perfect interchange between science and art" (108). Like 
the nonfictional Victorian cosmologist, his methodology em­
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phasizes the mutual interaction of general and particular, the­
ory and practice: "The two purposes would illuminate each 
other: the careful observation and inference which was his 
daily work . . . would further his thought as an instrument 
of larger inquiry." The "great idea" and the "arduous practice 
of his profession" are "twin object[s]" (109). Like Dorothea 
Brooke, Tertius Lydgate is a would-be architect, who seeks to 
realize his theory in the concrete world of physical objects: 
"Living bodies . . . must be regarded as consisting of certain 
primary webs or tissues, out of which the various organs— 
brain, heart, lungs, and so on, are compacted, as the various 
accommodations of a house are built up in various propor­
tions of wood, iron, stone, brick, zinc and the rest" (110; my 
emphasis). Following Bichat, Lydgate performs minute dis­
sections in his serach for "ultimate facts."18 
At first glance Will Ladislaw scarcely seems to be a scientist, 
though he is unmistakably a poet. Will tells Dorothea: "To be 
a poet is to have a soul so quick to discern that no shade of 
quality escapes it, and so quick to feel, that discernment is but 
a hand playing with finely-ordered variety on the chords of 
emotion—a soul in which knowledge passes instantaneously 
into feeling, and feeling flashes back as a new organ of knowl­
edge. ""' Although Will does recognize that feeling and know­
ing work in tandem, something is missing from this scheme, 
as Dorothea quickly points out: "But you leave out the 
poems. . .  . I think they are wanted to complete the poet" 
(166). "The true seeing is within," Ladislaw idealistically ar­
gues with his painter friend Naumann (142). But Naumann 
disagrees: he wants "the idealistic in the real" (159). Abstract 
imagination without concrete realization—the poet without 
his poems—is only half of the equation. 
Will never shows any interest in science, but he does find his 
ultimate vocation as a politician, becoming "an ardent public 
man" in later years (610): "He studied the political situation 
with as ardent an interest as he had ever given to poetic metres" 
(337). He is "a sort of Burke with a leaven of Shelley," thinks 
Mr. Brooke in his wonderfully muddled way (366)—but as al­
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ways, there is a leaven of truth in Brooke's inspired foolish­
ness. For politics is both Ladislaw's science and his poetry; his 
way of translating the ideal into the real. Romantic visions are 
transformed into concrete political proposals (just as Saint 
Theresa's mysticism led to the reform of a religious order).20 
However skeptical she may be about the details of the political 
process, George Eliot, setting her novel on the eve of the first 
reform bill and writing from the vantage-point of the second, 
knows how profoundly the particular lives of her provincial 
characters will ultimately be altered by the large evolutionary 
forces of political and social change in the Victorian era that is 
immediately to follow Middlemarch. Eliot takes Shelley's 
"Defense of Poetry" quite literally: her poet is the acknowl­
edged "legislator of mankind."21 For this Victorian sensibility, 
the ideal politician would also be the ideal poet, the man of 
particular legislation and sweeping imaginative vision: a fu­
sion of polar opposites.22 In this light Mr. Brooke's unlikely 
marriage of Burke and Shelley takes on more serious meaning 
as the political defender of tradition and order is counterbal­
anced by the poetical proponent of revolutionary change. 
As critics of Middlemarch have often noted, one of the chief 
unifying principles of the novel is the way in which characters 
not directly linked by plot provide thematic contrasts with one 
another. One such example is illustrated above: Lydgate the 
scientist—the empiricist who is also a transcendental anato­
mist; and Ladislaw the poet—the intuitive visionary who deals 
in practical legislation. Before turning to the ways in which 
George Eliot embodies a Victorian sensibility in the plot and 
structure of her novel, let me extend my discussion of character 
by noting that Ladislaw and Lydgate are only one of the many 
such polar pairs that interact dynamically upon the mind of 
the reader: the unassuming brown sparrow Mary Garth and 
the preening white dove Rosamond Vincy; the open-minded 
Reverend Camden Farebrother and the zealous Evangelical 
bigot Bulstrode; the emotionally ossified religious scholar Ca­
saubon with his dusty fragments, and the virile scientific re­
searcher Lydgate with his vital connections; generous-spirited 
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Dorothea and egotistical Rosamond; male Lydgate who chan­
nels his aggressive ambition into an ardent career, female Dor­
othea who seeks intellectual fulfillment through the submis­
sive hero-worship of marriage; "uncle" Brooke who takes 
young Ladislaw under his nebulous political patronage, 
"uncle" Garth who tutors young Fred Vincy in concrete agri­
cultural management; the list could be continued at length. It 
could be said that George Eliot's characterizations in Middle-
march are a Spencerian combination of individuation and in­
terdependence. Concerned with the "minutiae of mental 
make" (111) in every character, George Eliot paints a bril­
liantly individualized portrait of each, yet draws them together 
in the mind of her reader through the mediums of Middle-
march, a common humanity, and the novelist's philosophy of 
the one in the many, incarnate in the narrator's vision of a 
larger whole. 
I conclude my discussion of character in Middlemarch with 
the polar antithesis to Mr. Brooke, Caleb Garth. The contrasts 
are obvious: Brooke the wealthy landowner and Garth the es­
tate agent stand at opposite poles of Middlemarch's social spec­
trum; "the Garths were poor," but "did not mind it" (186). 
Brooke is the most foolish character in the novel, a childish 
figure benevolently tolerated by his friends and actively mocked 
by the larger community, but Caleb Garth's wisdom is ques­
tioned by none, including his author. Garth's refusal to act as 
Bulstrode's agent is the coup de grace to the banker's ruination 
in Middlemarch. The narrator clearly feels a special affection 
for Caleb: "(Pardon the details for once—you would have learned 
to love them if you had known Caleb Garth)," she apologizes 
to her reader (171). Brooke is lost in airy fancies and half-baked 
theories; Garth is the consummately practical man: "He was 
ready to accept any number of systems, like any number of 
firmaments, if they did not obviously interfere with the best 
land-drainage, solid building, correct measuring, and judicious 
boring (for coal)" (185). 
Like Dorothea Brooke and Tertius Lydgate, Caleb Garth is 
a would-be architect. And like them he too meets with setbacks. 
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The first thing we learn about him is that he "had failed in the 
building business" (170); yet we catch our first glimpse of 
Garth, when Fred Vincy comes to confess his financial peca­
dillos, "absorbed in a plan for Sir James Chettam's new farm-
building" (171). Caleb Garth is the most unqualifiedly heroic 
of Middlemanh's characters—not because of his success 
(which is minimal) but because of his sensibility, that un­
daunted striving for "the fullest truth" that incarnates the ideal 
in the everyday. Caleb's work is also his religion, in the truest 
sense of that word: "Getting a bit of good contriving and solid 
building done," he tells his wife, is "a great gift from God" 
(295). Caleb Garth is a practical empiricist: "A good deal of 
what I know can only come from experience," he advises Fred 
Vincy; "you are young enough to lay a foundation yet" (409). 
But the foundation of Garth's creed is as intuitive as it is ra­
tional; he speaks to Fred "with the air of a man who felt him­
self to be saying something deeply religious" (409). And here, 
the pragmatic Caleb Garth interacts dynamically with his po­
lar opposite, Mr. Brooke. For Caleb Garth too articulates a vi­
sion of the whole; he too is a poet-scientist. 
It is not surprising that Dorothea Brooke—who at the outset 
of Middlemarch stated her desire to "learn everything," so that 
"there would be nothing trivial about our lives. Everyday-
things with us would mean the greatest things" (21)—should 
four hundred pages later meet up with Garth and experience 
growing "confidence" in his "knowledge." The beautiful 
young heiress and the old workman find they have similar 
goals: " 'Most uncommon!' repeated Caleb. 'She said a thing I 
often used to think myself when I was a lad:—"Mr. Garth, I 
should like to feel, if I lived to be old, that I had improved a 
great piece of land and built a great many cottages, because the 
work is of a healthy kind while it is being done, and after it is 
done, men are the better for it." Those were the very words: 
she sees things in that way'" (402). Yet just as Dorothea's ar­
chitectural blueprints were juxtaposed to the "fragments of heav­
en" in her jewelry (10-11), so Garth follows his account of the 
pragmatic work of building with an imaginative vision: "You 
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would like to hear her speak, Susan. She speaks in such plain 
words, and a voice like music. Bless me! it reminds me of bits 
in the 'Messiah'—'and straightway there appeared a multitude 
of the heavenly host, praising God and saying;' it has a tone 
with it that satisfies your ear." Laborers' cottages are not the 
only structures in which Caleb Garth glories: "Caleb was very 
fond of music, and when he could afford it went to hear an 
oratorio that came within his reach, returning from it with a 
profound reverence for this mighty structure of tones" (402). 
And so, Caleb Garth hears the angels sing. At the conclusion 
of Middle-march, Dorothea Brooke is granted a redemptive vi­
sion of the larger whole, as she looks out her window to "the 
largeness of the world and the manifold wakings of men to la­
bour and endurance" (578). But it is Caleb Garth who experi­
ences the most comprehensive vision, a panorama closest to 
the omniscient narrator's own bird's-eye view of "that myriad-
headed, myriad-handed . . . social body." Like his creator 
Garth recognizes the poetry of the real, the sublime in the 
mundane: 
It laid hold of his imagination in boyhood. The echoes of the great 
hammer where roof or keel were a-making, the signal-shots of the 
workmen, the roar of the furnace, the thunder and plash of the 
engine, and the huge trunk vibrating star-like in the distance 
along the highway, the crane at work on the wharf, the piled-up 
produce in warehouses, the precision and variety of muscular ef­
fort wherever exact work had to be turned out,—all these sights of 
his youth had acted on him as poetry without the aid of the poets, 
had made a philosophy for him without the aid of philosophers, a 
religion without the aid of theology. [185] 
III. BUILDING A NOVEL: THE PART AND THE WHOLE 
We need not shrink from this comparison of small things with 
great; for does not science tell us that its highest striving is 
after the ascertainment of a unity which shall bind the smallest 
things with the greatest? In natural science, I have understood, 
there is nothing petty to the mind that has a large vision of 
relations, and to which every single object suggests a vast sum 
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of conditions. It is surely the same with the observation of 
human life.—George Eliot, The Mill on the Floss, 1860 
Critics of Middlemarch have often pointed out that George 
Eliot's description of Lydgate's microscopic visions sounds as 
much like the enterprise of a psychological novelist as it does 
the work of a research scientist:23 "He wanted to pierce the ob­
scurity of those minute processes which prepare human misery 
and joy, those invisible thoroughfares which are the first lurk­
ing-places of anguish, mania, and crime, that delicate poise 
and transition which determine the growth of happy or un­
happy consciousness" (122). When Lydgate quotes his 
"favourite bit from an old poet" to his wife Rosamund, he is 
surely voicing an ambition shared by his creator: 
What good is like to this,

To do worth the writing, and to write

Worthy the reading and the world's delight?

[320] 
In fact, Lydgate's poetry sits more comfortably upon a Victo­
rian novel than it does a treatise on anatomy. 
It is a familiar observation that still bears repeating that vir­
tually every major character in Middlemarch is in search of a 
key to all mythologies, on an evolutionary scale from Doro­
thea's spiritual yearning "after some lofty conception of the 
world" (6) and Lydgate's intellectual search for the primary tis­
sue (111), down to the "central poising force" (359) of Celia 
Brooke Chettam's maternal instinct and, at the lowest level, 
the froglike Rigg-Featherstone's avaricious aspiration for a 
money-changer's shop in which he might "have locks all 
round him of which he held the keys" (381). This desire for a 
vision of the whole does not originate with Middlemarch, 
however; it is a theme that can be traced throughout George 
Eliot's fiction. We find it in her heroines: in The Mill on 
the Floss's Maggie Tulliver, "thirsty for all knowl­
edge . . . yearning for something that would link together 
the powerful impressions of this mysterious life";21 and Felix 
Holt's Esther Lyon: "Her life was a heap of fragments, and so 
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were her thoughts: some great energy was needed to bind them 
together."25 The blind scholar Bardo of Romola foreshadows 
Casaubon's arachnae ambitions: "That great work in which I 
had desired to gather, as into a firm web, all the threads that 
my research had laboriously disentangled . . . was cut off by 
the failure of my sight."26 No character is more consumed by 
this ambition than the eponymous hero of Eliot's final, and 
most visionary, novel, Daniel Deronda: "He felt the inward 
bent towards comprehension and thoroughness . .  . he felt a 
heightening discontent with the wearing futility and enfee­
bling strain of a demand for excessive retention and dexterity 
without any insight into the principles which form the vital 
connections of knowledge."27 
In my opening discussion of Coleridge's Theory of Life, I 
observed how closely Eliot's "Notes on Form in Art" translated 
Coleridge's "individuation" into formal aesthetic principles.28 
But long before these notes of 1868, Herbert Spencer had made 
an aesthetic application of that scientific model. Spencer men­
tions in his Autobiography that the famous Spencerian pass­
word, "heterogeneity," first appeared not in a scientific but in 
a literary context, in an essay on the "Philosophy of Style" 
published in the Westminster under George Eliot's editorship 
in 1852. In that same essay, Spencer argues that a perfect liter­
ary composition will "answer to the description of all highly-
organized products of both men and nature. It will be, not a 
series of like parts simply placed in juxtaposition, but one 
whole made up of unlike parts that are mutually dependent."29 
As early as her first published writing, "Poetry and Prose, 
From the Notebook of an Eccentric" (in Charles Bray's Cov­
entry Herald in 1846) George Eliot had herself applied the 
same sensibility that animated the positivist, the phrenologist, 
and the transcendental anatomist, to the writer's craft: "I love 
to think how the perfect whole exists in the imagination of the 
artist. . .  . I love to watch the artist's eye . . . scrupulously 
attentive to the details of his actual labour, yet keeping ever in 
view the idea which that labour is to fulfill. I say to myself— 
this is an image of what our life should be,—a series of efforts 
directed to the production of a contemplated whole."*0 
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In the preceding chapters of this study, I have attempted to 
delineate the ways in which each of these Victorian thinkers 
sought to make it whole. All of their systems share a tempera­
mental tendency to mediate between head and heart, that sen­
sibility which Eliot personifies in the poet-scientists, the pas­
sionate intellectuals, the realistic idealists of her novel. The 
second common denominator found in this Victorian frame of 
mind is what Atkinson and Martineau called "the true cosmi­
cal view of Nature: the sense of variety in unity, and unity in 
variety: the whole in the parts and the parts in the whole.'"51 
The part/whole antithesis is, of course, closely linked to the 
head/heart dichotomy: the rational empiricist dissects the 
parts; the passionate idealist intuits the whole. Middlemarch is 
George Eliot's own aspiration toward a key to all mythologies, 
her effort to incarnate a monistic conception of the world. It is 
to the larger organism of Middlemarch as a whole, the struc­
ture of the novel and the strategies of its narrator, to which I 
now turn in order to view this novel as Eliot's own distinctive 
embodiment of a Victorian cosmology. 
The reader will remember that in 1851, Atkinson and Mar­
tineau had proclaimed, "While we dilate the sight in the sense 
of the Unity of Nature, . . . we must not forget to contract the 
sight to every particular and circumstance."32 In 1876 Lewes 
would write, echoing his hero Goethe, "Analysis and synthesis 
are the systole and diastole of science."33 Similarly, when 
George Eliot builds her fictional structure, she makes an aes­
thetic application of her hero Lydgate's scientific dictum: 
"There must be a systole and diastole in all inquiry"; "A man's 
mind must be continually expanding and shrinking between 
the whole human horizon and the horizon of an object-glass" 
(468). The uncommon eye of Middlemarch's narrator focuses 
with alternating but equal intensity on the whole and the part. 
Within a single paragraph, Eliot can shift from "a careful tele­
scopic watch [of] . . . the parishes of Tipton and Freshitt" to 
"a microscope directed on a water-drop" (44); from the tele­
scopic horizon of human society to the microscopic object-
glass of the individual psyche.34 
On one hand, Middlemarch: A Study of Provincial Life takes 
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as its building-blocks the entirety of the social organism. 
In the Cours de philosophie positive, Auguste Comte had 
observed this social organism from afar: 
Can we conceive of a more marvelous spectacle, in the whole range 
of natural phenomena, than the regular and constant convergence 
of an innumerable multitude of human beings, each possessing a 
distinct and, in a certain degree, independent existence, and yet 
incessantly disposed, amidst all their discordance of talent and 
character, to concur in many ways in the same general develop­
ment, without concert, and even consciousness on the part of most 
of them, who believe that they are merely following their personal 
impulses?™ 
Similarly, in Social Statics Herbert Spencer argued that 
This union of many men into one community—this increasing 
mutual dependence of units which were originally independent— 
this gradual segregation of citizens into separate bodies, with re­
ciprocally subservient functions—this formation of a whole, con­
sisting of numerous essential parts—this growth of an organism, 
of which one portion cannot be injured without the rest feeling 
it—may all be generalized under the law of individualization.™ 
Both visions are mirrored in Eliot's sweepingly telescopic van­
tage-point. "Watching keenly the stealthy convergence of hu­
man lots," the novelist "sees a slow preparation of effects from 
one life on another": 
Old provincial society had its share of this subtle movement: had 
not only its striking downfalls, its brilliant young professional 
dandies who ended by living up an entry with a drab and six chil­
dren for their establishment, but also those less marked vicissi­
tudes which are constantly shifting the boundaries of social inter­
course, and begetting new consciousness of interdependence. 
Some slipped a little downward, some got higher footing: people 
denied aspirates, gained wealth, and fastidious gentlemen stood 
for boroughs; some were caught in political currents, some in ec­
clesiastical, and perhaps found themselves surprisingly grouped 
in consequence; while a few personages or families that stood with 
rocky firmness amid all this fluctuation, were slowly presenting 
new aspects in spite of solidity, and altering with the double 
change of self and beholder. Municipal town and rural parish 
gradually made fresh threads of connection. [70-71] 
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This synthetic incarnation of a dynamic social organism is 
temporal as well as spatial. In 1871 George Eliot is writing a 
historical novel set forty years earlier; and her telescopic vision 
traces fundamental unities of human nature across the space of 
all recorded history: "In fact, much the same sort of movement 
and mixture went on in old England as we find in older Her­
odotus" (71). 
But Eliot's microscopic vision places an equal emphasis on 
the "play of minute causes" (44) within each unique and in­
dividuated part of this human whole. She is equally concerned 
with "heterogeneity," the "endless minutiae by which [each 
character's] view . . . was gradually changing with the secret 
motion of a watch-hand." (144). It is impossible to do justice 
by summary example to the brilliant particularity with which 
the novelist "pierce[s] the obscurity of those minute processes" 
(122) within each of her characters. Casaubon's realization of 
his own mortality, "a man . . . now for the first time looking 
into the eyes of death," with its mingling of the trivial and the 
sublime—"the pathos of a lot where everything is below the 
level of tragedy except the passionate egoism of the sufferer" 
(310-11) or Bulstrode's soliloquy of self-justification leading to 
his murder of Raffles—"the rigid outline with which acts pre­
sent themselves to onlookers . . . was broken into little se­
quences, each justified as it came by reasonings which seemed 
to prove it righteous" (452)—these can only be randomly of­
fered as a suggestion of the incredibly rich microscopic partic­
ularity of the novel's psychological analysis. 
But we must keep in mind that this is a world of dynamic 
polarities in which opposites interpenetrate. Reread George 
Eliot's description of old provincial society on the preceding 
page and note the underlying biological metaphor of "subtle 
movement" and "fresh threads of connection." Eliot's tele­
scopic vision, sweeping over time and space, is equally micro­
scopic: she focuses on the "particular web" of Middlemarch 
(105), intricately and uniquely woven in a highly specified his­
torical moment and well-mapped place. Conversely, the mi­
croscopic "minutiae of mental make" (111) of each character 
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must be subsumed into fundamental unity: "A human being 
. .  . is a very wonderful whole" (300). And transcending the 
individuated whole of Dorothea Brooke or Tertius Lydgate or 
Fred Vincy is the larger whole of human nature. Casaubon's 
small shivering self in the face of death or Bulstrode's calculat­
ing rationalizations resonate with universal insight into hu­
man nature, as Middlemanh's omniscient and moralizing nar­
rator so constantly reminds her reader: "We are all of us born 
in moral stupidity, taking the world as an udder to feed our 
supreme selves" (156). In reading Middlemarch we are each 
drawn into a greater human whole by virtue of the novelist's 
insistence that her particular psychological insights must be 
constantly enlarged into universal moral truths. 
But even the most optimistic of organicists must come to 
terms with the fact that the Victorian cosmologies of Middle-
march's characters, one after another, seem to fail; their visions 
proving, if not incorrect, at least inadequate. Saint Theresa 
may have been "centered," but Dorothea Brooke is "incal­
culably diffusive" (613). If George Eliot attempts her own key 
to all mythologies in Middlemarch, she does so with a keen sense 
of the very real hazards of such an enterprise. But there has 
been a consensus among George Eliot's critics that because 
Middlemarch contains so many doomed searchers for that elu­
sive key, therefore Eliot must believe that the enterprise is in­
herently futile, that the monist entertains a false view of real­
ity." But once we have placed George Eliot within this 
Victorian circle, such an interpretation becomes difficult to 
sustain. Again and again Eliot's closest intellectual associa­
tions and deepest friendships are with men and women not un­
like Tertius Lydgate and Dorothea Brooke, searchers for uni­
versal tissues and binding theories. I believe that George Eliot 
shares their aspirations. 
That "eminent philosopher" among George Eliot's friends 
who can "dignify" the mundane by the "serene light of sci­
ence" has been (arguably) identified as Herbert Spencer.88 But 
the actual historical source of Eliot's famous parable of the 
pier glass is not particularly important; any eminent philoso­
pher searching for a centering system runs this risk: 
 253 BUILDING A NOVEL
Your pier-glass or extensive surface of polished steel made to be 
rubbed by a housemaid, will be minutely and multitudinously 
scratched in all directions; but place now against it a lighted can­
dle as a centre of illumination, and lo! the scratches will seem to 
arrange themselves in a fine series of concentric circles round that 
little sun. It is demonstrable that the scratches are going every­
where impartially, and it is only your candle which produces the 
flattering illusion of a concentric arrangement, its light falling 
with an exclusive optical selection. [194-95] 
In a provocative essay on "Narrative and History" in Middle-
march, critic J. Hillis Miller has argued that "in each case the 
character is shown to be mystified by a belief that all the details 
he confronts make a whole governed by a single center, origin, 
or end. In each case the narrator demystifies the illusion." 
Miller asserts that Middlemarch is George Eliot's "subversion" 
of the "metaphysics" of wholeness, her deconstruction of the 
universe.39 But is Miller's "illusion" George Eliot's? Miller's 
reading would stress the "minute and multitudinous" disorder 
of those scratches; I would emphasize the "centre of illumina­
tion." "The phenomena constituting the external reality to us 
are presented discontinuously," writes George Henry Lewes in 
Problems of Life and Mind; "and it is the office of Philosophy 
so to connect them that their actual continuity be discov­
ered."40 The continuous cosmos is no illusion for these Victo­
rians, even though their systems may prove inadequate to em­
body it. 
The illusion of the pier glass-gazer—and the potential pit­
fall of the eminent philosopher—lies in mistaking the part for 
the whole, not in believing that there is such a thing as whole­
ness. Any reading of the pier glass parable must begin by stress­
ing that each "little sun" is in itself "a wonderful whole." 
George Eliot insists throughout Middlemarch on the integrity 
of each unifying consciousness: "Mr. Casaubon, too, was the 
centre of his own world; if he was liable to think that others 
were providentially made for him, and especially to consider 
them in light of their fitness for the author of a 'Key to All 
Mythologies,' this trait is not quite alien to us, and, like the 
other mendicant hopes of mortals, claims some of our pity" 
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(62). Eliot validates every such center, demanding her readers' 
sympathetic response and educating her characters to similar 
insight: "He had an equivalent centre of self," Dorothea real­
izes (157). 
"Things must be recognized as separate wholes before they 
can be recognized as wholes composed of parts, or before those 
wholes again can be regarded as relatively parts of a larger 
whole," Eliot writes in "Notes on Form."11 But if we are to 
escape the illusion of the pier glass, the separate whole, each 
center of consciousness, must finally be seen in the context of 
the larger whole. This broader vision is the province of the un­
common eye of the omniscient narrator, the synthetic philos­
opher who can see the order inherent in the dim lights and tan­
gled circumstance that is hidden to the common eyes of the 
novel's characters—and its readers. If George Eliot is to succeed 
in making it whole with Middlemarch, she must demonstrate 
this interconnectedness. Like Caleb Garth, Dorothea Brooke, 
and Tertius Lydgate, George Eliot is an architect, building her 
novel on the philosophical foundations of a Victorian frame of 
mind. The structure of Middlemarch is Eliot's own blueprint 
for wholeness. Where our common eye is limited to the small 
candle of self, the omniscient narrator's is not. 
Multiplicity is concomitant to unity; "trifles make the sum 
of human things," as Borthrop Trumbull says. The rich, 
abundant, and carefully detailed subject matter of Middle-
march underscores this point most obviously. But Eliot also 
emphasizes multiplicity in more subtle structural ways. "In 
watching effects, if only of an electric battery, it is often neces­
sary to change our place and examine a particular mixture or 
group at some distance from the point where the movement we 
are interested in was set up," she writes (292; and note the elec­
trical metaphor). Eliot self-consciously shifts her novelistic 
viewpoint throughout, to emphasize that every circle contains 
innumerable circles, each with its center and circumference. 
Take the famous opening of chapter 29: "One morning, some 
weeks after her arrival at Lowick, Dorothea—but why always 
Dorothea? Was her point of view the only possible one with 
regard to this marriage? . . . Mr. Casaubon had an intense 
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consciousness within him" (205); or similarly, chapter 53: 
Joshua himself was thinking that the new moment now was not 
far off when he should settle on the North Quay with the best ap­
pointments in Safes and Locks. 
Enough. We are concerned with looking at Joshua Rigg's sale 
of his land from Mr. Bulstrode's point of view. [382] 
The deliberate awkwardness with which Eliot makes her tran­
sitions from one center of consciousness to another serves to 
emphasize her point: this multiplicity is an important aspect 
of the novel's fundamental wholeness. Like her auctioneer 
Trumbull, Eliot insists that the events of Middlemarch be 
"viewed in many different lights" (323). 
The phrase "point of view" becomes a leitmotif in Middle-
march: "Sir James Chettam, for example, whom she con­
stantly considered from Celia's point of view, inwardly debat­
ing whether it would be good for Celia to accept him" (7); "Mr. 
Brooke, seeing Mrs. Cadwallader's merits from a different 
point of view, winced a little when her name was announced 
in the library" (39); "'He is no better than a mummy!' (The 
point of view has to be allowed for, as that of a blooming and 
disappointed rival)" (43); "It is a narrow mind which cannot 
look at a subject from various points of view" (49); " 'She is not 
in the least Evangelical,' said Rosamund, reflectively, as if that 
religious point of view would have fully accounted for perpet­
ual crepe" (77). Such a list could be continued at length: the 
above examples are taken only from book I.12 Paradoxically, 
the author's self-consciously shifting focus serves to draw at­
tention to the continuity and cohesiveness of the omniscient 
narrator's larger vision. 
Juxtaposing its myriad parts, the multilayered plot of Mid­
dlemarch is structured in such a way as to draw further atten­
tion to the larger whole. In the midst of her own marital crises, 
Dorothea Brooke's attention is drawn randomly out her win­
dow to Peter Featherstone's funeral, to a scene which 
aloof as it seemed to be from the tenor of her life, always afterwards 
came back to her at the touch of certain sensitive points in mem­
ory, just as the vision of St. Peter's at Rome was inwoven with 
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moods of despondency. Scenes which make vital changes in our 
neighbours' lot are but the background of our own, yet, like a par­
ticular aspect of the fields and trees, they become associated for us 
with the epochs of our own history, and make a part of that unity 
which lies in the selection of our keenest consciousness. [238] 
"Scenes which make vital changes in our neighbours' lot are 
but the background of our own": each character in the novel is 
a "little sun," a circle with a center whose circumference is 
coincident with the center of another. Each character's con­
sciousness is "inwoven" with the external medium of Middle-
march in an apparently random manner—one center may 
touch another circumference at any given point—but the final 
result is a unity that balances part and whole, overlapping cir­
cles that ideally coalesce to form one great sphere. 
The plot of the novel underscores this belief. George Eliot's 
narrative deliberately displaces central moments in the lives of 
her characters to the periphery of other lives. Eliot opens the 
"Finale" of her novel on the note of "Marriage, which has been 
the bourne of so many narratives" (607); Middlemarch is no 
exception: the marriages of Dorothea and Casaubon, Rosa­
mond and Lydgate, provide the novel with its predominant 
subject matter. But Eliot's focus is a curious one: we never see 
the central event of marriage itself take place in the novel. After 
a long depiction of her courtship, Dorothea's wedding is an 
offstage event, mentioned in passing at a windy dinner party 
gossip session on the feminine virtues among a number of mi­
nor characters: "Miss Brooke, however, was not again seen by 
either of these gentlemen under her maiden name. Not long 
after that dinner party she had become Mrs. Casaubon, and 
was on her way to Rome" (69). Celia, Dorothea's sister, ob­
trudes upon a moment of marital crisis between Mr. and Mrs. 
Casaubon "on a second visit to Lowick, probably the last be­
fore her marriage" (207). Lydgate's marriage is dated by Mary 
Garth, busy sewing the trousseau: "Rosamond Vincy . .  . is 
to be married next week, and she can't be married without this 
handkerchief" (292). That the marriage has taken place is re­
vealed in a chapter which centers on Casaubon's discovery of 
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his fatal illness: "One of the professional calls made by Lyd­
gate soon after his return from his wedding journey was to 
Lowick Manor" (305). The doctor's marriage is of peripheral 
concern to Dorothea, facing her husband's fatal heart condi­
tion: "'Is Mrs. Lydgate at home,' said Dorothea, who had 
never, that she knew of, seen Rosamond, but now remembered 
the fact of the marriage" (315). The reader's only clue to the 
moment of these great centering events of a life is through their 
casual impingement on the lives of other characters, them­
selves absorbed in their own crises. 
Marriage is the best, but not the only, example of this delib­
erate displacement of centers. The reader discovers that Fred 
Vincy has undergone a serious illness, but the fact is noted in 
an analysis of Lydgate's conflicts with Middlemarch's other 
physicians: "This had happened before the affair of Fred Vin­
cy's illness had given to Mr. Wrench's enmity towards Lydgate 
more definite personal ground" (331). Mrs. Vincy's dismay 
over Fred's social descent to become Caleb Garth's assistant 
prompts her husband to remind her of their daughter Rosa­
mond's miscarriage, another offstage event: "I'm sure I felt for 
her being disappointed of her baby; but she got over it nicely," 
Mrs. Vincy replies (416). The reader is not present at the event, 
nor does he even experience either Rosamond's or Lydgate's 
reactions to it. We are reminded in chapter 52 that Fred Vincy 
has reformed, "now returned from Omnibus College with his 
bachelor's degree" (375); but the narrative picks up Fred only 
in Middlemarch, where the events of his life overlap with those 
of the other characters in the novel. Dorothea paces the 
"virtual tomb" of Lowick in despair: "It was Sunday, and she 
could not have the carriage to go to Celia's, who had lately had 
a baby" (348); this is the only description of that event, which 
for Celia herself is a "central poising force" (359). The decen­
tralized web of Eliot's plot underscores her belief that one de­
cisively central psychic event is inseparable from a multitude 
of everyday external occurrences; each part, every individ­
uated, heterogeneous drama, is subsumed into a larger whole, 
Middlemarch—and Middlemarch. 
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Has George Eliot, finally, made it whole? She begins the 
"Finale" of her novel with the admission that she has not: 
"Every limit is a beginning as well as an ending. Who can quit 
young lives after being long in company with them, and not 
desire to know what befell them in their after-years? For the 
fragment of a life, however typical, is not the sample of an even 
web" (607). Just as George Eliot plays with polarities by open­
ing her novel with happy endings and closing it with new be­
ginnings, so the form of Middlemarch oscillates between 
wholeness and open-endedness: the exhaustively-documented 
known of the novel's narrative and the amorphous unknown 
beyond the space of its pages; that which can be predicted and 
analyzed in human nature and that which remains mysteri­
ously unknowable. Yet even as George Eliot admits to the lim­
itations of her fictional vision; which must, after all, restrict 
itself to a particular time and place, a suitable number of 
pages, etc.—"Every limit is a beginning as well as an end­
ing"—does she perhaps intend subliminally to remind the 
reader that omniscience is associated with divinity as well as 
with Victorian narrators? "I am Alpha and Omega, the begin­
ning and the ending, saith the Lord, which is, and which was, 
and which is to come" (Revelation 1:8); in my beginning is my 
ending. The novelist's sphere may only be a faint type of God's 
vision of the great world itself; but the eye of the fictional cre­
ator is as close as mere mortals can come to Bacon's "true 
model of the world" as seen by the eye of the Creator. 
Let me return one final time to "Notes on Form in Art" and 
George Eliot's definition of "the highest example of Form": 
"The relation of multiplex interdependent parts to a whole 
which is in itself in the most varied & therefore the fullest re­
lation to other wholes." What I would emphasize here is that 
apparently even the "highest Form" or wholeness is nonethe­
less "[related] to other wholes"; each perfect whole is "rel­
atively [part] of a larger whole."4* Any aspiration in Middle-
march toward an all-encompassing and self-contained whole­
ness is finally as much an illusion as that of the individual lit­
tle suns in the pier glass. 
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But such illusions are the inescapable lot of mortal vision. 
And however inadequate they are to be cherished and com­
mended, for they represent man's aspiration toward the tran­
scendent, his momentary glimpses of the Unknowable. This 
passage from Felix Holt illuminates Middlemarch as well: 
For what we call illusions are often, in truth, a wider vision of past 
and present realities—a willing movement of a man's soul with 
the larger sweep of the world's forces—a movement towards a 
more assured end than the chances of a single life. We see human 
heroism broken into units and say, this unit did little—might as 
well not have been. But in this way we might break up a great 
army into units; in this way we might break the sunlight into frag­
ments.11 
The narrator of Middlemarch takes the "little suns" of her 
characters' small visions and weaves these "fragments of a life" 
into the larger fictional web of Middlemarch. But the whole of 
Middlemarch is itself only a small part of a larger whole. 
George Eliot's own key to all mythologies can unlock only 
partial truths. The centre of illumination provided by the un­
common eye of the novelist is only the faint type of a perfect 
vision of the ultimate whole: 
Who shall tell what may be the effect of writing? . .  . As the stone 
which has been kicked by generations of clowns may come by cu­
rious little links of effect under the eyes of a scholar, through 
whose labours it may at last fix the date of invasions and unlock 
religions, so a bit of ink and paper which has long been an inno­
cent wrapping or stop-gap may at last be laid upon under the one 
pair of eyes which have knowledge enough to turn it into the 
opening of a catastrophe. To Uriel watching the progress of plan­
etary history from the Sun, the one result would be just as much 
of a coincidence as the other. [302] 
Uriel, you will remember, is Milton's "Regent of the Sun," 
"The sharpest-sighted Spirit of all in Heaven" (Paradise Lost, 
3:690-91). He is, quite literally, the eye of God: 
. . . one of the sev'n

Who in God's presence, nearest to his Throne

Stand ready at command, and are his Eyes
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That run through all the Heav'ns, or down to th' Earth 
Bear his swift errands over moist and dry, 
O'er Sea and Land. 
Paradise Lost, 3:648-53 
Uriel is a wonderful figure for the Victorian monist; he knows 
the unknowable, those things that, as Borthrop Trumbull 
said, "the understanding of man could hardly conceive; angels 
might, perhaps, but not men, sirs, not men" (443).15 In com­
parison to Uriel's vision, even the knowing eyes that can un­
lock the mystery of the written word (the Victorian novelist's?) 
are blind. 
But remember that one character in Middlemarch does, in 
fact, hear the angels sing: "Bless me! it reminds me of bits in 
the 'Messiah'—'and straightway there appeared a multitude of 
the heavenly host, praising God and saying;' it has a tone with 
it that satisfies your ear," Caleb Garth tells his wife. And ap­
propriately Caleb hears the angels' music in the "plain words" 
of Dorothea Brooke (402). It is the most misguided and unre­
liable characters in Middlemarch, the likes of Fred Vincy, who 
see the world from "an immeasurable depth of aerial perspec­
tive" (172). Farmer Garth is, quite literally, the closest to the 
earth of any character in Middlemarch. And so it should be. 
For in George Eliot's world, we catch glimpses of the transcen­
dent ideal through the mundane real. The final emphasis in 
any discussion of Middlemarch's narrator should rest not on 
her omniscience but on her common humanity; or rather, that 
common humanity as the source of any omniscience she might 
have. Eliot's narrator, like her characters, is ultimately more 
clown than angel. But in Middlemarch Uriel is of little inter­
est—it is Bulstrode or Rosamond or Casaubon who are to be 
the subject of this particular vision. 
Like all of her Victorian compatriots, George Eliot is a vi­
sionary who insists on remaining an empiricist. I conclude my 
discussion of Middlemarch with the opening paragraph of 
book 4, chapter 34. It is a perfect example, I think, of the whole 
in the part, Middlemarch in microcosm: 
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It was on a morning of May that Peter Featherstone was buried. In 
the prosaic neighbourhood of Middlemarch, May was not always 
warm and sunny, and on this particular morning a chill wind was 
blowing blossoms from the surrounding gardens on to the green 
mounds of Lowick churchyard. Swiftly-moving clouds only now 
and then allowed a gleam to light up any object, whether ugly or 
beautiful, that happened to be within its golden shower. In the 
churchyard the objects were remarkably various, for there was a 
little country crowd waiting to see the funeral. [236] 
Eliot's realism is resolutely "prosaic." This is the world of real 
weather, not vernal literary convention. It is a "particular 
morning," particularly described. Yet a "gleam" of visionary 
sunlight pierces the low-hanging clouds of this everyday view. 
It lights up "any object, whether ugly or beautiful." Eliot's 
creative vision penetrates to the poetry of the real. It illumi­
nates things as they are; but it does so by the light of the 
imagination. And they are, always, "remarkably various." Al­
though that visionary ray may suffuse everything in its path 
alike in a "golden shower," the "little country crowd" remains 
on terra firma, each unmistakably his quotidian self. 
1. Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar suggest that Eliot's intellectuality typifies 
her "need to evade identification with her own sex" (The Madwoman in the Attic 
[New Haven, 1979], p. 466). They dismiss Eliot's intellectual backgrounds: "As the 
token female in an intellectual circle that included such eminent thinkers as Spencer, 
Jowett, Froude, and Mazzini, Eliot might have suspected that . . . 'She was that most 
disagreeable of all monsters, a blue-stocking—a monster that can only exist in a mis­
erably false slate of society, in which a woman with but a smattering of learning of 
philosophy is classed along with singing mice and card playing pigs' (George Eliot 
to John Sibree Jr., George Eliot Letters, 1:245). Eliot, of course, had far more than a 
smattering of learning or philosophy. . . . But this could only serve to make her 
more freakish in her society" (p. 467). 
2. Eliot, Middlemarch, p. 441. Further references will be cited in parentheses in the 
text. 
3. Eliot, Middlemarch, p. 502; epigraph to chapter 68, from Daniel's Musophilus. 
4. George Henry Lewes, "Clever Women," Leader, 1 June 1850, p. 237. 
5. Willey, Nineteenth Century Studies, p. 260. 
6. Sidney Colvin, review of Middlemarch, Fortnightly Review 19 (1873), rpt. in 
George Eliot: The Critical Heritage, ed. David Carroll (New York, 1971), pp. 331-32. 
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7. George Eliot to Maria Lewes, George Eliot Letters, 1:29. 
8. For the contents of their libraries, see The George Eliot-George Henry Lewes 
Library: An Annotated Catalogue of Their Books at Dr. Williams' Library, London 
(New York, 1977); and The Libraries of George Eliot and George Henry Lewes, ed. 
William Baker (Victoria, B. C , Canada, 1981). In addition to Gerorge Eliot's 
"Middlemarch" Notebooks, ed. John Clark Pratt and Victor A. Neufeldt (Berkeley, 
1979), Joseph Wiesenfarth has edited A Writer's Notebook: 1854-1879 (Charlottesville, 
Va., 1981) that contains previously unpublished notes and never-reprinted essays, 
completing Pinney's earlier edition of the Essays. The gold-mine for the scholar re­
mains Gordon Haight's meticulously-edited nine volumes of The George Eliot Let­
ters. 
9. The earliest and still among the best work on Eliot's intellectual backgrounds is 
Basil Willey's chapter in Nineteenth Century Studies, emphasizing Eliot and the Bibli­
cal critics. Bernard Paris continues Willey's emphasis in Experiments in Life: George 
Eliot's Quest for Values (Detroit, 1965), which centers on Feuerbach and the "religion 
of humanity." U. C. Knoepflmacher's Religious Humanism and the Victorian Novel 
(Princeton, 1965) places Eliot within a larger Victorian context, again in the same vein 
as Willey and Paris. 
Less has been done on Eliot's scientific backgrounds. W. J. Harvey's classic essay on 
"Idea and Image in the Novels of George Eliot" (in Critical Essays on George Eliot, 
ed. Barbara Hardy [London, 1970]) provides a deft exploration of the Victorian notion 
that "we are the sum of our origins and development" (p. 153) as embodied in Eliot's 
fiction and within a contemporary context that includes Spencer, Chambers, Lewes, 
and Darwin. Studies like Robert Greenberg's "Plexuses and Ganglia: Scientific Allu­
sion in Middlemarch," Nineteenth Century Fiction 30 (1975), or Michael York Ma­
son's "Middlemarch and Science: Problems of Life and Mind," Review of English 
Studies 22 (1971): 151-72 have traced specific scientific allusions in the novel to some 
of their sources. George Levine is the best writer on the philosophical world-view be­
hind Eliot's interest in contemporary science; his "Determinism and Responsibility" 
compares Eliot and Mill (PMLA 77 (1962), rpt. in A Century of George Eliot Criti­
cism, ed. Gordon S. Haight [Boston, 1965]). Elizabeth Ermarth's "Incarnations: 
George Eliot's Conception of 'Undeviating Law'" {Nineteenth Century Fiction 29 
(1974-75):273-86) is a worthy successor to Levine on the same subject. Levine's superb 
recent essay, "George Eliot's Hypothesis of Reality," Nineteenth Century Fiction 35 
(1980): 1-28, compares Eliot's and Lewes's later thought. 
For essays on George Eliot and positivism, see chapter 1, note 63. 
10. George Eliot, "Janet's Repentance," Scenes of Clerical Life (1858: rpt. Har­
mondsworth, England, 1973), p. 364. 
11. See N. N. Feltes, "George Eliot and the Unified Sensibility," PMLA 79 
(1964): 130-36: "Middlemarch and George Eliot's other works and letters, express a 
view of the human personality in which wholeness is all, a view remarkably close to 
that expressed by G. H. Lewes in Problems of Life and Mind" (136). In Religious 
Humanism Knoepflmacher makes the point that "a majority of Victorians were to 
regard George Eliot as one who combined at least the 'essence' of the Church with the 
predominant 'spirit of science' " (p. 28). Middlemarch, says Knoepflmacher, "thrives 
on paradox. It is a mystic's rejection of religion and a rationalist's plea for irrational­
ity" (p. 114). 
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12. George Eliot to the Hon. Mr. Henry Frederick Ponsonby, George Eliot Letters, 
6:100. 
13. George Levine writes: "Although Middlemarch is concerned with the obstacles 
to the ideal and the limits of knowledge, its narrator is the altruistic scientist who 
perceives 'unapparent relations' and the continuities behind the discontinuities. 
Through all its questioning of history, narrative, and language, the book implies the 
continuous cosmos it is too wise to impose upon the common life of Middlemarch" 
("George Eliot's Hypothesis of Reality," p. 16). 
14. F. W. H. Meyers, "George Eliot," Century Magazine 23 (1881), quoted in 
Haight, George Eliot: A Biography, p. 450. 
15. For the purposes of this discussion, I shall treat "George Eliot" and the narrator 
of Middlemarch as one and the same; I also assume some contiguity between the views 
of the real Marian Evans and her fictional persona. 
16. Sir Humphry Davy (1778-1829) was a chemist who produced new theories of 
light and heat. His Elements of Agricultural Chemistry, which Sir James reads, was 
published in 1810. He gave a course of lectures on galvanism at the Royal Institution 
in 1801, and retained "electro-chemistry" as a lifelong interest. It is literally true that 
Davy was a poet-scientist, writing youthful poems such as "The Sons of Genius" be­
fore turning to the laboratory (see Dictionary of National Biography, 5:637). Coleridge 
said of him: "If he had not been the first chemist, he would have been the first poet of 
his age"; he attended Davy's scientific lectures "to increase his stock of metaphors." 
But Southey considered Davy a better scientist than poet: "He had all the elements of 
the poet; he only wanted the art" ("Sir Humphry Davy," Encyclopaedia Brittanica, 
1 lth ed. (New York, 1910), 7:871-73). 
17. George Henry Lewes, The Principles of Success in Literature (1865; rpt. Berke­
ley, Calif., 1901), p. 64. 
18. Note that Lydgate performs "galvanic experiments" (p. 112) in his search for 
"ultimate facts"; he is an "electro-biologist." As David Carroll writes: "Lydgate is pur­
suing the interaction of mind and matter to the apotheosis—the discovery of mind in 
matter—where their separateness will be resolved and paradise will eventually be re­
gained" ("Middlemarch and the Externality of Fact," in Ian Adam, ed., This Partic­
ular Web: Essays on "Middlemarch" [Toronto, 1975], p. 77). 
19. Ladislaw's poetic principles closely parallel Eliot's notion of "Romanticism, 
which has helped to fill some dull blanks with love and knowledge" (p. 140; my em­
phasis). Note also Eliot's use of the phrenological term organ. 
20. This theme can be found throughout Eliot's fiction; for example, in Adam Bede 
(1859): "All passion becomes strength when it has an outlet from the narrow limits of 
our personal lot in the labour of our right arm, the cunning of our right hand, or the 
still, creative activity of our thought" ([Boston, 1968], p. 180); and Daniel Deronda 
(1876): "For, look at it one way, all actions men put a bit of thought into are ideas— 
say, sowing seed, or making a canoe, or baking clay; and such ideas as these work 
themselves into life and go on growing with it, but they can't go apart from the ma­
terial that set them to work and makes a medium for them" ([Harmondsworth, Eng­
land, 1967], p. 583). 
21. Percy Shelley, Defense of Poetry, rpt. in English Romantic Writers, ed. David 
Perkins (New York, 1967), p. 1,087. Like Coleridge's Theory of Life, Shelley's Defense 
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was written in the romantic period (1821) and published in the Victorian age (1840). 
Much that Shelley says about poetry resonates with Ladislaw's character as poet-poli­
tician: "The most unfailing herald, companion, and follower of the awakening of a 
great people to work a beneficial change in opinion of institution, is poetry" (p. 
1,086). 
22. Barbara Hardy writes of Will, "He writes no more poems, and perhaps the 
reader knows why"; "Will's lyric is not only unaware of social links between its pas­
sionate moment and lower forms of variants, it is also unaware of the thickly peopled 
world. In this invariably social novel, we are perpetually reminded of the community" 
("Middlemarch and the Passions," in Adam, This Particular Web, pp. 19, 20). I 
would suggest that Will's "politics" become his "poetry," his incarnation of the ideal­
istic in the real. 
23. David Carroll writes that Eliot "acts out the dialectic of Lydgate's research 
where the energy of the mind bathes the unintelligible evidence in its own ideally il­
luminated space" ("Middlemarch and the Externality of Fact," p. 86). George Levine 
compares Lydgate's research to the scientific work of Lewes and W. K. Clifford 
("George Eliot's Hypothesis of Reality," pp. 12-14). 
24. Eliot, The Mill on the Floss, p. 320. 
25. George Eliot, Felix Holt (1866; rpt. Harmondsworth, England, 1979), p. 320. 
26. George Eliot, Romola (1863; rpt. Harmondsworth, England, 1980), p. 97. 
27. Eliot, Daniel Deronda, p. 220. 
28. A number of critics have applied "Notes on Form in Art" to Middlemarch, but 
to disparate ends. Darrell Mansell reads the essay as evidence that Eliot "is more anx­
ious . . . than most Victorian novelists that her novels be considered as organic 
wholes" ("George Eliot's Conception of 'Form,'" Studies in English Literature 5 
[1965]:655); conversely, J. H. Miller finds that "against the notion of a work of art 
which is an organic unity . . . George Eliot opposes the concepts of a text made of 
differences and of human lives which have no unitary meaning. . . . George Eliot 
presents a view of artistic form as inorganic, acentered, and discontinuous" ("Nar­
rative and History," English Literary History 41 [1974]:468). 
29. Herbert Spencer, "Philosophy of Style," Westminster Review 58 (1852):247. 
"Heterogeneity" appears on the same page: "increasing heterogeneity in our modes of 
expression." Lewes's essay on "Goethe as a Man of Science" was in the same issue. 
30. George Eliot, "Poetry and Prose from the Notebook of an Eccentric," in Pinney, 
pp. 17-18. 
31. Martineau and Atkinson, Letters, p. 256. 
32. Martineau and Atkinson, Letters, p. 256. 
33. Lewes, "Materialism and Spiritualism," p. 713. 
34. Critics from Henry James onward have loved to talk about "parts" and 
"wholes" in Eliot's fiction. As James's Theodora says: "George Eliot's intentions are 
extremely complex. The mass is for each detail and each detail is for the mass" 
("Daniel Deronda: A Conversation," Atlantic Monthly [1876], rpt. in Carroll, Critical 
Heritage, p. 431). Excellent essays have been written on both the whole and the parts. 
Isobel Armstrong takes the larger view: "These generalizations exert an extraordinary 
pressure on the particular facts of the narrative. They place them, with a sort of mild 
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and tactful deliberation, sub specie aetcrnitatis" (" 'Middlemarch': A Note on George 
Eliot's 'Wisdom,' " in Hardy, Critical Essays, p. 129); conversely, Barbara Hardy pro­
vides a masterful dissection of the parts in "The Surface of the Novel: Chapter 30" (in 
"Middlemarch": Critical Approaches to the Novel [London, 1967]): "Looking hard at 
the part . . . brings out other aspects of organization—the local configurations of 
scene and chapter. . .  . I want to say that some parts are simple and not symbolic, 
but that other, larger units are more intricately and systematically organized than I 
had imagined" (p. 150). 
Brian Swan singles out the part/whole relationship as central to Eliot's notion of 
symbolic form: "one in which everything is related to everything without sacrificing 
its own quidditas, the actuality of its present existence" ("Middlemarch: Realism and 
Symbolic Form," English Literary History 39 [1972]:289). For Swan, Eliot is thus si­
multaneously "realistic" and "symbolic." 
35. Comte, Cours, in Lenzer, pp. 270-71. In his study of Comte, Lewes paraphrases 
this same passage almost verbatim (see Comte, p. 263). 
36. Spencer, Social Statics, p. 497. 
37. This notion is a staple of Middlemarch criticism. Gillian Beer writes: "The typ­
ical concern of the intellectual characters of the book is with visions of unity, but a 
unity which seeks to resolve the extraordinary diversities of the world back into a sin­
gle answer"; but they are wrong: "any single interpretation of experience will mis­
lead" ("Myth and the Single Consciousness: Middlemarch and 'The Lifted Veil," in 
Adam, This Particular Web, pp. 102, 111). Similarly, W. J. Harvey: "We know that 
George Eliot was generally suspicious of anything in the nature of a key to the mean­
ing of life" ("The Intellectual Background of the Novel," in Hardy, "Middlemarch": 
Critical Approaches, p. 35). George Levine agrees: "George Eliot . . . had discarded 
the many religious and epistemological assumptions of her inherited culture, includ­
ing the convention that a single unitary theory of reality could certainly be estab­
lished" ("George Eliot's Hypothesis," p. 7). 
38. See N. N. Feltes, "George Eliot's 'Pier-Glass': The Development of a Meta­
phor," Modern Philology 67 (1969):69-71. It is now almost taken for granted that the 
philosopher is Spencer, although Feltes's actual evidence for the identification is less 
than decisive, consisting of a faint parallel between the pier glass and a metaphor 
about the effect of moonlight on water that Spencer used in the Study of Sociology. 
Hilda M. Hulme suggests that the philosopher may be Lewes himself, and quotes 
Lewes's use of a mirror image from Bacon's Novum Organum in his 1843 essay on 
Spinoza ("The Language of the Novel: Imagery," in Hardy, "Middlemarch": Critical 
Approaches, p. 123). Clearly, Eliot had many models from which to choose. The phi­
losopher may well personify any Victorian synthesizer, rather than a particular indi­
vidual. 
39. Miller, "Narrative and History," pp. 464, 470. 
40. Lewes, Problems of Life and Mind, Foundations of a Creed, 1:163. Levine's 
essay "George Eliot's Hypothesis of Reality" contains a timely defense against decon­
structionist readings: "Our subversive readings tend to neglect the primary object to 
which these self-conscious deconstructions of our common-sense traditions of order 
and narrative are preliminary: the reconstruction of meaning and order that is Lewes's 
objective as well" (p. 6; see pp. 5-6). 
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41. Eliot, "Notes on Form," in Pinney, p. 432; my emphasis. 
42. See also pp. 165, 205, 224, 250, 284, 301, 321, 375, 382, and 430. Hardy argues 
that Middlemanh's "shifting point of view is the structural equivalent for its theme 
of illusion, and the insistent rotation . . . puts each illusion in its place amongst the 
rest and lets the contradictions stand" (The Novels of George Eliot [1959; rev. ed. Lon­
don, 1963], p. 96). 
43. Eliot, "Notes on Form," in Pinney, pp. 433, 432. 
44. Eliot, Felix Holt, pp. 276-77. 
45. George Levine also sees Uriel as the personification of transcendent vision: 
"The novel is not an intuition embracing the universe but an intuition that, to 'Uriel,' 
what we take as discontinuous will be in fact continuous, that the invisible continuous 
cosmos is there, waiting for an all-embracing Uriel-like intuition" ("George Eliot's 
Hypothesis of Reality," p. 17). 
"A response to the mystery of things, together with the sense of awe and wonder that 
it produces, is one of the great human sanctities for George Eliot" (Harvey, "Idea and 
Image," in Hardy, Critical Essays, pp. 172-73): "She continued to feel a longing, if 
not for the transcendent, at least for the numinous, the incandescent, the mysterious" 
(Beer, "Myth and the Single Consciousness," in Adam, This Particular Web, p. 91). 
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